

104

# UNITED STATES POLICY AND ACTIVITIES IN HAITI

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Y 4. IN 8/16:H 12

United States Policy and Activities...

## HEARING

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

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FEBRUARY 24, 1995

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Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



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# UNITED STATES POLICY AND ACTIVITIES IN HAITI

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FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1995

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to other business, at 9:48 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The subject of today's hearing is Haiti, a tiny Caribbean nation where the United States has made an extraordinary investment of military resources, international credibility, and \$850 million in tax dollars.

The task before our committee is to assess whether the administration's strategy promises the best and most effective return on our investment. I would like to offer a few observations and recommendations that I hope would serve as a basis for a bipartisan, sustainable Haiti policy that, quite frankly, does not now exist.

I submit we cannot truly help nations by making them dependent on aid programs with short-term, short-lived benefits. Immediate incentives for the private sector are urgently needed to create sustainable jobs in Haiti and to meet high expectations among Haiti's desperate poor.

Many of our colleagues and I are disappointed that this key sector was virtually ignored in the initial U.S. emergency aid plans. Since the occupation, some new programs are being developed and will soon be announced.

We must also strengthen all of Haiti's democratic institutions so that democrats who struggled in vain for decades finally get the chance to rebuild their own nation. That, after all, is why President Clinton rushed to invade, occupy, and effectively run Haiti without seeking any congressional authorization.

Not all of Haiti's democrats serve in the executive branch or follow the Lavalas movement. To the extent that any Haitian perceives U.S. favoritism, the stated objective of institutionalizing democracy is undermined.

Regarding the elections, immediate steps should be taken to help ensure a level playing field and a secure environment leading up to parliamentary and presidential elections this year. I am pleased to note that the delegation of former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell is in Haiti this very day pursuing this and other issues.

Regarding the professionalism of Haiti's new security force, its leaders and members should be chosen based on merit alone, not

loyalty to any particular political movement. It should also meet at least minimal human rights standards.

I encourage the administration's efforts to ensure the integrity of these programs and will continue to monitor those developments closely. These are just a few key issues that I hope our witnesses will be able to address this morning. Progress in these areas will be scrutinized as Congress evaluates the soundness of a sustainable Haiti policy.

We are pleased that we have several Congressional witnesses this morning. Our first witnesses are Congressman Charles Rangel of New York and Congressman Pote Goss, two of the most knowledgeable Members of Congress on the issue of Haiti. We are pleased to welcome them this morning. We invite you to make brief statements and submit any written statements for the record, but before proceeding, I would like to recognize our ranking minority member, Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have no statement, I would just welcome Mr. Rangel to the committee this morning. We are delighted to have you with us, Charlie, and likewise Porter Goss, although I don't see him at the moment. We look forward to your testimony.

Chairman GILMAN. Before allowing our witnesses to proceed, are there any opening comments that any of our members would like to make?

If not, Mr. Rangel, please proceed.

#### **STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES RANGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK**

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, I would like permission to submit my testimony and just highlight my thoughts.

Assuming that permission is granted, I want to thank you, Mr. Gilman and Mr. Hamilton for the sensitivity that you have shared over the years, but more particularly the last few years with regard to this fragile country.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rangel, could we ask you to move the mike a little closer to you. It is voice activated.

Mr. RANGEL. Ever since I can remember, Haiti was always described as a beautiful country but the poverty was so devastating that people just did not want to leave their hotel or leave the beaches to even see it. For a variety of political reasons, dictatorships have just sapped the blood out of this country; Yet dramatically, when given an opportunity to vote for democracy, I can think of no time in recent history, where people actually were killed; and they still came out to vote even though the military was doing all that they could to stop that vote.

Finally one of our Ambassadors decided that he was going to convince the military that it was in the best interest of Haiti to allow the elections; while it was true that the United States had a different candidate, President Aristide received the overwhelming support of the people in Haiti. I don't think that that set politically well within our State Department, but nevertheless he had to be supported and to a certain degree he was.

For whatever reason, the military took over that country, and we saw a reign of absolute terror. To my surprise, there was substan-



tial support for the military regime right within our own State Department; but because of you, Mr. Gilman and Mr. Hamilton, other Members of Congress, including the members of the Congressional Black Caucus, we knew that we could not tolerate in this hemisphere seeing democracy overturned by ambitious military leaders.

I got the impression that it wasn't just Haiti we were talking about, we were talking about the reputation of the United States of America where President Bush and President Clinton had indicated that we would not tolerate that in this hemisphere. Even though there was very little political support for the use of the military in Haiti to restore Aristide and democracy, President Clinton exercised extraordinary courage by doing this; it was one of the most successful excursions and intrusions into another country in terms of seeing democracy returned. I was pleased to see that Speaker Gingrich had spoken publicly about the success of this venture.

I cannot think of a more proud day that I felt as an American than when I had the deep honor and high privilege to return to Haiti with President Aristide. I witnessed the unharnessed love and emotion extended to those who alit from the plane saying United States of America. I saw the love and deep appreciation the Haitian people extended to our courageous military forces, who too felt so proud that they played a part in the restoration of democracy to Haiti.

I have talked with the new Prime Minister, and it is just unbelievable the talent that exists in Haiti. This talent is rarely acknowledged because we only have the media to share with us the many bright people and leaders that we do have in this country.

I have spoken with businesspeople and well over half of those that were in Haiti before the coup have started back into business. I think one of the greatest things that has happened, and I think Congressman Torricelli certainly has had more experience in these international matters than I, was to see the CARICOM nations come together on anything in support of Haiti, to see the Organization of American States actually make an appeal to the United Nations for help; and to see the United Nations going in with the United States to lead the course in attempting to resolve this very sensitive question.

I think Haiti is coming back. I think all of the nations of the world are cooperating under our leadership and investing so that we can see our roads, infrastructure, and businesses restored, because the name of the game, of course, is the economic recovery. No democracy can survive with the people not working. But I think that this committee should be proud of itself for the work that its leadership has done in knowing that in our lifetime we can say that we actually witnessed and was a part of restoring a President to his country and to see that the support that was promised was actually given. We hope to soon return to Haiti, under the leadership of Chairman Gilman, as the President and the people of Haiti have invited us to formally thank us for actually bringing liberty back to them.

And so, distinguished members of this committee, I thank you for what has been done; but I would also like to remind all of us that we have some very sensitive days in front of us. I hope that we will

all be able to find some way to put our differences of how best to have approached this problem behind us and to have the U.S. Congress and our President clearly on the record in supporting this fragile country in returning to some type of economic independence.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rangel appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rangel, we thank you for your comments.

We know you have been spending a great deal of your time and efforts in the Congress in support of the Aristide regime and to try to put Haiti back on its feet.

Do you have any major recommendation that you would like this committee to explore with regard to trying to enhance the future of Haiti?

Mr. RANGEL. Yes. I don't understand why there seems to be a division between reports done by the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department. Over the last several years it was as though I was working with two different governments, and I don't know whether this has stopped or not.

There have been reports that have been given by the CIA that has portrayed President Aristide in such a way that anyone just reading those reports would have the man committed, indicted, and sent away; yet the State Department would say that they have checked out everything, and they have convinced the President that this doesn't exist.

I don't know how this can happen in our country because I have talked with the people in the CIA, and they said their opinions haven't changed. True, they haven't got any facts, but that is not their job to be accurate. All they do is gather information and disperse it. I don't think the time is right to have these allegations made public when they are not based on fact; and I don't really think that we have heard enough from the Congress in a positive way saying, "If you can't prove it, don't say it." Certainly not the CIA.

I hope that we could do this in such a way that it doesn't cause any embarrassment to our Government. I think you know exactly the reports that I am talking about.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rangel.

I would like to ask Mr. Goss, who we are pleased to have before us, would you care to do your statement now or would you want to vote first and come back and do the statement? Whichever you prefer.

Mr. GOSS. Whichever the chairman prefers, of course.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, we want to accommodate you.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, in that case, may I submit my full statement for the record at this time and make a few brief remarks.

Chairman GILMAN. We will be pleased to accept it. Why don't you proceed, Mr. Goss.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. PORTER GOSS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. GOSS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement, and I am going to go beyond it because in addition to that, I have just read the report again.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Goss, will you put the mike closer to you.

Mr. GOSS. I will be happy to. Is that a little better?

I have just had a chance to read the February 8 report, quarterly report, and I feel that a serious number of questions have been raised by that report. It is somewhat retrospective in reporting what has happened, and to quote it, it says, "This report documents the success of our operation in Haiti to date."

As a good American, I am delighted we have had some success, and I agree we have, but as a good American with oversight responsibility, I would suggest it is not all a record of success and the report does leave some very clear questions on matters that I would consider not to be too successful so far.

The report goes on to say that "we have restored the legitimate democratically elected government of Haiti to power." It is that type of delusion that is causing us a problem. We have just had an exchange on that here. We are focusing on Aristide. Aristide is not the Government of Haiti. Aristide is part of the Government of Haiti. We have a serious problem with the parliament, getting a parliamentary election taken care of there, and I am afraid that what has happened is there has been so much time focused on the debate over Aristide and getting him off the dole in the United States and back into Haiti and getting him back in power as President, as the duly elected and popularly elected President by 70 percent of the people, which is a wonderful accomplishment, but it is not the end game of what we are trying to achieve in Haiti.

When I went through this report, I found a number of problems that really derive from that. They go to the actual costs of this program, which are extremely high, and are going to continue for some period of time. I am not sure we are entirely on focus in the way we are delivering our aid. There are immense aid packages that any Congressman or woman would be delighted to have coming into their districts, great efforts being done to rev up the economy, and that is a wonderful thing.

I am not so sure it isn't being done at the wrong level. The people I am talking to at the bottom level, the people who are in the front lines of commerce, are not experiencing the same kinds of success as is being reported in this document, and I think we need to refocus our ideas there.

Talking to the parliamentarians and others there—and I will close with this comment—I find that there is a very deep concern that the U.S. program there, as good as it is, is very much biased toward a pro-Lavalas side, and that is causing many of the others who are participating in democracy there to have concern and to have worry that we in fact are not going to achieve the stability and security and the opportunity for economic investment that we are all hoping for and frankly spending an awful lot of money on right now.

Mr. Chairman, I hope I would be able to come back and pursue some further questions on this with some of your other witnesses if possible.

Chairman GILMAN. We would welcome that.

Mr. GOSS. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goss appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rangel, will you be able to return?

Mr. RANGEL. Yes, but I would like to say, as I indicated before Mr. Goss got here, that it was abundantly clear that the United States of America unfortunately was backing a candidate in the last election other than Mr. Aristide. I would hope that in the next election that we just mind our own business and let the people of Haiti decide who their President should be.

Mr. GOSS. May I respond to that briefly, and just simply say the next election is a parliamentary election, and we want to make certain that it has an across-the-board pluralistic atmosphere to it. I would agree we should not be backing a presidential candidate, but we should be backing democracy, and if we just back the pro-Lavalas side, we are not doing that.

Chairman GILMAN. If both our panelists are willing to return, we will stand in recess until the vote is over.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. Chairman Gilman had to go to a leadership meeting, and he has asked me to chair this hearing until his return.

Due to time constraints, we are going to go ahead with the second panel because Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott I understand has to leave by noon.

Is that correct, Mr. Talbott?

Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LANTOS. Will you indulge me for a moment?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LANTOS. I thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, even though these are turbulent times, there is a touch of civility and compassion left in this body, and I would like to ask you on behalf of all of us to carry to Secretary Christopher our warmest wishes for his speedy recovery. I have a card which I will pass around in the firm knowledge that all Republicans and Democrats will sign it. This will not be one of those cases where we wish him well by a vote of 6 to 5. We publicly want to acknowledge his enormous contributions to the foreign policy, the national security of this Nation, and we hope he will return in full strength very soon.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. I concur in that and I am sure everybody on the Republican side as well.

Our administration witnesses this morning are Mr. Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, and Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. We received your written statements which we will make a part of the record, and we invite you to be brief in your opening remarks to allow ample opportunity for Members' questions.

We also understand that along with Mr. Talbott we have Mr. David Rothkopf of the Commerce Department, who heads the Haiti Economic Development Working Group, who may be available to answer questions, along with Mr. Mark Schneider, USAID Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean, and a pretty nice fellow.

Mr. TALBOTT.

**STATEMENT OF HON. STROBE TALBOTT, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE**

Mr. TALBOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I might add that I am also joined by Ambassador James Dobbins, who is the coordinator of our programs in Haiti, and I would hope that you might also extend your hospitality to him.

Mr. BURTON. We certainly do. I am sorry for that oversight. I didn't have his name on our list here. So, Mr. Ambassador, welcome.

Mr. TALBOTT. Before going to the matter at hand, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Lantos, and indeed all of you, for your collective sentiment, your good wishes to Secretary Christopher. As it happens, I spoke with Secretary Christopher by telephone a little over an hour ago. He is, as you know, in Ottawa, although he is returning to Washington today. He sounded fine. He sounded slightly annoyed at this development because he has a lot of important work to do. He is eager to get back both to Washington and to work, including the good work that he is doing with you and with this committee and with your colleagues in the Congress. But I will certainly convey your good wishes to him.

Under Secretary Slocombe and I welcome the chance to give you a progress report on the U.S.-led, 31-nation effort that has rescued a neighboring country from disaster, shored up stability in our region, and defended our Nation's values and interests. Operation Uphold Democracy has peacefully ousted Haiti's brutal dictators, restored its legitimate government, established a secure and stable environment and is now preparing to pass the baton to a U.N. force under a United States commander.

Had it not been for the deployment of the U.S.-led multinational force on September 19 last year, your committee might well be holding a very different sort of hearing today, a hearing to survey the damage sustained and the damage to come as a result of a crisis allowed to fester.

Think for a moment where we would likely be today had it not been for the intervention last September. The dictators would still be in power, and their campaign of murder and terror against the Haitian people would be continuing. Tens of thousands of Haitians would be seeking refuge abroad, posing a threat to America's borders and to regional stability. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard would still be diverting massive resources on an open-ended, if not permanent basis to manage migrant interdiction and refugee processing along our own coastline.

Instead, thanks to Operation Uphold Democracy, life in Haiti is generally secure today. The simple activities of everyday life, street vendors plying their wares, children going to school, and families attending church services have come alive again. Thousands of men, women, and children who were in hiding or in exile during the dark days of military rule, from members of Parliament to mayors to clergy to entrepreneurs, have resumed normal lives.

The flood of migrants from Haiti which hit a high of over 3,000 per day in July, last year has virtually stopped. When our troops arrived in Haiti there were an average of 10 to 15 serious incidents of organized political violence reported each week. Today there are virtually none.

Over 3,000 members of the interim public security force, trained and recruited by our multinational force, are now on the streets of Haiti and acting as public servants rather than as official thugs. The interim forces are monitored and assisted by more than 600 international police monitors, or IPM's, spread throughout the country. The IPM's are police officers recruited from more than 20 countries on 6 continents and they are under the leadership of former New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly.

As for the Haitian Armed Forces, we are ready to work with the Haitian Government officials to make sure that the process of demobilization, however far it may go, takes place in an orderly and equitable fashion, consistent with President Aristide's emphasis on reconciliation. To that end, more than 2,000 former soldiers have been enrolled in a program of counseling and job training funded by USAID.

Mr. Chairman, one measure of the security of the situation in Haiti is the pace with which we are moving to turn the multinational forces responsibilities over to the U.N. mission. I am pleased to report that we are on schedule.

The U.N. force in Haiti will take over on March 31. It will be commanded by an American, Maj. Gen. Joseph Kinzer, and include about 2,400 American troops as part of a total force of 6,000. The United Nations will assume the costs for the American and international forces and the international police, costs that the United States has been paying up until now.

Mr. Chairman, from the beginning our primary goal has been to promote the process of democracy. Here, too, we are on schedule. We are working with the U.N. mission and the Organization of American States to ensure that the June legislative and local elections, as well as the Presidential elections in December, are as open and fair as possible.

With this objective in mind, the responsibilities of the U.N. mission will end by February 1996 with the inauguration of President Aristide's democratically elected successor. However, we all know that no matter how successful the Haitian people are at establishing a secure environment or building democratic institutions, stability will allude them without strong, steady, broad-based economic growth.

For its part, the international community is doing its share by funding programs that provide temporary jobs as well as emergency food and medical care, that strengthen key democratic and legal institutions and that spur economic growth.

At a meeting in Paris last month, international donors pledged \$1.2 billion. Non-American donors and lenders will provide over 75 percent of these funds, making this from an American standpoint the most successful instance of burden sharing in the history of the hemisphere. This demonstrates that American leadership can leverage tremendous power and resources on behalf of a common good.

Haiti's real economic future, however, lies in the private sector. That is why President Aristide has committed his government to far-reaching programs of free market reform.

On March 7-8, I will lead a delegation of several dozen corporate CEO's to Haiti to explore ways to spur private investment. I am

pleased that Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney will be accompanying us on that mission. So, too, will Peter Johnson, Executive Director of Caribbean and Latin American Action, who will be addressing your committee later this morning.

We are also organizing nearly a dozen sector-specific business missions to Haiti, bringing more than 200 United States business executives in direct contact with Haitian businesses and Government decisionmakers. In view of the significant overhaul needed for Haiti's infrastructure and manufacturing sectors, these missions will concentrate on telecommunications, power generation, transportation, and the environment.

Mr. Chairman, our intervention in Haiti made sense for reasons of American self-interest. That includes our economic self-interest. Of course the operation has been costly, but these costs must be judged in context, and that means, among other things, against the costs we would have incurred had we continued with inaction.

Since September 19 the U.S. Government has spent about \$700 million on Operation Uphold Democracy, most of which are one-time-only costs, instead of continuing to pay some \$300 million a year for the costs of nonintervention. In Haiti we have made an investment that protects our borders, that has helped consolidate democracy in our hemisphere and that will help Haiti become a good neighbor and stable partner in diplomacy and trade. Our intervention also does justice to America's core values and principles.

The best defense of our Haiti policy is simple. We intervened because it was in our national interest, we intervened after every other alternative had been exhausted, and we intervened because it was the right thing to do. We cannot say yet mission accomplished, but we can say so far so good.

Five months after President Clinton sent our troops to their country, Haitians are constructing roads to advance commerce and build a civil society rather than roads to escape terror. Now we must see the job through and that means until the completion of the U.N. mission 12 months from now.

Much of the credit that we have seen so far goes to Generals Shelton, Meade, and Fisher, to their officers, and to the troops under their command.

With that in mind, I would like to turn the microphone over to Under Secretary Slocombe who has some opening remarks of his own.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Talbott appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Slocombe.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, ACCOMPANIED BY MARK SCHNEIDER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, USAID**

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, like my colleague from the State Department, I appreciate the opportunity to be here to update the committee on developments in Haiti, particularly from the point of view of the role of the U.S. military. You have my prepared statement, and with your

permission I will summarize it, focusing particularly on the plans for the transition to the U.N. force.

The United States military forces entered Haiti, as you all know, on September 19, 1994, as part of a multinational force, authorized by U.N. Security Council resolution to use all necessary means to secure the departure of the coup leaders, to restore the legitimate democratically elected Government of Haiti, and to create a secure and stable environment that would allow the Haitian people to resume responsibility for building their own country.

After less than a month, the coup leaders departed, and President Aristide returned to Haiti to assume control of his Government. In the period before that transition, the U.S. military forces, with the participation of other countries, had begun the process of establishing their presence throughout the country to promote a more secure environment and to make it possible to create a context which was possible for international humanitarian assistance to flow freely.

Although we recognized from the outset that it was not feasible to attempt to search out every weapon in Haiti, the MNF has seized nearly 30,000 weapons of various categories, including grenades and explosives, as well as the entire very modest inventory of heavy weapons possessed by the former Haitian army.

Essential public services such as electric power have been restored in key areas, although there is still work to do in this area. The military has provided limited assistance to Haitian Government ministries by military civil affairs specialists whose role has been key in helping those ministries on the process of reestablishing functional governments. As conditions improved, it became possible to repatriate over 13,000 Haitians who had been at Guantanamo after fleeing Haiti under the military regime.

Throughout this process the problem of establishing a local public security force has been central. The Government of Haiti, with the assistance of the United States, has established an interim public security force of approximately 3,000 people who used to be in the Haitian Army, the FAd'H, who have been vetted, that is reviewed by both the Haitian authorities and the United States, and about 1,000 people who had been trained from among the refugees at Guantanamo.

With routine attrition there are now about 3,800 people in the IPSF. That is now the police force in Haiti. Their purpose is to provide a transitional police presence. They operate under the general supervision of something over 600 international police monitors. They will continue this function until the new civilian Haitian national police is trained.

That Haitian police is to be comprised of about 4,000 people. The first class has entered the police academy, which has been set up for the purpose of training them. In addition, about 250 former FAd'H have been assigned to a Presidential security detachment which is being trained to provide a personal security for the President of the country.

FAd'H personnel who failed the vetting process have been reassigned to nondefense ministries or offered 6-month career transitional training with pay under a contract program administered by



the USAID. Thus far, 2,000 screened out FAd'H members have signed up for the training.

The new Haitian national police will be deployed incrementally over the next 18 months. The first class entered training at the first of this month with a similar number to begin training each month until the force is fully staffed. The IPSF, that is the interim police force, will be incrementally retired as the new national police force takes over.

The accomplishments of the U.S. military are, I think, a subject of which we can all be proud. They are accomplishments in a novel environment and with a need to make literally within hours a shift from a forcible entry to an entry pursuant to an agreement but into a potentially hostile atmosphere, and their work since that time has been a tribute to the professionalism and dedication of our Armed Forces. The military has acted decisively, responsibly, humanely, and effectively in a difficult and complex mission.

Though U.S. forces lead this mission, high appreciation and similar acknowledgment should go to the other 27 nations whose contributions have made Operation Uphold Democracy a model for international cooperation. We believe that same spirit of cooperation will continue as we transition from the multinational force to the U.N. so-called UNMIH mission.

This transition has always been planned to take place at about this timeframe, and on January 30 U.N. Security Council passed a resolution which in effect recognizes that the MNF sent to Haiti has accomplished its tasks and it is now appropriate to transition responsibilities to the U.N. mission in Haiti.

The U.N. Security Council resolution passed at the end of last month specifies that this transition is to be completed by March 31, and we have every expectation that that will, in fact, be the date.

Much remains to be done in Haiti, particularly as Secretary Talbott's statement made clear on the economic front, but the military role is largely completed, although there will be a continuing need for military presence. The security environment throughout the country, although far from perfect, continues to improve.

Common criminal activity and Haitian on Haitian violence continues, but reported incidents are declining. The tragic incident with the American soldier killed at the toll booth sometime ago indicates that an operation like this is never without risk, but we know of no organized group capable of seriously threatening the Haitian Government or the international presence, including the American forces.

Nevertheless, the MNF security posture remains alert and prepared to respond as necessary while preparations continue to transition responsibilities to the U.N. mission in Haiti. For several months we have been consulting with the U.N. to determine how the United States can best contribute to the UNMIH mission and to promote continued recovery of Haiti's democratic institutions.

While there are still a few details to be concluded, I can provide a general outline of how that force will operate. The force will be authorized 6,000 troops. The United States is prepared to contribute approximately 2,500. About a dozen other countries are expected to provide the remaining 3,500 forces. Most of these are already a part of the MNF and will continue their participation in

the UNMIH and a schedule has been established for the rest to arrive.

We are very close to final agreement on the force structure for UNMIH. The U.S. forces will comprise less than half the total, but they will represent critical capabilities.

In addition to providing the force commander, the members of the headquarters staff, we expect to contribute a number of specialized forces such as medical, engineers, transportation, military police, civil affairs, special forces, aviation, and logistics.

In addition, there will be a contingent of combat units for a quick reaction force. The largest single portion of our contribution to UNMIH will be special forces units for training and coalition support, and a reaction force built around approximately just under 1,000 people, about 700 people in the quick reaction force.

Let me explain what the command structure will be. The U.N. Mission in Haiti force commander will be an American officer. Maj. Gen. Joseph Kinzer from the U.S. Army has been named as the commander for U.N. forces in Haiti. He will also be the designated commander of United States forces in Haiti.

As the UNMIH force commander, General Kinzer will make all the decisions involving UNMIH military operations. The U.N. Secretary General will, through a representative in Haiti, provide political direction and guidance.

All U.S. forces assigned to UNMIH will be under the operational control of General Kinzer. As United States force commander in Haiti, he will remain under the command of the Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command, General Sheehan, and will report directly to him. Thus, the chain of command from the President to the lowest United States commander on the ground in Haiti will remain unbroken.

General Kinzer will also have a United States Army Brigadier General who will serve as his deputy commander of the U.S. forces in Haiti. The deputy will carry out the day-to-day management of the United States contingent for General Kinzer.

It is also worth making the point that we have a clearly defined end date for our participation in UNMIH. In accordance with the relevant U.N. resolutions, UNMIH's mandate will end on February 1996. This will be, as Secretary Talbott said, after Haiti's December 1995 Presidential election, and the inauguration of President Aristide's democratically elected successor.

Because I know it will be of concern to the Congress, let me outline a few basic points about the facts about the costs. The incremental costs for United States participation in operations in Haiti is projected to be out of defense resources \$416 million in fiscal year 1995. This funds U.S. participation in the multinational force on the transition to the U.N. funded operation.

The fiscal year 1994 costs, that is for the year ending October 1 last year, were about \$200 million for Operation Uphold Democracy and \$174 million for maritime interdiction of Haiti and the subsequent care, housing, and feeding of Haitian migrants at Guantanamo Bay.

The proposed DOD supplemental which is now before the Congress, which covers operations in Haiti, among others, is crucial to maintaining current levels of training and readiness for our mili-

tary services. This year's shortfall, if not corrected in a timely manner, will have serious results on readiness.

Let me conclude by saying that the way in which the MNF mission has been planned and executed has incorporated many of the lessons learned in past operations, both under U.N. auspices and the operation in Panama. Similarly, as we assume a role in UNMIH, we intend to apply the same lessons.

We are now entering a new phase of the task we undertook in September of last year. This mission under the U.N. and the United States role in it will be somewhat different, but our focus on ensuring a stable and secure environment that will give Haiti the clear opportunity to revive its economy and rebuild its institutions of government will remain clear.

I should make the point also that one thing will not change. U.S. forces and all the other forces in the country will have the full authority to take whatever actions are necessary for their own self-defense as they carry out their missions.

I am confident that the success achieved in the past months will continue in the weeks and months ahead as we proceed with the transition of responsibilities. This is a difficult and challenging task both for military and for the civilians, for the Americans there, and for third country people, most of all for the people of Haiti. We are well on our way toward a significant accomplishment.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Slocombe appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Slocombe, Mr. Talbott.

I was in Haiti last Friday. The picture that you paint isn't exactly what I saw.

I first of all want to say that General Shelton, General Meade, General Kinzer are all doing extraordinarily good jobs. The military down there, every American ought to be proud of what they are doing, but it is an extremely difficult situation for all of them.

I understand from Mr. Goss's testimony it is going to be about \$1.2 billion that will have been expended by February 1996, and in your comments you said that a lot of that is going to end very quickly because we are going to be turning that over to the United Nations.

According to information that I received, in 1993 we spent—we paid for 40 percent plus of U.N. peacekeeping operations, and in 1994 it was close to 80 percent, including all of the expenditures that we paid for through the United Nations.

So saying it is going to be turned over to the United Nations is kind of misleading because we are paying most of the freight for these U.N. peacekeeping missions, even if we do turn that over to someone else.

What I saw when I was down there was that there is a need for some kind of a generation plant or generation plants, electrical generation plants, because large parts of the country in Port-au-Prince are without electricity for long periods of time. There is garbage everywhere.

One of the enlisted men that I met with privately told me that I should go visit the national prison in Port-au-Prince. They tried

to dissuade me from going, but I insisted, along with my delegation.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I have been there. It is appalling.

Mr. BURTON. I went into that prison and found that there had been one cell where 500 prisoners had been housed for 6 months standing in 6 inches of excrement, and that some of their feet became gangrenous and they had to be amputated and many of them suffer from hepatitis and other diseases.

That has since been cleaned up in large part by our troops, but I also witnessed a wall about 30 feet high that had excrement, garbage, and everything else hanging from it down at an angle of about 30 or 40 feet. And our troops, one sergeant in particular had been put in charge of cleaning that mess up, and I want to tell you, he is doing yeoman's service for the people of Haiti and his country, and fortunately he had some prisoners that were helping him. But our troops are doing some real extraordinary work down there, and I wish every American could see what I saw as far as their work is concerned.

My major concern is that we are pouring all of this money into that country, and unless there is a marked change in the way the roads are being handled, American industry and other industries around this country aren't going to want to go in there because they can't function because you can't get through the two main arteries of Port-au-Prince. It is bumper to bumper. We had a police escort and we still had to wait for about 10 minutes in several parts of that city. So it seems to me that that is one of the things, along with the port, that have to be dealt with.

When I talked to the AID Director down there, we asked him about his attempts to get the private sector of this country and other countries in there to take up the slack so that the American taxpayer doesn't have to pay the whole freight. His answer to me was pretty much that they had been hiring people to clean up the garbage and the mess there, several hundred people, but he didn't indicate to me there had been any appreciable direction or movement in the direction of getting the private sector involved.

I want to say to Mr. Talbott I am very happy that you are going down there with a delegation of businessmen to try to get them interested in getting that economy moving, but at the present time it is an absolute shambles, and I am very concerned about the way we are going about it. I would rather get the private sector involved, as one Member of Congress, rather than have the American taxpayer pay the freight for what appears to be an endless amount of expenses down there.

Now, I had the opportunity at the request of President Aristide because he had not yet entertained a Republican delegation, and he was anxious to meet with somebody from the majority, so I did go over to meet with him with our delegation, and I was concerned about some of the things that had been brought to my attention prior to our meeting. One, that Mr. Aristide still has people like Mr. Cherubin in his inner circle.

Mr. Cherubin, you will recall, was kind of a butcher in Mr. Aristide's administration and was responsible for many human rights violations, and alleged murders. Mr. Cherubin is still an adviser to Mr. Aristide, although Mr. Aristide told the Ambassador

who accompanied us after I left that he was going to make a change.

I would strongly urge the State Department, Mr. Talbott and Mr. Slocombe, to insist that the people who were perpetrating these human rights violations in the Aristide administration before he left the country be replaced because if those people are still in power or advising Aristide, I am very concerned about long-term human rights abuses.

I also talked to Mr. Aristide about the necklacing that he talked about in some of his speeches, and I was happy to hear that he is now going to try to reconcile the country and bring everybody together and stop these human rights abuses, and if that is the case, if he does do that, I think that will be something we can all applaud.

Now, regarding the national police, I met with Mr. Kelly, whom you refer to, and I think he is a perfect person to get that police force in order. The problem is, of the first 1,200 people that had been approved by the commission, the U.S. and Haitian commission, of the 1,200 people that had been approved to be members of that new police force, Mr. Aristide out of hand had dismissed all of them.

Now, we talked to him about that, and we understand that he has since relented and said he would accept about 800 of the 1,200. I think it is extremely important for our Government to make sure that the police force down there is not of one mind and one thinking process because what I am afraid that would lead to is more human rights abuses and violations.

So I would urge the administration and the Defense Department and State Department to make sure that the commission recommendations are observed and that there is a truly independent police force that is going to administer law and order and justice in a very fair way. I think that is about all I have to say.

I do have a couple quick questions, and I am sorry I didn't start my time, Mr. Hamilton, but I will try to conclude here pretty quickly.

Why wasn't jump starting the private sector, particularly the assembly sector, taken into account when USAID was designing its massive aid program over the last year or more? For example, the first formal mention of the enterprise development fund was in Paris on January 31, 3½ months after the occupation, and you might want to ask the USAID representative to comment on that.

I might say before he comments or before you respond that I was disappointed in the answers of the USAID person in charge when I was down there because his indications to me were not that we were trying to get private sectors involved but that we were going to continue to have U.S. Government carry the bulk of this economic solution. So that is my question. I will be happy to yield.

MR. TALBOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be appreciative if Mark Schneider would join us at the table.

Let me just say while he comes to the microphone, you shared with us several exhortations, and I can answer you very succinctly and I hope satisfactorily. The answer is yes. We, too, have had our concerns about Mr. Cherubin. We have raised them persistently and insistently with the Government of Haiti, and we are totally

confident that we are going to have a satisfactory resolution of that issue forthwith.

Also, we are satisfied that, after some wrinkles which you referred to, proper vetting of the interim public security force is now taking place and that it will indeed be the kind of broad-based organization that is consistent with President Aristide's own commitment to reconciliation, and also I might add the commitment of his Prime Minister Michel.

I don't know if you met with Prime Minister Michel when you were there. You may know if you did meet with him that there are representatives of six different Haitian political parties in his Cabinet.

Before turning the microphone over to Mr. Schneider, I would just point out that as for jump starting, as it were, the economy in the private sector, we had that very much in mind. Our priority and strategy is very much the same as yours, but of course job one was establishing a secure and stable environment. That had to take precedence over everything else.

That said, when several of us visited Haiti very early on after the intervention, and I went down there with Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch and Deputy National Security Advisor Burger, we made a point of meeting with representatives of the Haitian private sector in order to understand their needs and concerns so that we could factor that into our decisionmaking back here.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I could, I would like to go back to your point about Haiti's infrastructure and its importance in terms of permitting the private sector to want to return and reinvest in Haiti. At the beginning, we basically set ourselves a task of creating an environment that would induce the private sector to reinvest in Haiti. Then we looked at the steps necessary to get there. As you recall, Deputy Secretary Talbott testified that we have just secured pledges of some \$1.2 billion from a variety of international donors, in what is probably the most successful effort ever in that regard. And about \$187 million worth of those pledges from the World Bank, the IDB, and the European Union are specifically focused on transportation infrastructure. There are specific loans that will be used for road building, bridge construction, ports, and the network of facilities for the transportation sector. This is obviously crucial to the return of the private sector.

The second point I would make is that in order for the private sector to get the loans that it needs to operate, Haiti had to get back in the good graces of the international financial community. They were in arrears by some \$83 million to the World Bank, the IDB, and the IMF. We worked with Treasury in a very integrated, coordinated, fashion, and Treasury put together a collection of donors that helped Haiti clear those arrears and become eligible to receive the kinds of loans for infrastructure, roads, industry, et cetera, that will help spur the private sector recovery.

More directly, though, your point about the assembly sector is something that we have been working on. The Deputy Secretary is going to Haiti, as he said, in a week or so, and we are working with OPIC, to produce very quickly a loan guarantee program. OPIC has indicated they are ready to provide \$100 million over the next sev-

eral years, and a portion of that will begin to flow immediately, to be used to provide the kind of working capital that hopefully most of the private sector will use to come back in.

The head of the Haitian industrial association, John Baker—whom you may have met on your trip there and who has been named by President Aristide to head a Government private sector commission—indicated that about 32 of those firms have reopened their doors with a low level of employment at this point, about 5,000. He said, but he does expect that to increase, and we hope that the OPIC process will encourage that.

I should tell you that so far as USAID directly is concerned, when you go through the various elements of the private sector, we expect to be spending this year about \$9 million in different programs aimed at providing credit to small businesses, and direct support for the Mixed Commission led by John Baker looking at reform of the private sector, including the agricultural area.

I should add that since two-thirds of the Haitian labor force is in agriculture, spurring small farmers and agriculture production is one of the crucial issues in trying to get the private sector operating in that country.

One additional point I would like to make, Mr. Chairman, is that in our view we are now at a point where the private sector is beginning to look at ways in which they can reopen their doors quickly, and we are looking at ways that we can support them.

Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.

I am going to yield now to Mr. Hamilton. Before I do, let me just say one thing.

OPIC is going to loan, what, \$100 million or come up with \$100 million, but there is still a lot of concern that private banks will still be willing to go in there because there are other safer areas where they may want to go. So it is going to be very important that OPIC convince them that this is still going to be a safe investment environment.

You don't need to comment on that right now, so I will yield to Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I see our chairman has come in. Perhaps I should yield to him if he would like to proceed.

Chairman GILMAN [presiding]. No, no, go ahead.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your having these hearings. A couple of quick questions. You now believe that we have a stable and secure environment in Haiti?

Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, sir, and that view comes in the first instance from our military commanders there and has been endorsed of course by the international community.

Mr. HAMILTON. Does President Aristide fully support the timetables you have laid out for the United States and the United Nations to complete their responsibilities, the March 31 date and the February 1996 date?

Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, Congressman Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Fully supports that?

Mr. TALBOTT. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me tell you what worries me more about Haiti. I am much less worried about Haiti in the next year than I am what happens to Haiti when the United Nations pulls out.

One of our prominent journals yesterday accused you of timid globalism. These journalists come up with some great phrases, don't they, Mr. Talbott? The idea here is that our approach is too tentative, that we are trying to do too little, that we are going to get out too quickly, that as soon as the United Nations and the United States are out, the thugs and the military will come back in, and Haiti will be a mess within a short period of time.

That is my worry. How do you respond?

Mr. TALBOTT. Thus. First of all, I think it is worth recalling that there were some prophecies of doom earlier on as well. There were predictions that the intervention, regardless of whether it was in a permissive or a nonpermissive environment, would trigger violence, particularly Haitian-on-Haitian violence. There would be re-creation, vengeance, riots, necklacing, and the like.

The Haitian people have made clear, I think, in their response to Operation Uphold Democracy that they want and are prepared to take advantage of what it is that we, the United States, leading the international community, have given them, namely a chance to continue the work of building a democracy that was taken away from them with the coup.

What happens after February 1996, you are quite right to worry about, Mr. Hamilton, but the chances of things going well after February 1996 will depend in very large measure on how we use the year ahead of us now, namely to use the year ahead of us in the ways that we are outlining here, to make sure that there is an enduring, secure and stable environment, that there is a competent, professional, nonpartisan police force, security force that will be able to put in the hands of Haitians the maintenance of a secure and stable environment, that there are free and fair elections, that a new parliament comes in that is strong and vigorous, and that something is done about the economy, and we have already addressed that.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think all of those things can be accomplished in a year?

Mr. TALBOTT. I think we can make the necessary good start on which the Haitian people demonstrating what they have already demonstrated can then build.

Mr. HAMILTON. How do you define the U.N. mission? When you come to February 1996, what do you at that point expect to have accomplished?

Mr. TALBOTT. The principal goal of the U.N. mission in Haiti will be to maintain the secure and stable environment that now exists so that in such an environment the work that we are talking about in the area of politics and economics and the building of a civil society can go forward.

Also, the U.N. mission will continue the good work that has begun by the multinational force, Ray Kelly and the rest, to complete the transition from a dictatorial repressive military to a security force under civilian control.

Mr. HAMILTON. Are you reasonably confident that Haiti can accomplish these good things?



Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. After the United Nations pulls out?

Mr. TALBOTT. Yes. I have been down there now twice since the multinational force went in. While my trip, like Congressman Burton's trip, of course, opened my eyes wide to the immense problems, the horrible legacy of the past, the magnitude of the challenges they face, they were also basically encouraging.

Mr. HAMILTON. So, come February 1996 you would expect that you would have a secure and stable environment that would allow the Haitian people to assume responsibility for rebuilding their country?

Mr. TALBOTT. That is correct. I would also not only hope but expect that Haiti would have gone through what President Aristide himself said is the most important election with a new democracy, and that is the second election, that it will have a new President, it will have a functioning parliament, local governments, a judicial system which is another important part of the work that we are doing down there, a private sector that will be up and running to an extent that it is not now and an international community that is engaged and prepared to stay the course.

Mr. HAMILTON. And you would anticipate that they would have a functioning court system, a functioning parliament, and in addition to that secure environment, that there would be economic progress, I presume?

Mr. TALBOTT. You are of course—I am giving you affirmative answers, and I don't want to qualify those. I simply want to make sure that all of us consider the fact that utopian predictions would be nonsense in this case.

Haiti is far and away the poorest country in this hemisphere. It was for a very long time before this catastrophe of the coup in 1991 befell it, and the coup in 1991 set the economy even further back.

Congressman Burton provided some vivid images of what they have to cope with. Unemployment, particularly in the cities, is astronomical, but the Haitian people are proud, they have 200 years of experience of independence and having their own state, and now they have an international community that has joined to help them finally make it, and I think they can do so.

Mr. HAMILTON. When all of this washes out, what we will have really accomplished, is it not, is giving them an opportunity to proceed toward a democratic government and improve their economy and have a stable and secure environment?

Mr. TALBOTT. That is correct. If I could take advantage of what I think may be an implied invitation to refute a phrase that is sometimes used in connection with this kind of operation, we are not engaged in nation building in Haiti. First of all, Haiti was a nation before. It has been a nation since the early 19th century.

There is, however, a huge challenge of rebuilding that nation that is before the Haitian people themselves. They need, however, to have a democracy in order to do that, and they need to have the support of the international community and they now have both.

Mr. HAMILTON. And at the end of the day, of course, whether they succeed or not depends not on us but on them?

Mr. TALBOTT. Emphatically, and they know that, and they wouldn't want it any other way, and President Aristide, Prime Minister Michel are eloquent on that point.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

A few brief questions, then I will turn to our colleagues.

Mr. Talbott, what is the total cost of our operation? I note in your testimony that you indicated some costs for 1995 and some for 1994. What is the total costs to date that we have incurred with regard to this operation?

Mr. TALBOTT. If you will permit, Mr. Chairman, I will speak to the costs under the international affairs account and Under Secretary Slocombe will speak to the DOD costs. Is that appropriate?

Chairman GILMAN. Please.

Mr. TALBOTT. Actual obligations in fiscal 1994 were \$146.4 million. I should say, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy, of course, to provide you with a full breakdown on these costs, line items.

I can review those in summary orally now, but let me just give you the bottom-line numbers. Fiscal 1994 we are talking about the international affairs budget, actual obligations \$146.4 million, fiscal 1995, estimated obligations \$288.8 million, and for fiscal 1996 we have requested \$115 million. That is in economic support funds and Public Law 480.

Under Secretary Slocombe will speak to the defense costs.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. For fiscal year 1995, that is the current year.

Chairman GILMAN. Did we spend any in 1994?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I will do it in the other order. I was going to start with fiscal year 1995.

For fiscal year 1995 we expect that the incremental cost of United States participation in operations in Haiti will be \$416 million out of the defense budget. In addition, there will be costs which are projected for the care, housing, and feeding of Haitian—that is for the MNF and the U.S. participation in the UNMIH.

In addition, there will be costs for Haitian migrants at Guantanamo Naval Base which were originally projected at just under \$50 million. That may be somewhat lower because of the relatively early repatriation of the Haitians.

For fiscal year 1994, the costs for preparing Uphold Democracy and for the 2 weeks or so when it was carried out in fiscal year 1994 are \$201 million and the costs for the maritime interdiction force and migrant-related operations were \$174 million.

In addition, the Department of Defense expended \$126 million under the Food and Forage Act by the Army in fiscal year 1994.

So if my arithmetic is correct the total for Defense Department expenditures is \$967 million.

Chairman GILMAN. That is the overall expenditure from fiscal year 1994 through to the present time?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, through 1995, projected through 1995.

Chairman GILMAN. It is \$967 million.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Chairman GILMAN. And the total for State Department then is approximately?

Mr. TALBOTT. Four hundred and thirty-five point one.

Chairman GILMAN. It is \$435 million?

Mr. TALBOTT. Point one.

Mr. Chairman, I am advised by staff that Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Wendy Sherman provided the committee through you a detailed accounting in a letter of February 3 which I have just been given a copy of.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. I thank the chairman for yielding.

I want to make one point. I worry about these arbitrary deadlines. The task ahead of us and the United Nations for the next year to February 1996 is a very formidable task by anybody's definition, and it seems to me the better thing to do, rather than to say the United Nations is going to be out of there on a certain date, is to say that we are going to be there long enough to give them an opportunity to create a stable environment, and then we will get out.

I know the political pressures that operate on you are very strong here, some of them coming from this institution, but it just doesn't seem to me to be sound policy to say we are going to get out as of a certain date. That is the only point I want to make.

Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

I note then from the figures you gave us we have roughly expended about \$1.4 billion with regard to the Haitian initiative. Is that about correct, including both DOD and the international operations?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Chairman GILMAN. We are accurate on that?

Now can you tell us exactly how much are we paying third-party countries for their involvement in Haiti? Have we paid to train them, to equip them, to deploy them?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Chairman, it is a little hard to hear.

Chairman GILMAN. Are we making contributions to third countries who are involved in the Haitian operation and has that been included in your estimate of the total costs?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. On the part of the Defense Department, we provide certain support to other members of the multinational force. The Department of Defense is reimbursed by the State Department for that assistance, and we can—

Chairman GILMAN. Well, how much are you paying these third countries?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We can get you the exact amount. It is a relatively modest amount, but we can get you the exact amount for the record.

Chairman GILMAN. According to a December—

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The number I have is something like \$8 million in support of the MNF.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Slocombe, according to the President's report of December 31, 1994, your support for foreign forces were \$61 million. Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. This is "Annex A"? Yes. What we have—the numbers I have are for the Army 18, for the Air Force 4, and for State 40, so it would be \$61 million, yes, sir.

Chairman GILMAN. Do we actually pay their salaries while they are out there?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. What we pay, as I understand it, is an amount with the MNF, for some of the MNF countries equivalent to what the United Nations pays for peacekeeping forces, which is just under \$1,000 a person a month.

Chairman GILMAN. Would that take into account the increased number of U.N. people who will be coming in to take the place of our forces?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We won't pay it once it becomes a U.N. operation, the United Nations will pay it. We would pay a share of the U.N.—

Mr. BURTON. Will the chairman yield?

Chairman GILMAN. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BURTON. One of the things I found when I was down there, when I talked to our enlisted men they were very upset because the U.N. peacekeeping forces when they take over are going to get something like \$35 a day in salary, and that is what I understand these troops that you are talking about right now are getting, and our troops are getting much, much less than that, and yet they are doing the bulk of the work.

I think that that is something that should be looked into by our Government because they really resent, our troops who are doing yeoman's service down there, resent being paid so much less than these international forces who are coming in there under U.N. auspices who are being paid indirectly or directly by the U.S. Government at a higher rate than our soldiers are getting.

I would like for them to respond to that, Mr. Chairman, if they would.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, would you yield to me briefly on this point?

Chairman GILMAN. Yes. Can we first get a response to Mr. Burton's inquiry.

Mr. BEREUTER. I didn't know there was a question.

Chairman GILMAN. Could you respond to Mr. Burton's inquiry.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The money is paid to the countries involved. I have no reason to believe that the countries involved pass 100 percent of it through to the troops on the ground. It is intended to reimburse the countries for the costs of having the troops there.

If it is passed through by the countries in question, as I say, I would be surprised, because it is meant to be payment for the costs of the forces, and after March 31 United States will get it for its people who are there. We will not pass it through to the soldiers, they will continue to get their regular pay.

Mr. BURTON. I don't want to prolong this, Mr. Chairman, but if I could follow up very briefly.

Chairman GILMAN. But time is running.

Mr. BURTON. This is very important because the morale of our troops is at stake down there. I can tell you, they are very upset because they have been told that the U.N. peacekeeping forces are getting \$35 a day, which is much more than most of the enlisted men are getting.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. But, Mr. Burton, as I understand it, it is about \$1,000 a month, so it is about \$35 a day, but it doesn't go to the troops as individuals unless for some reason one of the governments chose to pay that. And I would be—obviously, to the coun-

tries involved, \$35 a day is a fortune. I would be very surprised if they are paying anything like that as supplemental pay for being in Haiti.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, would you yield, please.

Chairman GILMAN. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the Chairman.

My colleagues may remember this is the issue I brought up in the markup of H.R. 7. That is why the amendment that I offered on the floor, which was accepted by unanimous consent, attempts to direct our U.N. mission to examine this issue and come up with recommendations.

Some countries are basically getting a 1,000 percent markup on their troops, and believe it or not, surprise, it doesn't go to the troops' pocket, it goes to the treasury. But I am sure our troops believe that these troops are getting not \$3 a day but \$35, but it ought to be changed.

Thank you.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. But it is not intended simply to compensate for the salary costs, in any event.

Mr. PAYNE. Would the chairman yield?

Chairman GILMAN. I would be pleased to get into the order in which you have appeared. We have just got a report that U.N. sources informed us that for the U.N. operation in Haiti there will be a cap put on all procurement for American companies as a way of retaliating against our Nation for its insistence on naming a United States commander as head of the Haitian operations.

Are any of our panelists aware of any cap or limitation on United States companies competing for procurement opportunities for the troops in Haiti?

Mr. TALBOTT. No, sir, not aware of it. Could I ask Ambassador—

Chairman GILMAN. Could I ask our DOD panelist.

Mr. TALBOTT. And also Ambassador Dobbins who may have something.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am not aware of any such arrangement. What I am trying to confirm is I believe one of the major contractors is an American firm. I will consult with my aides.

Chairman GILMAN. Do we have any information? This comes to us from a U.N. source.

Mr. DOBBINS. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Would you identify yourself, please.

Mr. DOBBINS. I am sorry, my name is James Dobbins with the Department of State responsible for coordinating Haitian affairs.

I am sure that the United Nations has taken no steps in the form of a retaliation for naming an American commander to this operation. I know of no limitations whatsoever on American contractors in this operation. I do know that one of the main contractors that has been in discussion with the United Nations is an American company.

Chairman GILMAN. I would welcome if the panelists would provide us with any information following this hearing.

Now let me go back to our list. Mr. Hastings.

Mr. TALBOTT. Could I just say, could we maybe be in touch at the staff level to get more information on the assertion and the allegation. It will help us be responsive.

Chairman GILMAN. I would welcome it.

Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you so very much for your testimony, and let me make just one statement that in spite of the potential bear traps that may be in Haiti's future, the fact of the matter is that in my considered opinion the manner in which the United States Government through its administration has conducted the activity in Haiti is a spectacular success in terms of where we were as opposed to where we are today and where we likely will be after the UNMIH forces are transferred.

Strobe, I would like to just personally thank you for an outstanding job as well as Secretary Christopher and those at the Department of Defense that are deserving of praise as well.

I would like to ask you, Secretary Talbott, if you would agree with this statement that President Aristide, to his credit, has repeatedly counseled national reconciliation to his people and practiced that himself by reaching out repeatedly to the business community and to rival political parties.

Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. HASTINGS. Do you agree with that statement?

Mr. TALBOTT. I would.

Mr. HASTINGS. Let me ask you, Mr. Slocombe, because I am in South Florida and we continue to have our immigration problems, we are constantly concerned about the Haitians who are in Guantanamo as well as others who are there.

Are there children still in Guantanamo? And I direct my question to you because you mentioned the repatriation of Haitians. Are there still children in Guantanamo?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There are about 700 Haitians of all ages and descriptions in Guantanamo. They come under several categories. I know that one of the major categories and which amounts to several hundred is minors.

Mr. HASTINGS. Right. My understanding is that some of those minors are unattended and are without, you know, any direction as far as parenting is concerned in Haiti. However, according to various sources in Miami, there are potential sponsors for those children in the United States.

Do we have any plans to either repatriate the children or to bring them to the United States under appropriate sponsorship?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The responsibility for that, of course, lies with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and not with the Department of Defense.

Let me tell you what I know about the subject, but an authoritative answer would have to come from INS. Maybe Jim Dobbins, Ambassador Dobbins knows more about this than I do. Why don't you try.

Mr. DOBBINS. These unaccompanied minors cases are being reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine where they would receive the best care. Some of them have family in Haiti, some of them may not have family in Haiti, some of them may have rel-

atives or people prepared to care for them in the United States or in third countries. So the process is a case-by-case review of each one to determine where the child would receive the best care and based on that determination is made where to send them.

Mr. HASTINGS. Well, to the extent that my urging has any value, I would urge that those that can, move to expedite this matter as best we can. It is just an unfortunate situation, should not continue in the pattern that we are in.

Mr. Chairman, because of the interests of time, I will yield on any further questions.

Mr. BEREUTER [presiding]. Mr. Salmon.

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do have a couple questions. The first one I don't want to dwell a lot on, I think it can probably be answered succinctly, but my understanding of our vital national interests and military intervention in the first place was probably twofold: one, of course, the refugee issue; two, the issue of the humanitarian violations.

Can you expand on that for me? What other vital national interests were at stake?

Mr. TALBOTT. Haiti is, of course, a neighbor in the most literal sense. We share an ocean boundary with Haiti. When things go very, very badly for one of our neighbors, it affects our national interests in several ways, particularly if the catastrophe, the humanitarian and human rights catastrophe in a given case results in an outpouring of refugees, virtually all of whom want to come to the United States. It confronts us not only with a moral dilemma but also with a political and practical dilemma which we saw in extreme form last summer.

We also have a national interest in the continuing trend of democratization in this hemisphere. Haiti was a fledgling democracy when it had the election in December 1990 that produced President Aristide by an overwhelming majority. Haiti thus joined a trend which had swept through the hemisphere.

The reversal of democracy in Haiti was bad not only for Haiti but also, had it been allowed to stand, would have sent an ominous signal elsewhere in the hemisphere.

Mr. SALMON. Thank you.

I will leave it at that. I know that we were effective in restoring Aristide, but how effective were we in the real goal of restoring a true democracy in that country?

And the follow-up question to that would be, let's say hypothetically that 2 years down the road the democracy goes belly up and a dictatorship again is in power and economic improvements, free enterprise improvements that have been made to that point are completely wiped out. Are we going to then reconsider again military intervention, or do you have more thoughts? Have we learned anything from this time that maybe we could possibly improve upon for next time if indeed there is a next time?

Mr. TALBOTT. I might say both by prelude and in parenthesis that one of the reasons that Operation Uphold Democracy has been as successful as it has been is because we did draw upon the lessons of earlier experiences. We drew upon the lessons of Panama, of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the gulf war, and in this respect in particular we saw this from the beginning not just as a military op-

eration but as a political operation and indeed as an economic operation.

Closely integrated into the military planning were plans to make sure that we help the Haitian people reestablish the infrastructure of democracy. This I think is responsive to your point.

One of the first things that our troops did when they arrived in Haiti was to put the parliament back in shape so that it could resume work. One of the things that Mark Schneider and AID are doing is working with the institutions there, not just the parliament, which will have of course new members when the elections are held in June, but also municipal and local bodies as well. That is one of the reasons that we are optimistic that the hypothetical that you raise will not occur.

Mr. SALMON. One final point. I see that my time has expired.

The multinational mission to me is somewhat of a misnomer. How many other countries are paying, not that we are paying the pay, but how many other countries are actually participating? How many forces have they sent and when we arrived September 19, 1994, when did the third-country forces arrive?

Mr. TALBOTT. Shortly afterwards, but Under Secretary Slocombe will respond to that.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There are now—I am always suspicious of numbers to four significant figures—but there are now 1,884 non-U.S. military personnel participating in the MNF, with Bangladesh as the largest contingent, just over 1,000. Over 20 countries have a total of 665 international police monitors in Haiti. The largest contingents there are Jordan, Bolivia, and Argentina and Bangladesh.

My recollection is that the very first third country people were in in significant numbers within a couple of weeks. I know I went down to Haiti within less than a month, and the port security, for example, at that point was being turned over, I think, to Bangladeshis. There was a CARICOM, the Caribbean group which had taken over some of the security in Cape Haitien, so that within a period of a few days they started to arrive and they were taking over significant functions within a month.

Mr. TALBOTT. But with the indulgence of the Chair and the red light, I would just add one thing. One of the many reasons why we have planned from the beginning and now welcome the imminence of the hand-off from the multinational force to the U.N. mission is that the multinational force was overwhelmingly American, both in personnel and in who was paying for it. The U.N. mission will be an assessed U.N. operation, of which the United States will only pay 25 percent rather than virtually all of it, and we will have less than half the personnel.

That is part of the point here. We are handing this off to a truly international—

Mr. SALMON. I understand that, and just a quick question. Will our troops be under the U.N. command then?

Mr. TALBOTT. Our troops will be under American command, as Under Secretary Slocombe made clear in his opening statement.

Mr. BEREUTER. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



Let me first make a statement. We have all been hearing a lot of harping and carping about Haiti and about what we should have done and what we shouldn't have done, but, you know, if we look at what we have done and what has happened, I think if we went back 6, 8, 10 months or a year and look at the position we are at now, I think it is really miraculous, quite frankly, the constructive role that we have played in Haiti; the fact that there were virtually no American casualties in Haiti; the fact that the Haitian people have welcomed us with open arms. And, I think by all standards our involvement in Haiti has been a tremendous success.

First, we heard that it wasn't in our national interest, in some quarters it was said, to get into Haiti. Although I don't know how anyone—I think Mr. Hastings and some of the others have mentioned with refugees coming to our shore in south Florida and bursting at the seams—how anyone could say that Haiti wasn't in our national interest or isn't in our national interest just amazes me.

We are told that we ought not to have incursions on the other side of the world. Haiti is right in our own hemisphere, so it certainly seems to me that it is in our national interest.

We also heard last year in some quarters that Aristide wasn't worth defending. I would say that we are not defending Aristide, we are defending a democracy. The fact of the matter is that the United States took the lead in mobilizing international support for Haiti's democratic election in December 1990. The Haitian people elected Mr. Aristide—that is not my choice, it is their choice—in a fair and free election, and therefore I think that we are defending democracy there.

The last statement I want to make before I ask a couple of questions is that I don't think that the Somali syndrome, quite frankly, ought to pervade our foreign policy much the way for so long the Vietnam syndrome pervaded our foreign policy. I think we have to take each situation as it comes, and I think Haiti is different from Somalia. I think the fact that it is very close to our shore makes it different, the fact that there are so many people who have escaped makes it relevant to us, and I think that frankly the President did the absolute right thing and that the operation has been successful.

Having said that, I would like, Secretary Talbott, if you could give me your assessment of the job that Mr. Aristide has played. We tend to either hoist people up as great leaders or knock them down as villains, I think that those of us who have been involved in public life understand that leaders usually represent neither extreme and are somewhere in the middle, and all human beings. But, I would like you to please rate the job that Aristide has done since he has come back.

Mr. TALBOTT. It is such an important question I don't want to appear to be giving it short shrift, but in the interests of time I will try to be very succinct. If you want elaboration I will, of course, provide it.

The short answer is, he has done a splendid job. He has lived up not only to our hopes and expectations, but he has lived up to the promise that he made before going back to be a President who personified reconciliation. And there were concerns about that, and

those concerns were not entirely baseless. But it is not just what he said since coming back, it is also what he has done.

He has almost single-handedly forestalled an outbreak of the kind of retribution and violence that many were concerned about. By bringing Mr. Michel in as the Prime Minister, he has demonstrated his commitment to a principle that a couple of your colleagues have enunciated earlier, and that is the importance of engaging the Haitian private sector, which incidentally, I think it is fair to say, voted overwhelmingly against President Aristide, unlike the Haitian populace as a whole, in the December 1994 election, but Michel is a businessman himself and has reached out to the business community.

Now, obviously because of the magnitude of the challenges he faces, there are certainly going to be points on which we are going to not see the situation the same way that he does, but our relationship with him is extraordinarily trusting and cooperative. He listens to us, we listen to him, sometimes he does what we advise him to do, sometimes he doesn't. But he is the President of that country, and it is ultimately up to him and all Haitians to make the key decisions.

Mr. BEREUTER. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ENGEL. If I could, Mr. Chairman, just very quickly speak to the concerns that Mr. Hamilton raised earlier in terms of our leaving Haiti prematurely. The same article that he was referring to mentioned three things that really need to happen before we can really breathe well: The old army—

Mr. BEREUTER. I remind the gentleman we have five members here yet.

Mr. ENGEL. But, Mr. Chairman, I have frankly sat here all morning and listened to people go on for 15, 20 minutes.

Mr. SMITH. There will probably be a second round, and some of us do have to leave.

Mr. ENGEL. I don't mind. I just wish these things would be applied uniformly.

Mr. BEREUTER. Would the gentleman continue and just make his points briefly.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.

The old army being fully dismantled, new civilian police force put in place, credible elections held, and the economy begin to grow. Would you concur that really those are the four things that need to be put in place before we can breathe freely in Haiti?

Mr. TALBOTT. Before we can—

Mr. ENGEL. Before we can feel that we have really done what needs to be done, have created the stability at which point we can leave?

Mr. TALBOTT. The ultimate status of these institutions is up to the Haitian people to work out, and surely the new Haitian Parliament will have an important role to play in that as well.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. The Chair is trying to take into account the fact that Secretary Talbott needs to leave at 12. We have five members who have not had a chance. We had some abuses of the process early which I understand may irritate those of us that remain. It is the Chair's turn for his time at this moment, according to the

order of appearance, but Mr. Smith has an appointment so I yield my place in line to him in return.

Mr. SMITH. Very briefly, I really thank my good friend Doug Bereuter for yielding. I want to associate myself with Mr. Hastings' comment about the need for bringing those Haitian children who are in Guantanamo here, especially if a family member can be found. I think that ought to be a very, very high priority. I want to associate myself with his remark.

Very briefly, at the January 29 meeting, the donors meeting, my understanding is that \$1.2 billion was pledged. The Haitian Government has said that justice reform, agriculture, education, public works, and health are the five primary areas. And perhaps, Mark, you might be the best one to answer this.

What is the status currently of the children of Haiti as it relates to illness? Is there any thought being given to a massive vaccination day to try to catch up on some of those kids who over the last several years have not gotten their DPT shots and their other shots, to do what has been done in other countries under UNICEF, PAHO, and U.S. sponsorship, a day where everyone is vaccinated to catch up? I yield.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you very much, Congressman.

You are right that the health area is one of the gravest challenges facing the government in Haiti. One out of every 10 children die before the first birthday.

What we did was just what you are suggesting. On approximately November 20, President Aristide announced in conjunction with PAHO, UNICEF, and USAID, a nationwide immunization campaign, and I am pleased to be able to report that in Port-au-Prince, 600,000 children have now been vaccinated. It reached more than 90 percent of the goal.

The objective obviously is to extend this nationwide, with the hope of completing that level of coverage by June. However, the vaccination campaign outside Port-au-Prince was disrupted by Hurricane Gordon, and although this resulted in a delay, they are now catching up. And they now expect—according to the people who are organizing the campaign with whom I talked in Paris—to reach the 90 percent goal by the end of June. The focus was on measles which has caused a serious epidemic in the past, but includes the other childhood diseases as well. It is beginning, in the crucial health area.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman for his courtesy.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

It is hard to get seen back here in this corner here. I get glossed over.

Let me first of all, though, also let me state my deep pride in the job that has been done by the United States military in Haiti.

First of all, I think that the decision to go, and I sit here and listen when people talk about why are we moving out so quickly and why is the United Nations moving out, and you know just a year or so ago there was absolutely no one other than I guess Congressional Black Caucus and Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Oberstar, maybe Mr. Dodd and a few others that said we ought to go in. And

I am sure that one of the reasons for, in my opinion, the premature pullout, is because it was tough enough to get in and I guess you had to say, Well, we are going to come out more quickly than we even feel we ought to come out, but a lot of times we kind of forget history, and the fact that probably one of the most courageous decisions made by any President in the history of this Nation was made when President Clinton decided that it was the right thing to do even though there was absolutely no support other than outside of the few members, the few friends of Haiti, and the Congressional Black Caucus. So I commend him for that decision. I guess it almost parallels Truman bringing MacArthur back in the late 1940's, early 1950's when that was an unpopular decision, but he did it anyway.

But I am so proud of what our troops have done, and I, too, wish that they were not going to withdraw when they are going to withdraw. And second, I wish that the United Nations did not have this time certain because I think time certain and all of our military men on the ground all indicate that dates certain are not the best way to go.

But saying all that, let me ask quickly, one, how is the military down—and finally, in my comments I was one of the few who advocated that the time that President Aristide was out of the country should have been put out of his term because he really has had very little time to govern, and the fact that the elections are coming up and they have no provision for reelections I felt was unfair anyway and that he should have had an opportunity to serve for the 5 years or whatever the term was, but he will only have half a term.

Quickly, how is the military downsizing going, and second, how is the creation of the public sector jobs that was supposed to be a 50,000 number but have not gotten up to that number yet?

Finally, once again, I would like to know how you are doing with the judicial system which was certainly compromised in the past.

And last, let me just mention that I don't know how much my colleagues—and I wish Mr. Burton was here, he is my long-time friend—but it is not uncommon that United States troops supervise things that are not pleasant. In World War II it was the United States troops that supervised in every European country the redevelopment of those countries. And so I just don't understand why all of a sudden because United States troops are supervising unpleasant tasks in Haiti, it is what the troops that are in charge have done throughout the history of the military.

But anyway, could you respond to the question about wanting to downsize and to the 50,000 public sector jobs that were promised? And, No. 3, what is happening with the prosecutors and judges, I guess in the 1 minute that I have left.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Do you want me to respond on the downsizing first?

We have gone from over 20,000 in the early part of October down to about 6,000 now. As I said in my statement, the United States contribution to the U.N. mission in Haiti will be on the order of 2,500 people. We would expect to reach that level not obviously on the moment of the transition on March 31, but within a few weeks after that.

The downsizing has gone very well. It is also worth making the point that there is a rotation. It is not all the same people who arrived at the beginning.

Mr. PAYNE. Also, quickly, the Haiti downsizing of their military.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The Haitian military is now effectively—the old FAd'H is effectively gone as an institution. About 3,000 people who were from the old army. The old army/police have been vetted by agreement with both the United States and the Haitian authorities. They now constitute the bulk of the interim public security force.

As was alluded to earlier, we have had a problem about making sure that the people who were vetted are the ones who are there and the people who are not vetted are not there. That is being worked now and I think satisfactorily.

Over time we will be training a civilian police force. The police academy to do that is open and has had its first class. Over the period of the next 18 months, that national police will gradually replace the interim public security force.

There are transition job training and payment programs for the people in the old FAd'H, the old army who are not going to be in either the IPSF or the new police force.

Mr. BEREUTER. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The chairman will take his time at this point.

First I would ask unanimous consent that the opening statement of Christopher Smith be made a part of the record. We will conclude then with the 5 minutes for Ms. McKinney after the chairman has his time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. First of all, for the record, I strongly disagree with the military incursion in Haiti. I continue to disagree with it. I just want that a part of the record. I think it was ill-advised.

But I would like to make sure we have all the costs down. Secretary Talbott, if you can tell me, the figures that you gave us from the 150 account, do they include the \$56 million plus for this fiscal year for the U.N. mission costs in Haiti and the \$27 million plus for the voluntary contributions, the peacekeeping operation?

Mr. TALBOTT. For this fiscal year?

Mr. BEREUTER. For this fiscal year.

Mr. TALBOTT. Fiscal 1995. I see that the breakdown I have of the figures that I gave to Chairman Gilman earlier under the \$288.8 million for fiscal year 1995 include \$18.2 million for non-U.S. multinational force. Let me see if Ambassador Dobbins has anything on that.

Mr. BEREUTER. They don't agree with the figures I have here.

Mr. Slocombe, perhaps you can tell me, what about the 1996 request from the Defense Department for the peacekeeping activities in Haiti.

Mr. TALBOTT. Just to clarify, I hope that I was clear both before and now that I was referring only to the function 150, the international affairs budget portion. That may possibly get to whatever discrepancy you are seeing.

Mr. BEREUTER. Now I am switching to fiscal year 1996, Secretary Slocombe. We have a dash on our information saying "to be pro-

vided by the Department of Defense." What will be the cost out of the Department of Defense for peacekeeping activities for Haiti?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I will have to get you that number. There will obviously be some cost because almost half the year will have been gone before February 1996.

Mr. BEREUTER. I heard Secretary Talbott say that we will have a stable and secure environment in Haiti, not only now but in February of 1996, and I really think you are extraordinarily optimistic. I hope you are right, but I have my doubts.

When we look at what we are trying to leave there, some elements of democratic institutions where none have existed for the most part for the history of the country, I would think that one of the things we would focus on would be the parliament and the judiciary.

There are indications at least by letters of U.S. AID memoranda, on December 29, that very little had been done in the way of assisting the parliament. In fact, there is a letter from you dated December 27, Mr. Talbott, that says that of the Parliament they should take the initiative to develop their own institution rather than awaiting initiatives from the United States and others. You may know that the Congress itself has, especially the House, taken great actions to help the parliaments emerging out of the old Warsaw Pact countries across the face of Central and Eastern Europe.

I would ask any of you what are we doing to assist the parliament assume some of their responsibilities because they have of course a major role in the time that is remaining if we are not to be moving back to a dictatorship there, and what are we doing to support and help Haiti's judicial branch, which is badly in need of assistance?

Mr. TALBOTT. We as a group welcome your question, Mr. Chairman, first, because it gives us a chance at least to partially respond to an unanswered question or two of Congressman Payne's. Second, because it gives me a chance to reiterate that despite the passage that you have mentioned from my letter, of course we are, as I indicated earlier, working with the Haitians to develop their parliamentary and judicial institutions. But let me turn to Mr. Schneider.

Mr. BEREUTER. If your answer is extensive, I would appreciate it if you could just summarize it and then give it to us in writing. It is important. We would like to have it, but I want to give Ms. McKinney her time.

Mr. TALBOTT. Thank you.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Two things. First, we began by facilitating the return of the parliamentarians to Haiti as soon as the crisis was over. We began to provide immediate assistance—office supplies, typewriters, radios, et cetera—early on.

There was an initial expectation, that Haiti would have parliamentary elections in November, and we designed our parliamentary support program, which is obviously crucial for democratic institutional strengthening to begin when the new Parliament takes office.

We are working now with the Congressional Human Rights Foundation and the Center for Democracy. You will hear from them later on plans for orientation for the new legislators, training

the permanent staff of the Parliament, providing for a legislative reference service, computerization, and other support, including commodities for them. We can go into detail in the written response.

Mr. BEREUTER. Would you please provide us that kind of detail for judicial branch and for the parliament. I would appreciate it.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Fine. On justice we have a major support program. At present, we have 20 judicial mentors in the 15 Haitian communities where there are trial courts. And the members of multidonor program met last week to set out the support for the justice sector.

Mr. BEREUTER. Ms. McKinney, you and I have been very patient. You have the last 5 minutes. I recognize the gentlelady.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I ask unanimous consent to insert my statement into the record.

Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McKinney appears in the appendix.]

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you. I don't think I will take up the entire 5 minutes.

First of all, I would also like to share my pride to Deputy Secretary Talbott and Under Secretary Slocombe and the rest of the members of the administration on the fine work that you have done in Haiti. I do have one concern.

Under Secretary Slocombe, you wrote in your statement that no organized group is capable of seriously threatening the Haitian Government or the international presence. I am concerned about the number of weapons that still exist in Haiti that are in the hands of people who are not friendly to democracy.

I am also concerned about the status of FRAPH and where they are and what they are doing, and I would also like to know if Emmanuel Constant is in this country.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. With respect to weapons, as I said, we have rounded up a large number of weapons, most of them, although not all, from exactly the groups that you are concerned about. There is no way to get up all the weapons in Haiti.

The statement in my paper is a fair summary of the views of the intelligence community and the military there on the state of the threat. FRAPH, which was this sort of auxiliary group for the coup leaders, is effectively broken as an institution.

Now that is not to say that there are not plenty of resentful people who could do all kinds of very bad and dangerous things. It is simply that we watched this situation very closely and we don't see an organized group.

There is a story today that there will be something that will happen during carnival. It is perfectly possible, but we don't see any organized force, and we are looking right hard.

With respect to Constant, I think my knowledge of that subject is largely what I know from the newspapers.

Mr. TALBOTT. I can do just a sentence or two on that. It is a long and tangled story that doesn't have a very clear ending. We will get you the long version if you want it.

The long and short of it is, he got a tourist visa quite sometime ago which was reinstated when all visas that had been suspended

were reinstated at the time that the sanctions were lifted. The State Department has revoked his visa.

I think the short answer is, we don't know where he is now, but he does not have a valid visa. We will get you more on that.

Ms. MCKINNEY. You can get me the long story, too. Thank you.

Mr. TALBOTT. OK. And the ending when we know that.

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. Gentlemen, we have some questions we would like to submit for the record from some of the members who weren't here.

I have one more question, then we will let you go because I know you have to leave just about now.

It has been reported to me that there have been possibly some incidents of hostility toward our troops down there. Have there been such incidents in addition to the one we know where the one soldier was killed and the other, a Ranger, was killed and one was wounded? Have there been other incidents, and if so, can you give us a number?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I better get you the answer to that for the record. There have certainly been other incidents where there has been firing and so on in the area. We can get you a complete report. But the overwhelming response to the American presence is that the American military are liked and respected in Haiti. It is a country where you go around and you see signs, signs on the wall, to which we do not intend to conform, that say "Americans stay for 50 years." We don't intend to do that, but I think that is a fair measure of the response.

Mr. BURTON. But there have been incidents where our troops have been shot at?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There have been a very few. I will get you the exact record, but overwhelmingly the troops have rightly established both that they are there to be helpful and they are not to be tampered with.

Obviously there was the incident right at the beginning in Cape Haitien where a group of police made the mistake of pulling a weapon on an American unit and then a significant number of them were killed when the American unit fired back. Most of them were at the beginning, and I will get you a list.

Mr. BURTON. If you could get us as close to an accurate account, we would really like to know.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We will get you all we know.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, gentlemen, appreciate it.

We welcome our final panel of distinguished witnesses. I will recognize each of you for a brief opening statement. We have received your written statements and your biographies. I understand Mr. Aronson has some time constraints, so we will let him speak first.

We have Prof. Allen Weinstein, founder and president of the Center for Democracy, a nonprofit organization created in 1984 to promote and strengthen the democratic process around the world. The center continues to play a singular role in the search for peaceful and lasting solution in Haiti.

Mr. Peter Johnson is executive director of the Caribbean Latin American Action, a private nonprofit group that promotes U.S. relations and development in the Caribbean basin. C/LAA and its



Miami conference are unparalleled sparkplugs to regional commerce, a rôle they are now playing in Haiti.

Our good friend Mr. Bernard Aronson, former member of the State Department, has returned to the Hill to relive fond memories testifying before us.

Are they fond?

Mr. ARONSON. They are, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. He served 4 remarkable years as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in the Bush administration, where he was the architect of the democratic transitions in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Haiti.

And my good friend Maj. Andy Messing is executive director of the National Defense Council Foundation. He is a retired U.S. Army special forces officer who earned two Purple Hearts in service in Vietnam. Major Messing has extensive experience in political transactions and has directed humanitarian and refugee relief operations in many hot spots.

I welcome all of you, and we will start out, Mr. Aronson, with you. Do you have an opening statement?

**STATEMENT OF BERNARD ARONSON, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS**

Mr. ARONSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The issue of Haiti is I think much more complicated than our domestic debate would suggest. As you know, the United States took the lead in mobilizing the international effort to make the elections possible. I think we therefore had a stake in defending that outcome.

Second, it is less well known that Haiti was the first test case of something called the Santiago Declaration, which the OAS adopted in June 1991. That was a very important change in hemispheric geopolitics because every nation in the hemisphere committed themselves collectively to defend democracy in any member state.

As you well know, for most of this century Latin America practiced the doctrine of nonintervention and they argued we should not get involved, even in the case of Panama where you had a dictatorship that overthrew an election. So there were legitimate issues at stake in Haiti. I would stipulate that there is disagreement about whether we should have intervened, the manner we did so, and the decision of the President to do so without consulting Congress. But I think the issue before us today is not whether we should have gone into Haiti, but what do we do now that we are there. I think it is important that those who disagreed with the original decision not express that by a precipitous demand that we pull out too soon because I think that would in fact be the worst outcome. We have now committed our prestige and our Nation.

I will submit my statement for the record, but let me just make a few suggestions on points that the committee might want to watch in the interim period.

One, I think we have learned from Panama and El Salvador that it always takes longer than we predict to recruit and train and make operational an entirely new police force, and we should build that into our timetable. Deadlines always slip; it is a very cum-

bersome process. If you give it enough time it can work, as it has in Panama and El Salvador, but it can't be done quickly. If you try to do it too quickly, you put on to the streets a force that is really not up to the job.

Second, the issue of the Haitian Army is being debated now inside Haiti, the future of the institution. That is not a decision for the United States to make, but I hope we do not tilt against what seems to be the trend, which is the abolition of the army, as was done in Panama. I think the Haitian people may make a decision that they want that institution abolished, that they don't need a standing army.

I happen to think that that is a wise decision. I think if it is done, we should insist that it be done constitutionally through two successive votes of the Parliament. If it is done, then I think we should cooperate in perhaps helping to create some new forces, a coast guard that could operate under the Ministry of Transportation, a border patrol that could operate, perhaps, under the Ministry of Finance, which could perform functions that the FAd'H used to perform that are necessary and could satisfy those who feel that it would be useful to have some balance of forces inside Haiti without recreating or resurrecting an institution which I think has been corrupt and antidemocratic.

Third, I agree with the points made by I think Mr. Bereuter and others that we need to focus attention on judicial reform.

Fourth, I think we should resist any efforts to delay the holding of Presidential elections in December 1995. It is critical that they go forward because the real test of our policy will be the peaceful transition to a successor. Some may argue that the Haitian electoral system is going to be overloaded, because municipal and parliamentary elections will be held in June, maybe we should wait and delay the Presidential elections. I think we should resist that. I think that could provoke a crisis. I think that election has to take place as contemplated.

Finally, I think those who cautioned against setting an arbitrary deadline for withdrawal have a point. One of the lessons I think we learned from December 1990 is that we celebrated the success of the elections too quickly and we pulled out the international monitors too quickly, and Haiti was beginning an experiment in democracy that it wasn't quite prepared for. In retrospect, had we kept a civilian international presence after the December 1990 elections for a period of time, maybe some of this crisis could have been avoided.

So I would urge that under a U.N. umbrella, some international presence continue after February 1996, perhaps for as long as a year. They could be civilian monitors in the human rights area, they could be police monitors and trainers, but they ought to be visible, they ought to be in the country, and give the new government about a year to get on its feet for a balance of forces to develop inside and for this experiment to take off.

I don't think U.S. troops should be part of any such presence, but I think it is a mistake to just let a new government begin in February 1996 with no international presence, given everything that has happened.

The final point I would just make is that we ought to give some consideration if budgetary realities would permit to seeing whether we could create a tax incentive for the assembly sector plants that were in Haiti prior to the coup and then left as a result of our sanctions and the crisis to see if we could induce them to return. As you know, Mr. Chairman, all of these companies can enjoy the same trade preferences under the Caribbean Basin Initiative in neighboring countries.

I think a lot of them that have left will not come back to Haiti unless something extra is added, and perhaps with a very minimal budget impact, some sort of a grace period, a tax relief could be provided for 10 years for a company that was in Haiti after the elections and left since then, which would return. That actually might be a more effective expenditure of our funds than to try to put in direct aid and create whole new industries. Those are the only wage-earning jobs really that Haitians have, and I think we need to make every effort to see if we can start them up again.

President Cristiani of El Salvador was in Washington yesterday. I happened to see him, and he reminded me of something that I think we forget, which is that we sometimes put an enormous amount of our resources and attention in a country when there is a crisis. Then after we think we have solved it, we tend to forget it too quickly. El Salvador still needs our help, and I hope we don't make that mistake in Haiti.

I know this has been a contentious political issue, but we are there now. The worst outcome would be to pull out too quickly, to do too little and to leave nothing behind. So I hope we stay the course without risking American lives unduly, and my sense of the spirit of the hearing is that there is some consensus to do that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aronson appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BURTON. Let me just say to the panel, and I hope I can ask for your patience, I just heard all these bells go off. I think we have two or three votes coming up altogether. You have to leave, do you, Bernie?

Mr. ARONSON. No, I am OK, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. If you wouldn't mind waiting, we will try to get some of the other panel members back. I have some questions for you, Mr. Aronson, if it is possible for you to stay.

Mr. ARONSON. My time is actually OK. I didn't know how long the hearing would run, but I can stay for at least an hour or so.

Mr. BURTON. OK. We will be voting, I will say it will probably be about 15 to 20 minutes before we return, so please accept our apology. We have got a lot of things going on on the floor. We will be back just as soon as possible.

[Recess.]

Chairman GILMAN [presiding]. The committee will come to order. I apologize to our panelists for keeping them waiting. We regret we have no control over the House floor proceedings, and there probably will be another two votes. But we will try to continue without interruption if we can. We will share responsibility for getting to the floor. Mr. Burton will be with us shortly, and we are going to do a little tandem running to the floor.

So I am pleased that we have our second panel with us. I understand from my staff that Mr. Aronson has already made his statement. We have Professor Allen Weinstein, founder and president of the Center for Democracy.

Mr. Weinstein, if you would like to proceed.

**STATEMENT OF ALLEN WEINSTEIN, PRESIDENT, THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY**

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am Allen Weinstein, president of the Center for Democracy, a nonprofit, nonpartisan foundation created in 1985 to assist in strengthening the democratic process in countries undergoing a transition to democracy.

Since 1991, the center has worked in Haiti with the Haitian Parliament. We have cooperated with pro-democratic Haitian business and political leaders and have assisted municipal officials. My testimony today reflects personal perspectives and is in no sense an organizational statement on behalf of the center.

America's immediate goal in Haiti, Mr. Chairman, that of restoring President Aristide to power, was achieved 4 months ago. Unfortunately, our larger mission, that of facilitating development in Haiti of democratic institutions and processes, has proceeded since then only fitfully and at best unevenly.

The burden of my testimony is to urge this committee, the Congress, and the administration to pursue on a bipartisan basis an accelerated focus program of support in the 5 weeks ahead prior to formal transfer of troop authority on the island from United States to U.N. command on March 31, measures that will lay essential groundwork for a lasting democratic system.

Now that the United States has returned Jean Bertrand Aristide to Haiti, it must use its remaining weeks of virtually complete authority to help the Haitian people pursue the even more difficult mission of building democratic structures and habits atop the ruins of tyranny.

A decade ago testifying before the Senate at another watershed in the struggle for democracy, I noted that the country in question, prior to an historic election—in that case the Philippines—stood poised between hope and despair. The words apply to Haiti today.

Haiti confronts in the next critical 5 weeks the departure of half the remaining United States troop complement, de jure transfer of authority to U.N. control, and most importantly, a defining moment of preparation for the parliamentary and municipal elections now scheduled for June.

This hearing is especially timely, Mr. Chairman, coming 5 months after Operation Uphold Democracy was begun and 4 months after President Aristide's return, in the end, in my view, assuring that democracy in Haiti has been and will continue to be in the foreseeable future primarily an American responsibility.

For that reason, the United States military and civil personnel responsible for coordinating our occupation of Haiti deserve our gratitude for the skill, tact, and bravery with which they have implemented this policy, whatever their views of it.

As a result, democracy's beachhead has been secured in Haiti, and at minimal cost thus far in American or Haitian lives. Now,

however, in the 5 weeks remaining prior to turning over primary responsibility for Haiti to the United Nations, the moment has come for the United States to lead decisively the process of helping to consolidate a democratic future for all Haitians.

I believe that four major efforts to be undertaken under American leadership in cooperation with Haitian and U.N. authorities in this month plus ahead, if achieved, can help to confirm an unprecedented politics of hope on the island. If not taken now, however, the bright promise of a new beginning which U.S. soldiers brought to Haiti may quickly turn to popular disillusionment. These four steps are crucial.

One, consolidating democracy for Haiti requires immediately energizing a sluggish and divisive pre-election process. Electoral conditions minimally acceptable to the broad spectrum of Haitian political parties and leaders, whether pro- or anti-Aristide, must be created.

An election constitutionally stipulated in late 1994 now slouches toward possible achievement in June 1995 under U.N./OAS auspices after President Aristide's recent election decree, despite horrendous procedural difficulties. These include an absence of current voter rolls and an electoral council comprised largely of political novices. Political parties remain disorganized and mainly unfunded. There are no campaign ground rules, and one overriding concern permeates the entire political atmosphere—a fear for personal security.

Guaranteeing security for political candidates and their supporters remains a Herculean task in a country filled with hidden weaponry. In this effort, American leadership will be required to encourage consensus among the major political groupings so that they choose to participate fully without threat of withdrawal on grounds of unfairness should defeat loom.

Nor is the election of parliamentary and municipal officials in June the only concern in this respect. Haiti will elect a new President in December, and Jean Bertrand Aristide made a solemn commitment both prior to his return and since then not to be a candidate for reelection, something which the Haitian Constitution proscribes. President Aristide has stated that he will preside over a fair and free Presidential election, handing over power for the first time in two centuries of Haitian history to his elected successor.

The President deserves praise for this pledge, made more generous still by the years he spent in exile deprived of his office, and the United States and the international community must help Aristide assure that such a peaceful transfer of power does occur at year's end or early in 1996.

Two, in order to reduce the residue of Haiti's historic climate of fear, ironclad procedures must be installed for verifying that the officer corps and recruits in the country's new police force now undergoing training respond to professional and not political direction. Otherwise, we will witness the replacement of the old blatantly oppressive military with merely a newer, subtler but no less oppressive police.

Efforts from whatever quarter in Haiti to employ alleged human rights violators, insert recruits unvetted by American or U.N. ex-

perts or to otherwise undermine professional training procedures for the new police will badly injure its credibility at the outset and open the door to future abuses.

Continued close monitoring of the police training process by experienced U.S. Department of Justice and military personnel should be the norm. Any Haitian officials or government advisers incapable of adapting to this demanding standard of police behavior should be replaced.

Preventing the integrity of a largely U.S.-based professional police training program from being undermined, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, will require special vigilance in the weeks ahead. Here; as in safeguarding Haiti's fragile and incomplete new electoral process, American political will and leadership can mean the difference between nominal and genuine compliance with international norms.

Three, strengthening and accelerating national reconciliation is immediately essential to the establishment of democratic habits in Haiti. For two centuries, Haitian political losers have felt unsafe, going into hiding or exile but not into domestic opposition. The practice of protected political opposition has little meaning for most Haitians.

Given the evident absence of security for ordinary Haitians of all political viewpoints, I trust it will not appear hopelessly naive on my part to suggest that the process of national reconciliation in Haiti would benefit from some immediate steps under American leadership in the remaining weeks of our mandate.

These specific actions could include: (a) convening, as a number of Haitian leaders have suggested, a national dialogue prior to the parliamentary municipal elections, one comparable to those which have helped to develop civic links across party lines in countries elsewhere with few democratic traditions like Haiti, such as Nicaragua; (b) encouraging adoption by consensus of a formal code of conduct among leaders in Haiti to define the conditions and limits on political behavior during the two elections which lie ahead, a code which would deal voluntarily with accepted or acceptable and prescribed conduct during the campaigns; and (c) recognizing the institutional legitimacy of the remaining handful of legally elected Haitian senators, since the entire Chamber of Deputies and all other senators are now up for election, thus acknowledging the Haitian Parliament's institutional continuity and importance as an independent and coequal branch of government rather than neglecting Parliament as the United States has largely done in practice and assistance to date since President Aristide's return.

These are only some of the practical steps which the United States could take in the weeks ahead to assist in national reconciliation. They would reaffirm our commitment to the primacy of democratic process and procedure over personality in Haitian policy. Such actions would have special relevance today when there does not exist in Haiti even the beginnings of an independent and effective judicial system.

Finally, point No. 4: helping the newly resurgent Haitian private sector, especially the pro-democratic businessmen and women anxious to rejoin the inter-American market system that is vital in de-

veloping Haitian democracy. However, I am going to leave that discussion for one of my colleagues, on this panel, Mr. Johnson.

I will simply say, Mr. Chairman, that if my friends within Haiti's business community, which was devastated by the embargo's impact, have a common complaint, it has been with the elephantine pace of delivering the support measures promised by the various mega-packages of economic aid periodically announced by this country.

Surely a country such as ours, which could draft and begin implementing assistance to all of devastated post-World War II Europe through the Marshall plan in a matter of months, can finally in the weeks ahead respond to the job-creating proposals of Haiti's responsible business leaders.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, each of the goals previously described can be addressed dramatically and effectively by American leaders in the 5 weeks remaining prior to handing over our present unilateral responsibilities to officials representing the United Nation. Each is an interrelated factor in the overall mosaic of democratization in Haiti, assuring fair and free elections, guaranteeing personal security under professional police protection, encouraging genuine national reconciliation, and supporting the revival of a strong private sector.

Nor is funding the primary problem. Rather, the major difficulty has been in reassessing the American mission in Haiti to focus on today's, not yesterday's, realities and imperatives.

If democracy in Haiti is not to be left on the beachhead, the time has come to move out, to recognize that our initial goal, that of restoring President Aristide to power beyond challenge, has long been achieved. That was then, this is now.

Five weeks from now we must leave as our legacy to the U.N. command and to the Haitian people a coordinated framework to sustain and consolidate democratic procedures in the months and years ahead. Achieving that framework, Mr. Chairman, will require 5 strenuous weeks of effort between now and the end of March, a period in which we Americans must confront our problems in Haiti as candidly as we do our initial success.

In that fashion we can best seize our opportunity to extend and develop what nascent democracy has already achieved in Haiti during its 5 fragile months of existence.

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have submitted a fuller statement to the committee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinstein appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Weinstein. The statement will be accepted as submitted.

We now turn to Peter Johnson, executive director of the Caribbean Latin American Action, a private nonprofit group that promotes U.S. relations and development in the Caribbean.

Mr. Johnson.

#### STATEMENT OF PETER JOHNSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CARIBBEAN LATIN AMERICAN ACTION

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate the opportunity to testify before this committee on this important issue.

The testimony we have submitted for the record is presuming that from an organization like ours—

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Johnson, would you put the mike a little closer, please.

Mr. JOHNSON. The testimony that we have submitted for the record is submitted with your understanding that our organization is supported by some 120 American and largely American but some Caribbean companies, and that the perspective on the future of these companies and the role that these companies could play in the redevelopment of the Haiti political process would be a role expected of us.

The burden of the testimony therefore is rather sharply on the role of the private sector and what is being done to get the 85 percent unemployment and underemployment rate in Haiti today down to something that would reasonably be able to support a democratic process.

In C/LAA, as you know, Mr. Chairman, there are some 30 or 35 companies which in fact have been involved in Haiti, but this unemployment figure that I just referred to can only be knocked down if we can apply the appropriate instruments to return some of these companies back to Haiti.

I share all of my colleagues' comments about the political future of Haiti. I simply want to stress as strongly as I can that that political future at the end of the day is going to depend on jobs, and if we can't get those jobs back in, we are aiming for serious problems.

During the second half of the 1980's, as this committee certainly knows, and the early 1990's before the embargo and the coup, the light manufacturing and the agricultural sector in Haiti probably employed between 100,000 and 150,000 people. Today that figure is probably closer to 3,000 to 5,000.

Our friend from U.S. AID this morning earlier today mentioned that some 5,000 were reemployed in the assembly sector, and that was a bright start. That is just not the right reading. The fact that there are 4,000 to 5,000 or 3,000 to 5,000 or whatever that figure is, this reflects some companies which in fact have put a very small percentage of work on a very low-risk basis back into Haiti.

The companies that I am referring to remained during the embargo period and were largely very banged up by the embargo itself. They tried to stay the course through different arrangements that were made available to them, but when they finally left, for El Salvador, Honduras or other places, they really were fairly crippled financially.

Now, I would submit and have submitted to the administration and, Mr. Chairman, we have talked about this ourselves several times, that there needs to be some kind of a program urgently devised that would in fact help these crippled companies back to Haiti. You might ask, why these companies, if they are crippled, why not have other companies come back such as those that might be involved with Strobe Talbott's mission, that was mentioned again this morning, on March 7 and 8.

Well, the point is that the political environment and the business environment and in Haiti is not the kind of an environment where a new company for Haiti out of Peoria, IL, is going to accept an



invitation to invest in that business environment. We should be dealing with those companies which are accustomed to the environment, which know Haiti, which in fact are interested in returning to Haiti, knowing all of its problems. By and large, these aren't large companies.

I know you have a letter from the Kellwood Corp. that we have received a copy of by virtue of their involvement with us. This is one of the biggest apparel companies in the country. They have in fact put a little work in Haiti, but they are not going to do any more for another 8 to 10 months as stated in that letter until they see a better business and political environment and things straighten out somewhat.

There is another letter that came in from a smaller artisan company from Vermont, and this company is quite different from the Kellwood example. This is a company that in fact stayed the course as far as they could in the artisan area, employing 200 or 300 people when they were at their best, employing no one today, but needing some assistance to get back in.

That was again mentioned this morning by the administration. I think those of us who are following the issue closely are clearly aware of the U.S. Government's efforts to involve the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in some kind of a combination with two American banks, Bank of Boston and Citibank, both of which are in Port-au-Prince, to solve this working capital issue, to solve the problem of these crippled companies.

The problem with this issue, with this conceived program, is two fold. One is it is not going to be ready for several weeks. More importantly than that, OPIC, adhering to its own responsibilities and regulatory processes, must fund financially sound enterprises. You are certainly going to have to say the same thing about Bank of Boston and Citicorp.

So at the end of the day we are going to be funding companies to go back to Haiti through that program which have virtually no experience in Haiti, therefore they are not going to go back in the short term or we are going to be financing major infrastructural projects which are fine and very important long term.

The advantage of the companies that I am trying to address here and identify is that they can probably return without all of this new infrastructural which really will be necessary for the long term development of Haiti, but we have got to solve the 85 percent unemployment problem today.

I think I will end there, Mr. Chairman, because I get more critical perhaps than I should be and I have tried to tone down the written testimony to portray as much detail as I can about this whole issue of trying to fill jobs in the middle of the society. AID and the other funders are dealing with the micro side, and with the infrastructural side.

What I am trying to do is to address a solution which is practical and which the companies want to capitalize upon if they can to do something in the middle.

You, Mr. Chairman, in your own experience have a case in your district that I am aware of called RSK Industries. RSK Industries, just to put on the record, in the late 1980's and early 1990's employed 3,000 to 4,000 people in Haiti at better than minimum

wage, good working conditions, and sought very eagerly to return to Haiti and restart. RSK was very, very beaten up through the embargo process.

The kind of product they had was not able to be easily transferred to another country. It was very much Haitian. The company is in very bad shape today, desperately looking for some development help to go back. It would seem to me that a perfect place for some development resources, fitting perhaps in with OPIC and with the banks.

So I am not going to try to lay out a scheme, but it would seem to me that we have a development issue here, and a fundamental political issue where some development resources on a short-term working capital guarantee kind of a loan basis could help enormously as we look toward the objectives that Allen Weinstein and that Strobe Talbott and others speak of that we must be addressing within a year. I see a fundamental disconnect between our political objectives over the year and what we are really putting in place in terms of instruments to solve the unemployment problem in Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

You certainly focused attention on a very critical need, and we would like to explore that further with you.

The last speaker on our panel, Maj. Andy Messing, retired Army, executive director of the National Defense Council Foundation.

Mr. Messing.

I may have to declare further recess if Mr. Burton doesn't return because we have about 7 minutes remaining on a vote. I may have to go to the floor, but why don't you start your testimony.

Major MESSING. Would you like to go to the floor right now, sir?

Chairman GILMAN. That might be appropriate. Why don't we declare a 10- or 15-minute recess pending the return of Mr. Burton and myself. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. We will reconvene. I don't know who testified last. Mr. Johnson.

Major Messing, would you like to testify now, then we will get to questions.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. F. ANDY MESSING, JR. (USAR RETIRED),  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL  
FOUNDATION**

Major MESSING. Yes, sir, thank you. My name is Major Andy Messing, National Defense Council Foundation. We are a foundation that looks at low-intensity conflict, special operation low-intensity conflict, and we also do a measure of refugee relief.

We have put 134 tons of food and medicine into the hottest combat areas of the world. The reason we do that as a side bar is because that gives us entree into some of the most denied areas of the world, like Somalia and Upper Huanuco Valley of Peru and places like that. It gives us a little bit of edge on our academic reports because we have what Sir Robert Thompson used to say is the IWT, "I was there."

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit two articles for the record, an op-ed piece that I did on Haiti, which is 3 days ago in the L.A. Times, which talks about our half effort in Haiti, and also an article about "No Time for Defense Downsizing," which was published in another magazine which talks about how, with the increased threat against the United States and the free world, that we shouldn't be taking a meat-ax approach to the downsizing of our military, and we should be reorganizing our military to meet the threats and meet the kind of missions that we have going toward the 21st century, one of them being peacekeeping.

Mr. Chairman, these are the two articles here in case you have a staff member who wants to get them.

[The articles appear in the appendix.]

Major MESSING. Mr. Chairman, I want to express—I may not look like it, but I am very outraged. I am very angry. I am angry as an American, and I use that as a capital A and use it as a small a American in terms of being a U.S. citizen, and then as a member of the Western Hemisphere, I am angry in that respect.

I am angry as a former officer of the military; I am angry as a human being about some of the things that have transpired both in Somalia and Haiti. And I would like to elaborate on that.

Having worked for over 6 years with Gen. Edward Lansdale as a protege of his before he died, he taught me a lot of valuable things about whenever we look at foreign policy and defense, we should always look at it in a multispectrum kind of way; we should not just look—as right-of-center people look at economic and security concerns, and not allow the liberals on the left to just look at the social and political concerns; but we should indeed look at the full spectrum of concerns because, in doing that, that is the only way you can get a clear picture of what is going on and address the proper solution to what is transpiring.

When I worked with Richard Nixon on a book called "No More Vietnams," one of the subjects we discussed was the security of the Western Hemisphere. And as a matter of fact, I brought General Lansdale up in a historic meeting in 1986, and the three of us sat around and just brainstormed about where America was going into the 21st century; and what we saw was America not with a clear vision of how to deal with emerging and amorphous threats to our country.

But one thing that struck me listening to these two historical figures, General Lansdale and President Nixon, is they always referred to history. And Mr. Chairman, I want to refer to history. I want to refer to 30 years ago when the United States parachuted the 82d Airborne into the Dominican Republic, which is incidentally, as you know, contiguous to Haiti and had a similar situation with military generals in revolt and a basic, similar environment.

And one of the things that transpired when Lyndon Johnson did that incursion into Haiti, one of the things that the military did was take the full-spectrum approach to adjudicating the situation. They jumped in with rifles and as soon as the situation was stable, they broke out the shovels.

Indeed, Grenada, indeed Panama, indeed Kuwait, we did that. And where we have failed in Somalia, in spite of valiant attempts, in spite of the dedication of the troops, in spite of the fact that not

one but two American Presidents have had a sincere dedication toward adjudicating that particular conflict in Somalia, we failed because we always kept the rifle and we never picked up the shovel in Somalia; and I see the same thing happening in Haiti, which brings me great frustration and great sadness because the Haitian people are very pro-United States and very wonderful people on an individual basis. And to see this transpire just breaks my heart, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to bring to this committee's attention a book that was written by a very famous general, Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr., and in the back of it he cites the commander summary of the report of stability operations Dominican Republic. And it is on file at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Obviously, nobody thought to look at that particular summary when we did the Somalia operations; and certainly, they have not broken out the same darned report for our Haiti operations. It causes me great frustration because our military is not learning by its own history, by its own famous generals. It is a major failure of leadership that has been promulgated by those in charge of the executive department decisions on these two particular deployments.

Now Strobe Talbott, whom I briefly worked for in the transition between the Republican and Democratic administrations when I was working with Rich Armitage at State as a consultant, I heard him talk here. Rather ironically, I heard him talk when I was at State about Russia and I disagreed with him about a lot of stuff that he was articulating then.

So it is no surprise that I adamantly disagree with him now, Mr. Chairman, when he talks about stability right now, that is, a misimpression that he is trying to convey to you, the representatives of the people.

I left tact and diplomacy at the doorway, Mr. Chairman, because I feel that this is a travesty on the American public that things like 42 hostile incidents against American military forces over the past couple of months haven't been reported to Congress or made available to the media.

Now, I obtained this information from a retired officer, and I corroborated this with a DOD official, that somewhere these hostile incidents are not being reported to you, the people's representatives, which indicates the degeneration of our capabilities and influence and capabilities over the situation. And I am very disturbed about this because if it was stopped at Army, then that shows short-sightedness; if it was stopped at DOD, that shows a little bit of political short-sightedness; if it was stopped at State or NSC, it shows even a further problem; and if it was stopped—who knows, even by Bill Clinton.

I was told that one general made the statement that if American soldiers were not hit in sniping incidents, then it wasn't an incident. Well, I don't look at it that way, Mr. Chairman. I have been to 27 different conflicts around the world, as you know, 57 times into El Salvador alone; and when a bullet goes by me, I get excited. And I know if my son was on the ground—and I have two children serving in the military right now, a daughter and a son—very proud of them; if a bullet came whizzing by their ears, I would

want to know about it. And the failure of DOD or State or NSC or whoever to be forthright with you is embarrassing at the least.

Say, for the sake of argument, that it hasn't been 42 incidents. Say it was 21 incidents, OK, say it was 11 incidents; if we cut the figure down even more conservatively, it still shows that we are losing a grip on the situation in Haiti.

Mr. BURTON. If I might interrupt, I am going to have to go vote and in about 5 minutes what I would like to do, Chairman Gilman will be back, I would like to ask a couple of questions. The first one I will ask of you. You said there are 42 instances that you heard of where troops have been fired upon or their lives have been put in jeopardy.

Major MESSING. Yes, sir, one resulted in the death of an American forces soldier that you are aware of, that you made reference to earlier, sir.

Mr. BURTON. I asked that question earlier, and they were very vague; they said they would get me some information. I would like to see some documentation from you, as well, if I could get that.

Major MESSING. At this point it is an allegation that has been made to me by an A-1 source and corroborated by a DOD official.

Mr. BURTON. If you could talk to that source and ask them to give it to me, I would like to talk to them.

You were talking about keeping the troops there until the situation was stabilized. I was just down there and I don't know that the economy is going to be able to come back in a year, and maybe not even 2 years; and the American people, I am not sure—and I might address this to Mr. Johnson as well. I am not sure that the American people will tolerate keeping their troops down there, especially if some unfortunate incidents occur where American troops are killed, because most people didn't want us to go in there anyhow, and having been there and seeing the lack of infrastructure and the terrible problems they face in getting businesses back—and there are less than 500 of 45,000 jobs that have returned, and many companies will not invest—how can we justify keeping troops there to stabilize the situation beyond 1 year or 2 years when there may be no end in sight? And is there any hope of bringing these jobs back?

Mr. ARONSON. Mr. Chairman, the point I was making is that some international presence ought to stay following the inauguration of the new government in February 1996 because I think it is asking too much for a brandnew government to take office and suddenly face an environment in which they have to test all of these new institutions with absolutely no security blanket. That will be the acid test. Are the new police loyal? Are they competent? Are there remnants of the old guard that are going to overthrow them?

I am not advocating that the United States forces stay, but under U.N. auspices, some visible presence remain in Haiti as a warning to everybody that the international community remains engaged and committed. I just think we are testing the system too much to pull everybody out just as a new government takes office.

That is exactly what we did with President Aristide's government; we really pulled out all the international monitors after the election and, in retrospect, we should have kept them there.

But I am not advocating United States troops; I think we could design a presence with a significant number of U.N. monitors and maybe some armed police trainers and monitors from other countries, Canada and elsewhere, that would be significant enough that everybody would know that the international community is still in Haiti. There is a risk in that, clearly; and if they were targeted, the smaller the force, the more likely somebody might take them on.

Mr. BURTON. Unfortunately, I have to run and vote. I will run and vote and come back.

But I would like to say this, Bernie, there was a policeman that was dragged out of the police force and killed by five people who were not accepted into the academy just recently, and that happened just because our troops pulled out of that area after they thought they had stabilized it, in a fairly stable area, and they said they thought they would have to go back in for an indeterminate period of time.

Think about that.

Mr. ARONSON. I am going to have to leave because I have a commitment that I absolutely can't break.

Mr. BURTON. Are you going to be up here on the Hill in the next 2 weeks?

Mr. ARONSON. At your pleasure.

Major MESSING. Mr. Chairman, I would like to finish my remarks when you get a chance.

Mr. BURTON. We will be back in just a minute. Would you gentlemen mind waiting for just a minute? I really apologize. We will be right back.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. I want to thank you gentlemen for your patience. I have some questions and I think Congressman Goss has as well.

Major Messing.

Major MESSING. Sir, just to briefly elaborate on one thing. The 42 combat—hostile combat actions against American troops that have taken place over the past few months, that I referred to, in theory you should be able to obtain that particular documentation that you referred to from your previous request earlier to the DOD representative.

I am just pointing out that this level of incidents indeed has been masked, and it has been verified to me by a DOD official. And the point I am trying to make is if, indeed, we are having these levels of hostile incidents against American troops, it shows that we are starting to lose a grip in Haiti and that the tide has turned. And I would like to elaborate on why I think the tide has turned.

When you approach any peacekeeping mission, just as in the Dominican Republic, just as in Grenada, which—as you know, I was there with you—just as Panama, which I visited after it occurred, and in the gulf war, Kuwait, which I was there, you have to always keep in mind as soon as stability occurs, you have to start working that shovel hard. You have to bring up the ability of the people to have clean water, to have a postal system, because you cannot have commerce without a postal system. And believe it or not, the U.S. Army has reserve units that do nothing but the postal stuff in civil affairs.

You have to bring up the medical care of the place. You have to do a myriad of things to bring—to resuscitate the dead body, or the body in a coma that you have come upon.

Clean water, you know, 80 percent of infant mortality can be associated with bad water, as you are well aware from your travels in El Salvador.

The point I am trying to make is, you have to have a very comprehensive plan before you go in. Before, not as you go in or *x*-number of months after.

I was appalled—appalled listening to the Government representatives talking about, oh, we are going to do this now and we are going to do this now. They should have had that in the—front-loaded into their planning. Military planners and State Department planners and NSC planners should have had that front-loaded into their thinking, and as soon as hostilities ended, they should have been paving roads. And I have seen them pave a mile a day when I was in Vietnam.

The engineer brigade should have been digging wells and restoring the electrical grid. They did restore the electrical grid, but to the point it was a temporary fix. They went down to 30 megawatts a day and less. I think it is low as 20 megawatts a day. That means food spoilage, you can't manufacture; it goes on and on.

The point I am trying to make is, without the military going in there and making an initial fix or attempt at nation-building or infrastructure work or whatever you want to call it, then you have an automatically built-in failure like we had in Somalia.

And I am not denigrating the troops. The troops are magnificent. I am denigrating the leadership. Let's separate the troops and the leadership; I want that perfectly clear. Because the troops there, they go there, they leave their families; because the fact is, they want to do the right thing, they want to do the honorable thing, and they suffer the—the 10th Mountain Division is suffering the highest divorce rates in the military right now because of three back-to-back deployments, Mr. Chairman: Hurricane Andrew, Somalia, and now Haiti. And they just pulled out and their division is in turmoil because of the family problems that have been generated to this family-oriented volunteer army.

Mr. BURTON. What I think we would like to do, Andy, you have raised a lot of issues. I think we would like to ask some questions about that. I know I would. I would also like to, as I said when I was leaving, ask Mr. Johnson and Mr. Weinstein some questions as well. But what you all are saying is that what has happened so far will only lead to failure because they didn't have a plan going in, or they have not yet developed a full-spectrum plan to deal with the problems you are talking about?

Major MESSING. I think that is correct and that, coupled with the fact that nobody wants to talk about the drug aspect of this and the fact that President Aristide has a \$4.5 million bounty on his head.

Mr. BURTON. Where do you get that figure?

Major MESSING. I got it from people who were protecting him, who had access to the information. Nobody wants to talk about how the drug dealers want to knock off President Aristide. America

shouldn't spend \$1.6 billion and x number of lives in an effort that is honorable, not to have it succeed.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Johnson, you indicated that you didn't think the 130,000 or 140,000 jobs that were there at the time Mr. Aristide left and later when our invasion took place—you don't think that those are likely to return and there are less than 5,000 now. If that is the case, how can this economy—given the infrastructure problems that you and Major Messing and others have talked about, how can this economy ever hope to recover; and if it doesn't recover, it seems if we stay there 1 or 2 or 3 years, it is not going to change anything.

Mr. JOHNSON. The point I was making, somehow those jobs have to return. If those jobs don't return, no other jobs will return. Those are the jobs that are—those employees have been working for companies which have Haitian experience and are the likely ones to return. Given the environment in Haiti, to expect a company which is looking for, as all companies do, a good business environment, a good political environment where there is stability and so on, it is just unreasonable to expect that a company searching for that kind of an offshore location is going to go to Haiti.

Mr. BURTON. I think it was you that indicated that there ought to be tax credits given and tax incentives for American business to go there or other businesses to go there. To what country are you talking? And to what country are you asking these tax credits be given? Haiti can't give the tax credits because they don't have the money.

Mr. JOHNSON. Bernie Aronson indicated at the end of his remarks that some consideration be given to some kind of a tax credit system for companies. I suppose he was talking about American tax credit for companies that would begin to return to Haiti or invest in Haiti.

I don't quite see how that would work, myself. I don't think that is really the fundamental need. I think the fundamental need that we see in the companies that we have surveyed—and we have really done a survey of the companies and we can supply that information to you and the committee—they really do need working capital. They are small capital companies, that produce in Haiti, and supply to the major retailers, the WalMarts and the Kmarts. But they themselves are not major, deep-pocket companies. That combined with the fact that they were very beat up during the embargo when they were forced out and had to move their equipment and sever their employees. For a small company, that was an expensive proposition.

As they come back now to their banks, the banks are telling them that you are not in good enough condition to take a \$500,000 or \$2 million loan to return to Haiti. This is an endemic problem for virtually all of these companies that we characterize as the kind of companies that have to return to Haiti if we are going to solve the problem—if we are going to get anywhere near that 100,000–150,000 number again.

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask one more question. I see our Chairman has returned, and we have Mr. Goss with us and Mr. Payne.

I have listened to everybody's testimony, hit and miss, running back and forth. And after hearing Major Messing saying there was



no plan going in that was going to take care of the necessities that you have to have to get an economy moving again and to have stability in a country like this, and because the infrastructure is not there, and because there really isn't a completely elected government, and because Mr. Aristide continues to have his cronies around him who, before, were a large part of the problem, it seems to me it is going to be very difficult to return democracy as you talked about, Mr. Weinstein, and develop an economy that is going to be able to employ another 140,000 people, because people don't have the incentives to go back in and there is still a problem with instability.

I will ask all three of you, how are we going to get this done, even if we put all this money in there and keep our troops there a year or 2 years? It seem it is like it is a Gordian knot.

Major MESSING. I would like to address that real quickly. Congress, from the get-go, should have funded this up front. When they don't fund up front, then the DOD will do it on the cheap. When this happens, you have to wind up—when you decide that there is going to be a peacekeeping mission somewhere in the world, you have to notify DOD that we are going to cooperate with you on this, because if you don't convey that impression right off the bat, and they think they are going to have to take a lot of things out of hide, then they are going to wind up doing it on the cheap and not doing a full-spectrum type of thing where they don't deal with the rifle and the shovel and do the proper infrastructure work that needs to be done in order to have a successful mission—peacekeeping mission in this case. That is the first thing.

The second thing is, future peacekeeping missions that you mandate, the President or the Congress mandate, you have to make sure that DOD understands that they are going to have the rifle in one hand and the shovel in the other.

And the third thing is you should, right now, concentrate on directing DOD, State Department—particularly AID and DOD—to concentrate on the infrastructure while they have the last vestige of muscle there. They should have done it at 21,000 soldiers, but now that we are down to 5,000 soldiers, it can still be accomplished. We can rotate Reserve and National Guard units in, that are combat engineer companies, the postal units that I was talking about, civil affairs units, a lot of them out of Senator Strom Thurmond's home State, that have the capability to do it. They were activated for Kuwait, and they did it in Panama and Grenada. There is time to do that before we turn it over to the U.N. mission.

I am offended, as a Monroe Doctrine advocate, that U.N. forces are in our hemisphere; they should be OAS forces, like Gen. Bruce Palmer talks about. You ought to hear the laudatory remarks about combined United States-OAS forces; you saw them in Grenada, and that is what we should be having. Bangladeshi soldiers on the pier at Port-au-Prince, watching the repatriation of American hemisphere Haitians, Americans guarding them, when they can't speak Creole or English; they don't have the vested interest as somebody from our hemisphere would have, especially from the Caribbean grouping. This should be an OAS—we shouldn't be turning over control to the United Nations. I find this completely bizarre.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Andy. I would like to hear from the other two gentlemen and then recognize the chairman.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, the figure \$1.5 or \$1.6 billion was floated about this morning as a figure, a total figure to date of what this mission has cost. It is not my impression that the American taxpayer is going to respond to a request for some huge amount to deal with the Haitian economy and all the social problems of 200 years.

I tell a story in Haiti that my Haitian friends of all political persuasions find amusing and agreeable. There are two solutions to the Haitian problem; one is realistic and one is utopian. The realistic solution is for 100,000 angels to come down from heaven armed with Uzis and disarm the island; the utopian solution is, Haitian political and economic leaders get together and begin to talk through and work out their problems. And that has been the utopian solution, and we have 5 weeks now, 5 weeks before this is out of our hands.

I know that is not a popular position to take in Washington today because, for all we know, President Clinton will be down there to preside over the transition. I am very proud of the small role our center played in working with the parliament to get the amnesty passed. We flew down in a military plane at that point to try to begin getting the generals out and President Aristide back and things moving.

But not everything that could have been done in the last 5 months has been done, and we are still harking back to what Haiti needs. I think you have heard some realistic talk from Peter Johnson here about what Haiti needs economically. I have tried to be realistic about what it needs politically.

There is no rational way in which all of this can be done in 5 weeks, or between now and next February or whatever, but we have to make a beginning. And if we do not, it seems to me that we at least ought to acknowledge that fact and settle for a more modest set of goals. But at least a beginning, Mr. Chairman.

At least a beginning is the idea that this election that is going forward can be held, under the circumstances, in as stable a way as possible and we emerge with an opposition that doesn't have to fly to Miami or Orlando or the Dominican Republic immediately after that election, if they lose, but they can stay at home and their minority rights will be protected.

At least what we have a right to expect is that this police force will not have hundreds of folks slipped in unvetted, but that it will be a responsible police force bereft of human rights abusers and not anybody's political guard.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, since we seem to be venting, I will vent a little bit myself, if I may. I feel it is important to get on record the outrage I feel—and surely others in this room—at the rather shameful response by some Haitians, whether impulsively or inspired, to the current mission by President Carter, General Powell, and Senator Nunn. How quickly they forget. An unnamed advisor to President Aristide is quoted in the Washington Post, stating about President Aristide's dinner guests, that we know, quoting, we have to watch all three of them carefully because they are tricky, sneaky.

One may disagree with the purposes of the mission honorably and responsibly. President Aristide seems to have been courteous about their presence, hospitable, but apparently this particular advisor does not recognize how many Haitian and American lives might have been shed needlessly to obtain the President's return but for the earlier efforts of President Carter, General Powell, and Senator Nunn. I think that particular remark has hovered over my testimony this morning. Thank you for letting me get it off my chest.

Mr. JOHNSON. You really asked the fundamental question. You are putting it right there. How are we going to get from here to there in a year? And we have lost—Major Messing is absolutely right; there has been a lot of time lost, and we are still losing time.

I have to come back to where I came from in my remarks and in the written testimony, that the only real fundamental way to stabilize a democracy, to put the underpinnings to a democracy, is to get the middle sector of the society cooking again in terms of job creation.

I don't see any magic wand to do something like this. The American taxpayers are certainly not going to pay for this for very much more time.

So I think a little invested in business and getting small businesses going in the middle of the community and in the middle of society is a very inexpensive price to pay for permanent jobs in Haiti.

Chairman GILMAN. I want to thank Congressman Burton for taking on the chairmanship. I have to go over to the Senate. I want to thank our three panelists. If I am hearing you correctly, the three most important elements right now are infrastructure, economy, and political structure. Getting all three done simultaneously with our limited resources in the short-term is not going to be easy. But I think we all recognize how important those three factors are.

So again, I want to thank our panelists. I am sorry that you have been delayed by the interruptions of voting. I thank Dan Burton for taking on the chairmanship for us. You will forgive me; I have to go over to the Senate and meet with my counterpart over there.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I also agree that it is a pity that there is a time put on the removal of our troops rather than the mission.

I did have some questions regarding the—I think that there was an attempt initially to try to get people from our hemisphere, as you mentioned, Major, that OAS and the Monroe Doctrine countries should be in charge. I think that there was an attempt early on to get the OAS involved, but there was not very much—since the main portion of the OAS is run out of Latin America and South America, there was not too much support, I think, other than Venezuela was the only Latin American country that showed any support.

But could you explain a little more about the problem that Aristide has with the drug dealers? I know that he—under the old system, it is alleged that the police chief of Port-au-Prince, Michel Francois ran the drug operation, and his brother, and that Aristide

was always opposed to the drug situation and that was one of the reasons why the military sort of wanted him out.

Could you just, if you know anything about that, elaborate on that situation? Because during the time that Aristide was out, the drug situation did increase. And I wonder now, has it started to decrease?

Major MESSING. The experts on this are based out of Miami with the DEA. There is an individual whose name I will give you after this hearing that you could consult with to get the full historical significance of drug trafficking for the past decade in Haiti.

Part of the problem with Aristide before, and one of the reasons he was removed was because of the fact that he dragged his feet on the drug trade activity under his first administration. I mean, it was a compilation of things, but that was one of the factors. Now that he is back and American forces are back—the American forces came in, drug traffic went down considerably.

I remember the first time I went into Haiti, which was August 1993—myself and a Frontline TV reporter went—going down to one of the places to look at where the boats were being built; and from here—from where I am sitting to where you are sitting were bales of marijuana and cocaine ready to be transported to the United States by awaiting boats. I mean, before Aristide and the American forces—the American forces came in and Aristide was returned to power, there was considerable amount of transshipment of drugs through Haiti. That is a fact.

After we came in, it dropped off precipitously to just about zero for a while, but now it is on the way up, according to the antidrug forces that I talk to.

But the point is that the economic nomenclatura, or however you say it, of Haiti and other dark side capitalists, in conjunction their Colombian counterparts, have threatened Aristide, according to an A-1 source that had been in the bodyguard detail of President Aristide. I will tell you one thing, if that American bodyguard detail leaves Aristide, he is a dead man. He is a dead man. So just keep that in mind as you are doing your deliberations.

But the point I am trying to make is, the Colombian drug cartels are interested in getting—by the way, tonight on “NBC Dateline” they are going to be talking about some of these drug activities and one of our advisers, a former U.S. Customs Commissioner, Willie von Raab, is going to be on there talking about the volumes of drugs that are coming into our country now. But Haiti was a major transshipment point, and when Haiti was shut down, all the drug activity went over to the East, to the Dominican Republic and to Puerto Rico. And the reason it is significant that it went to Puerto Rico, then containerized cargo is not inspected when it comes back to the United States. Nobody wants to talk about this drug activity. I am kind of appalled, personally.

Mr. PAYNE. I couldn't agree with you more. The issue seems like it has come off the radar screens. We used to have a Select Committee on Narcotics, but that was eliminated even before the contract. Charlie Rangel did an excellent job of keeping a focus on the drug problem worldwide, but now that we have saved a few dollars by eliminating the committee, there is no focus in the Congress at all on the whole problem of drugs.

But my time has just about expired. I just want to say that I really think that our troops did such an excellent job in Haiti. It is almost unbelievable that after 20,000-some-odd personnel that were sent there, that there has really been only 1 hostile casualty.

I was just reading several months ago of a maneuver in Florida where we lost five or six personnel by accident, just in that one maneuver, and to have such a large-scale operation and not have lost any person but one person is just—it is almost mind-boggling.

The other thing, just in conclusion, I heard you talk about the morale problem, and it is a whole new era, but this whole question of a military and what do we have a military for or what do people when they volunteer—when I was a kid they used to draft you, but when they volunteer for the military, I don't know what the expectations are of a person who is volunteering.

I mean, it is great to be able to stay at home, I guess, or be in a local place in Maryland, but when you join the military, I guess whatever happens happens. And you expect the worst, although you hope it doesn't happen. And I am just a little baffled about the fact that you were saying that we have some people—I guess we have been there a year or less, but that there are some—that there is a bad morale problem and people don't like to be there.

What I am trying to do is come to grips with the new military and what do we tell them the expectation is? What does a person in the military expect life to be for the 2 years they join?

Major MESSING. To give you a quick verbal burst, Congressman, when most people join the military right now, they have a vision that if they go to Somalia, they go there not to provide security but also to save lives. They don't go there just to stand around with a rifle in their hand. They want to build schools. Whether they are infantry or whether they are combat engineers or whether they are civil affairs people or whoever, they go there with the idea that they are leaving their wife and their children with the idea that they are going to do some altruistic mission. That did not occur. That created a major morale problem from our forces in Somalia and, guess what, that happened again in Haiti, except for the American special forces who were in the South.

But basically everyone goes like this while they wind up doing their civil action and civil affairs mission as they were trained to do. But the major conventional force units, which were the predominant force of Haiti, were precluded from participating or interacting with the Haitians and doing things like building schools, paving roads, and doing this and they cited budget reasons. Gee whiz, we are going to spend \$1.6 billion and we are not going to have too much to show for it; and we have had 42 combat—we have had 42 hostile incidents against the American military force in the past few months. That is an indicator that people have expectations, and the expectations are not being filled; and it reflects in the attitude of our American military. And again you were not here, sir, when I said, separate the troops from the leadership. The troops did a great job.

Mr. PAYNE. I saw—

Major MESSING. They believe, they sweat, they sacrifice; they do what they did when I was in Vietnam, what they did in Grenada,

what they did in Panama and Kuwait—they do what they do best. It comes to the leadership, sir.

Mr. PAYNE. In Rwanda, in 48 hours, they turned cholera around, where 5,000 people were dying a day just from drinking the water. In 48 hours, they dropped the number down to 800. When our troops go in, they do it well and make me proud to be an American and to see them in action. I saw them in Rwanda; when the people were dying in Goma, they turned the water around just like that.

Major MESSING. When you let them do civil action, civil affairs, and you let our combat engineer units go nuts doing infrastructure work they are happy troops. A busy troop is a happy troop. More than that, had we had that attitude, had the military leadership had that attitude, had they felt that the funding would have been given them by Congress, front-loaded so they didn't worry about it being out of hide, and had the executive branch at NSC and State Department and other places said, have at it, this would be an entirely different situation and you would not have a crabby Andy Messing here talking about how disappointed I am that we frittered away \$1.6 billion and several lives, one being an American special forces sergeant.

One other thing. There is an American captain that deserves a medal, not being admonished, for going down and checking on the civil rights, the humanitarian rights in that prison. Right now he is being threatened with a court martial because he decided he wanted to go there and take a look at things that were happening in a prison in Port-au-Prince. Half that prison was front-loaded by people put there by Francois before Aristide came back to power. Some were Aristide supporters.

He wanted to see the living conditions and what the treatment was of those prisoners; and this American captain, instead of being given a medal, he is being slapped and his career is finished and he is being threatened with a court martial. Unless I don't know something about this incident, unless he went down there and was threatening to blow up the place or went naked and was not doing what he felt morally correct in doing, then this is wrong and this is a reflection again on our military leadership.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, can I add a footnote related to the broader discussion we were having earlier?

Congressman Payne, good to see you again. There is a real difference between the status of forces of American troops in Haiti and some of these other examples you were using. Take Rwanda. American troops did an extraordinary job there. In Rwanda there was no government to have a dialog with. The troops were the de facto government, running the good things in Rwanda; just as when, during our Revolution, George Washington was the government, essentially as he moved about the country making civil decisions. The same was certainly true in Grenada, and the same was true in Panama; the same assuredly was true in West Germany and Japan after the Second World War.

You have a situation here, however, where we have terms of reference that complicate life enormously for American troops. Even if they want to do something, you have a Haitian Government skel-  
etally in operation, many branches of which were assisted by civic

action teams, some of whose leaders I met on one of the six trips I have taken to Haiti since last September.

You have the United Nations moving around. You have the OAS moving around. They are going to be monitors. You have the embassy. This hodgepodge of decisionmaking, frankly, sometimes got in the way of doing good things.

And then you have another problem, something that the chairman alluded to earlier, and it is a terrible problem, getting around. Mostly our troops there drive around very slowly just trying to get up, at least the ones in Port-au-Prince. So the government, the Prime Minister is in Petionville, the President is in Port-au-Prince; the communication process is, to say the least, very rudimentary.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Goss. You have been very patient.

Mr. GOSS. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.

It has been a long day, and we have had many things interceding since we started this hearing this morning; and it is good to get back to the subject. I am delighted to see these witnesses. They have all corroborated some of the thoughts and information we have had about the problem of getting on target with the economy and making it work. I think Mr. Johnson's remarks are on the mark there.

The costs that Mr. Weinstein has alluded to are staggering, and I don't think we know them all yet. I think there are clearly more coming, because we seem to be in there ironclad until February; and there are a lot of sort of unannounced arrangements that are going to have to be paid for, and I suspect the American taxpayer will pay for that.

As the major said, he is extremely frustrated and has shown it very well with what I would call the misuse of the military in a situation, in part, which has caused some real morale problems and left us wondering.

I have very few questions to address to you gentlemen because I think you have made yourselves very clear and the testimony you have given us is valuable. I hope you all have time to read the fourth report, or the report submitted on February 8—I don't know whether it was the fourth one or not, by President Clinton who has inquired to the Congress on what the situation is in Haiti. I am sorry I had to miss the questioning of the witnesses from the administration earlier today and I would like permission to submit to you, Mr. Chairman, through this committee, some questions that strike me as relatively important.

Mr. BURTON. Without objection.

Mr. GOSS. I think they have given us a report, which I recommend for your reading if you haven't seen it, which clearly underscores some of the successes that have been there which we should, as Americans, be very proud of, the fact that we have tried very hard on behalf of a friendly neighbor nearby to do something right to help them develop a viable economy and a stable democracy and peace and freedom, the fact it is a country that has never known that in its 200 years of existence and it is a very tall order.

What is not in the report from the White House, however, is perhaps more compelling than what is in. We get back into some of the cost areas there.

I am not quite sure what the new rules of engagement are going to be when we get the U.N. peacekeeping in there. We are going to have some of our military, 2,000, 3,000—something in that area; there is apparently going to be a double chain of command. The general in charge is going to report both to the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the one hand and to his superior in the U.S. military, which is a somewhat curious arrangement.

But more than that—whether that is going to work well or not, we will see—one of the cautions we have in that area in Congress is that we, I think, all felt a little bit that the Clinton administration had done an extremely assiduous job of discussing the Haitian affair with the United Nations, but perhaps had been less diligent discussing it with the U.S. Congress; and I hope we are not going to find ourselves back in that situation again.

But when you get down to the U.S. armed personnel—and I presume armed is the right word—I don't know whether these will be lightly armed or not armed; I don't know whether they truly are going into some kind of unarmed civil peacekeeping arrangement where the only time we can use force is in our defense if we happen to have it. The report is unclear.

The report is both retrospective and prospective. In the prospective areas, it says we will have a quick reaction force to provide backup support for other UNMIH forces. That has a bit of an ominous ring to it. What kind of backup support is that? And what is going to happen if we have the type of situation that we have read about since the report from the White House.

This is an AP report, if I may, Mr. Chairman, that talked about Limbe Haiti where a mob marched in and took over as soon as our forces left the local police function there, beat the lieutenant to death. We can be proud of ourselves for confiscating weapons, but it is not going to stop the habit in Haiti of beating and burning people. And this lieutenant was beaten and then burned and then buried.

The same gentleman who is going to be the top of the chain of command for United Nations, representing the Secretary, Gen. Laquedra Rameni—I don't know him; perhaps you do—he has commented and said, well, these are not problems that prevent the country from moving ahead.

I would suggest that stability is a very serious problem. I think it is great we have had no major incidents there, and I would expect we would have none. Sending 20,000 troops to basically an unarmed country should mean we do pretty well; the odds are quite good in our favor. We have, in fact, taken over the management of a small Caribbean nation in my view, and it is not Florida, but Haiti. We are the power.

The White House report starts very proudly suggesting that the mission has been accomplished, that we had to use all necessary means to secure the departure of the coup leaders, that has been done well and peaceably primarily thanks to the statesmanlike efforts of the three gentlemen who went there and saved the day at the last minute.



"To restore the legitimate democratically elected Government of Haiti to power" is an interesting question. I would suggest that the power in Haiti today is the U.S. military.

And then going on for the third objective, which is the tough one for the year ahead, which is to create a secure and stable environment which will allow the Haitian people to resume responsibility for rebuilding their country. That is what we want to help them in, but I have to caution—it is not selected Haitian people; it is all Haitian people and there is a very strong perspective in that country now that United States aid is all pro-Aristide, and if not pro-Aristide, it does not matter. We have to overcome that as well.

Going back to the cost questions, I read in this report a very plaintive request from the administration; and I know it is legitimate because we have just completed the process of the debate and the vote in the House on the supplemental DOD bill. The statement in this report is, without a timely passage of the supplemental appropriations bill, the net effect will be a significant decrease in overall military readiness. We are not talking about overall military readiness in Haiti, we are talking about the protection and security of the United States of America.

We have a shortfall here of \$2.6 billion. I would hope that we are not jeopardizing our national security and our readiness capability for \$2.6 billion. Be that as it may, I happened to go back to look and see that all those Members of Congress who were here, who advocated the invasion of Haiti and use of troops and this extraordinary commitment of dollars, these same folks could not find it in their hearts to vote in support of that emergency supplemental, by and large, that we passed earlier this week, which means there is a disconnect in the administration's political support on this Hill and is something they perhaps should look to. It is a fairly important disconnect.

The final point is, I read about all these other countries that are going to help us in the UNMIH operation, and it is quite a bunch. And on top of that, some of these are folks that are already there helping us with the multilateral force.

But when I look at the countries, they are small countries, and in many cases, I know they are countries that we have made arrangements that we are basically paying the troops. So we are in a position, it seems, where we are paying other countries for mercenary troops to give us either the camouflage of a multinational force in Haiti or the comfort of having other people there. At the same time, we are threatening the readiness of our own military forces of the United States of America, so says the White House report.

That is a very curious position to be in, and one, I think, Mr. Chairman, that your committee ought to pursue diligently in your role of oversight. Any comments, I would welcome. My desire is to bring stability and better economy and peace and democracy, but there are a lot of indicators there that show us we have a very tough struggle.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. We need to wrap this up in a few minutes for all our sakes. I am about to collapse and I have to catch an airplane.

Major MESSING. Congressman Goss, I couldn't agree with you more. There is a disconnect, and there is a disconnect of downsizing the military, at the same time giving them more tasks and less money, and not focusing them on things that wind up enabling them to accomplish their mission. So your perceptions, sir, are clear in that respect.

The solution to it is that we have to understand that these kinds of peacekeeping missions, when authorized by the executive and the legislative branches in a combined way, the legislative branch has the obligation to provide a measure of oversight in requiring the administration, the executive branch, to understand that they are going to have the money that they need to accomplish the mission in a correct manner; and this is part of the problem that has not occurred both in Somalia and here. If you don't front-load the operation with dough, it ain't going to get done right, and that is part of the main problem here.

And then we get into a problem where we whiz away money at a quantum rate and we don't get the job done; and we lose face and we have to drag in these cover forces. I am appalled, personally, that U.N. troops are being paid \$900 to \$1,000 per soldier. Some of these people, their wage in their own country is \$25 a month. A lot of these people view these nonregional forces coming in here as mercenaries, as you correctly put it, and a lot of these U.N. forces send in poorly trained and poorly disciplined troops. That is another aspect that we haven't addressed, the poorly disciplined U.N. troops that are engaging in this.

Mr. WEINSTEIN. The Congressman has raised a number of important issues. Let me point out the one that is likely to give a few nightmares to all of us within the next month and a half. United States becomes UNMIH command on March 31. By mid-April the election campaign is in full swing, and we have in Haiti 6,000 troops—about half of those United States troops under U.N. command, the rest, troops from different countries.

We will have the new police trainees beginning to trickle out in various ways. We will have some OAS election monitors wandering about. Will we have a plan? Will we have a structure? Will we have even a 911 number to call if you are getting the heck beaten out of you in the same town that the Congressmen indicated? This is not an abstract problem.

What happens then? Who comes from where through the traffic jams of Port-au-Prince, or do we use my 100,000 angels to deal with that? That is the concrete issue that I wish we could spend more time on.

Chairman GILMAN. I thank you for your comments and for your patience. I think is that this is a severe problem that we are going to have to deal with. We didn't front-load the planning, and hopefully it is not too late.

Thank you. This meeting stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

# APPENDIX

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STATEMENT BY

HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HEARING ON HAITI

FEBRUARY 24, 1995

CHAIRMAN GILMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR HOLDING THIS IMPORTANT HEARING AND FOR INVITING ME TO TESTIFY.

I WISH TO EXTEND MY CONGRATULATIONS TO CHAIRMAN GILMAN, WHO HAS WORKED WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, TO ASSIST IN THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY TO HAITI. I ALSO WISH TO COMMEND PRESIDENT CLINTON, WHO DESPITE THE ENORMOUS RESISTANCE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, PENTAGON, AND THE CIA, FOLLOWED THROUGH ON HIS PLEDGE TO RETURN PRESIDENT ARISTIDE TO HIS CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICE AND ASSISTED IN HAITI'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY. I ALSO WISH TO EXTEND MY PRAISE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, COUNTRIES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) WHICH DEMONSTRATED WHAT UNITY IN THIS HEMISPHERE CAN ACCOMPLISH.

FOR THREE YEARS, THE UNITED STATES AND COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD MAINTAINED A COMMITMENT TO HAITI OF RESTORING THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT. AT THE END OF THAT LONG STRUGGLE ON OCTOBER 15, 1994, I, ALONG WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HOUSE, HAD THE HONOR OF LEADING A CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION THAT RETURNED WITH PRESIDENT ARISTIDE TO PORT-AU-PRINCE. IT WAS A HEART WARMING AND MEMORABLE JOURNEY. PRESIDENT ARISTIDE ELOQUENTLY SPOKE OF RECONCILIATION - "NO TO VIOLENCE, NO TO VENGEANCE, YES TO RECONCILIATION" HE UTTERED. THIS WAS A SPECIAL DAY FOR AMERICANS, BEING PART OF THE SOLUTION FOR A CARIBBEAN NEIGHBOR RATHER THAN PART OF THE PROBLEM.

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FROM THE BEGINNING OF OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, PRESIDENT ARISTIDE'S UNRELENTING CALL FOR RECONCILIATION HAS BEEN ADHERED TO. IN THE FIVE MONTHS SINCE OUR TROOPS ENTERED HAITI, WE HAVE LOST ONE AMERICAN SOLDIER. OUR TROOPS HAVE BEEN WELCOMED BY THE HAITIAN PEOPLE. HAITIAN-ON-HAITIAN VIOLENCE REMAINED AT AN ALL TIME LOW. ON JANUARY 30, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, HAVING DETERMINED THAT A SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT EXISTED IN HAITI, PASSED RESOLUTION 975, PROVIDING FOR THE TRANSITION FROM THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF) TO THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH). THE UNMIH TRANSITION WILL BE COMPLETED ON MARCH 31. THE NUMBER OF US FORCES IN HAITI HAS DECLINED FROM 20,000 TO ABOUT 6,100 AT THE PRESENT TIME. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT APPROXIMATELY 3,000 US TROOPS WILL BE PART OF THE UN MISSION.

DESPITE THE OBVIOUS SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS BY THE ARISTIDE GOVERNMENT TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS CLIMATE IN THE COUNTRY, I AM SURPRISED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD, ONCE AGAIN, RELEASE A REPORT MAKING UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THIS REPORT NOT ONLY WENT BACK FOUR YEARS TO THE TIME JUST PRIOR TO ARISTIDE'S ELECTION, IT AGAIN INCLUDED ALLEGATIONS FROM INDIVIDUALS WHO SUPPORTED THE COUP. FURTHERMORE, IT FAILED TO REPORT SYSTEMATIC EFFORTS BY THE ARISTIDE ADMINISTRATION TO CARRY OUT JUDICIAL REFORM, HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION AND PROMOTION AND ACTIONS TO BRING TO JUSTICE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE THOUSANDS OF MURDERS COMMITTED DURING AND AFTER THE COUP.

AFTER THE OUSTING OF PRESIDENT ARISTIDE, THE LEVEL OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DID, IN FACT, ESCALATE. DURING THIS TIME, ATTACHES, FRAPH MEMBERS AND ARMED BANDITS TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE CLIMATE TO CARRY OUT POLITICAL AND CRIMINAL KILLINGS. HOWEVER, AS THE REPORT POINTED OUT, UNDER "ARISTIDE II" THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION HAS IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY. FURTHERMORE, FOLLOWING THE RESTORATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY INITIATED A PROGRAM THAT CREATED AN INTERIM POLICE FORCE. THE PROGRAM INCLUDED: INTERNATIONAL POLICE MONITORS (IPM'S), AN INTERIM PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES (IPSF), POLICE TRAINEES FROM THE US SAFE HAVEN IN GUANTANAMO, AND A NEW POLICE ACADEMY.

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THE INTERIM POLICE FORCE WILL OPERATE IN HAITI UNTIL A PERMANENT PROFESSIONAL POLICE FORCE CAN BE TRAINED. IN COOPERATION WITH CANADA AND FRANCE , THE US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HAS ESTABLISHED A NATIONAL POLICE ACADEMY TO TRAIN A PERMANENT PROFESSIONAL POLICE FORCE. THE FIRST CLASS BEGAN TRAINING ON JANUARY 31. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 4,000 INDIVIDUALS WILL BE TRAINED.

THE HAITIAN ECONOMY IS IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF RECOVERY. THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO A VARIETY OF MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMY SUCH AS PRIVATIZATION OF MOST PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, AND REASSURANCE TO POTENTIAL FOREIGN INVESTORS. I HAVE RECENTLY MET WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, SMARCK MICHEL, WHO EXPRESSED HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE SLOW PROGRESS OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND THE NEED FOR JOB CREATION.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ALONG WITH THE UNITED STATES HAVE STRENGTHENED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION. DURING THE JANUARY 30-31 CONSULTATIVE GROUP MEETING IN PARIS DONORS PLEDGED UP TO \$900 MILLION IN ASSISTANCE TO HAITI. MAJOR DONOR SUPPORT THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN APPROVED AND PARTIALLY DISBURSED INCLUDE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT FROM THE WORLD BANK (\$40 MILLION), INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (\$40 MILLION) AND US GOVERNMENT (\$40 MILLION). THE UNITED STATES HAS COMMITTED \$87 MILLION IN ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND \$57 MILLION IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. IN THE INTEREST OF OUR MAINTAINING OUR REPUTATION, WE MUST FOLLOW THROUGH ON THIS PLEDGE.

KEEPING THE COMMITMENT TO ADVANCE COMMERCIAL REGENERATION IN HAITI, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, STROBE TALBOTT, WILL LEAD A PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MISSION IN MARCH. THIS MISSION WILL BE COMPRISED OF SOME 30 US FIRMS FROM A BROAD SPECTRUM OF INDUSTRIES. IN ADDITION, THE US-HAITI BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, WHICH WILL BE INAUGURATED DURING THIS VISIT, WILL PROVIDE A FORUM TO FOSTER GREATER INTERACTION BETWEEN US AND HAITIAN OFFICIALS AND BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVE . THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OPENED ITS OFFICE IN HAITI ON FEBRUARY 6.

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US AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERVICE ONE-STOP SHOP CENTER, LOCATED IN NEW YORK CITY, WILL PROVIDE ON-SITE TRADE AND INVESTMENT COUNSELING TO US EXPORTERS AND INVESTORS INTERESTED IN DOING BUSINESS IN HAITI.

THE HAITIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT UNDER PRIME MINISTER SMARCK MICHEL IS FUNCTIONING. THE TRAINING OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE WAS LAUNCHED BY THE US ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE PROGRAM ON JANUARY 17 IN COOPERATION WITH THE HAITIAN JUSTICE MINISTRY. IT IS EXPECTED THAT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN JUNE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN NOVEMBER.

INITIALLY, THE US MILITARY PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE IN HAITI WAS MET WITH A GREAT DEAL OF SKEPTICISM. BUT TODAY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD BE PROUD OF WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. I SALUTE PRESIDENT CLINTON AND CONGRESS FOR BEING PART OF THE SOLUTION FOR A CARIBBEAN NEIGHBOR. IT IS INCUMBENT UPON US NOT TO ALLOW LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS TO SHRINK FROM OUR RESPONSIBILITY AND TO WORK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN REBUILDING THE ECONOMY OF HAITI.

I URGE THAT CONGRESS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY AND THAT WE HONOR OUR PLEDGE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN

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**Congress of the United States**  
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TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
BY PORTER GOSS (FL-14)  
24 FEBRUARY 1995

It has been 159 days since more than 20,000 U.S. troops occupied Haiti. Although there are now fewer than 6,000 U.S. troops there, the bills for U.S. operations in Haiti are still mounting and have now passed the \$850 million mark. Despite all of this manpower and money, little lasting progress has been made toward an orderly and safe withdrawal of our troops and a shift of responsibility for the fate of Haiti to the Haitian government.

Recent reports indicate that the Clinton Administration has been less than candid about operations in Haiti by failing to acknowledge the genuine fragility of both the security situation there and the reconstituted Aristide government. The tenuousness of both of these could lead to deadly consequences for our troops as the transition to a UN mission is made.

The much-touted "secure and stable" environment is clearly tenuous. We have seen reports of unrest in Limbe, prison riots in Port-au-Prince, politically motivated intimidation campaigns, periodic food rampages, rampant crime, violent land disputes, and signs of growing frustration about the lack of jobs and progress in some sectors of Haitian society. Problems that are simmering today could easily erupt during the transition when the U.N. plans to rely heavily on Haitians to provide law and order.

The Aristide government isn't up to the job. Today, for example, it often takes the direct intervention of the Prime Minister or the President to get a ship offloaded by workers in one of the government run ports. As a whole, the Aristide government lacks institutional depth and today our troops are taking up the slack by providing many governmental functions through out the country. In instances when our troops have attempted to hand responsibilities over, such as fuel deliveries for example, Haitian authorities have been largely unable to follow-through.

The problems the Aristide government faces are being compounded daily by the flood of refugees being forcibly returned from all around the Caribbean and the 4,000 Haitians we repatriated against their will in recent weeks. The refugees are often disgruntled and frightened and many are camped in Port-au-Prince demanding jobs from a government that simply cannot deliver.

It is also clear that the Haitian Interim Police Force are not up to the job of providing for law and order, as it will be called

upon to do when UNMIH takes over on 31 March. The Haitian IPSF remain afraid to patrol on their own, generally do not command the respect of the Haitian people, and are largely lacking in training. Across the board, while the Aristide government may have the will to follow-through it does not yet have the ability.

These problems come as no surprise to many of us who maintained throughout the lead-up to the occupation that moving from the return of Aristide to a safe and orderly hand-off of Haitian affairs to Haitians was NOT going to be a short-term, low-cost venture. The Administration is now talking about having our soldiers in Haiti as part of the U.N. mission until February of 1996 and pouring untold amounts of money (recent estimates project \$1.6 billion by early 1996) into a small nation that seems utterly incapable of absorbing that kind of infusion.

How do we make genuine progress from where we are today? The first priority must be to move the elections process forward at the earliest possible date. In 1991, President Aristide appeared not to understand that democracy means shared power rather than consolidation of power. Today, lack of progress on the elections means that Aristide rules without any checks or balances. Already we have seen his willingness to take action by what amounts to decree. He apparently promulgated his own version of the electoral law, for example, rather than that passed by the duly elected National Assembly. You cannot build a democracy without a parliament. The time for elections is clearly now.

Hand-in-hand with those elections must be concerted effort by U.S. policymakers to seek a more even-handed approach in aid programs and political support. Throughout the Haitian crisis, the Clinton Administration showed a marked tendency to put the interests of one man (President Aristide) above the Haitian constitution, above the Haitian parliament and above true democracy in Haiti.

If you talk to a broad range of Haitians or the OAS observers you will find that Americans are not considered to be "impartial." We appear to have taken sides and that cannot continue. I am particularly concerned about recent reports of Aristide's attempt to politicize the police force and I hope our Administration will follow-through on its pledge not to allow him that leeway.

As the election cycle gets underway the need for balance in what we do in Haiti will become paramount. All political parties will be looking for signs of unfairness. A failed elections cycle could jeopardize everything that U.S. soldiers and U.S. taxdollars have been working for because in Haiti, a contested election is contested forever.

All of the efforts on "governance" issues will mean nothing if we don't redirect current aid programs from "handouts" to programs designed to bring genuine economic development to Haiti. What there was of the Haitian economy has been decimated by a complete



lack of effective governing and the U.S. led embargo of the past three years. It is clear that even a few months of relative calm have not put the economy on the track to recovery. Prices have not come down. It remains extremely difficult to move goods in and out of the country. And currency instability, the lack of law and order, and the lack of meaningful laws to protect private property stand as significant barriers to the return or start-up of businesses. Even the economic elites in Haiti who have traditionally made up the backbone of Haitian commercial activity are unwilling to take the risks associated with jumpstarting the economy.

Despite the obstacles, there are American and Haitian businesses interested in going back to work there. An increased availability of investment capital and incentives would facilitate that process. While we are encouraged by signs that OPIC and U.S.A.I.D. are working on investment programs, time is clearly of the essence.

As many of you know, I have had fundamental disagreements from the outset with the Clinton Administration's approach to the crisis in Haiti. Today the occupation is a fait accompli; the invasion debate is over; and the United States is now running a small Caribbean nation. But my bottom line has not changed: we should move as quickly as possible to get our men and women in uniform out of Haiti and to handoff the responsibility for that country to a newly and duly elected parliament and president because, in the end, only Haitians can solve Haiti's problems.

## STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE STROBE TALBOTT  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, Under Secretary Slocombe and I welcome the chance to give you a progress report on the U.S.-led, 31-nation effort that has rescued a neighboring country from disaster, restored stability in our region, and defended our nation's values and interests. Operation Uphold Democracy has fully lived up to its name. It has peacefully ousted Haiti's brutal dictators, restored its legitimate government, established a secure and stable environment, and is now preparing to pass the baton to a United Nations force under a U.S. Commander.

We cannot yet say "mission accomplished." We have another year of work ahead of us. But we can say, "So far, so good." This mission, while still a work in progress, is well on its way to being a success. Five months after President Clinton sent our troops to their country, Haitians are constructing roads to advance commerce and build a civil society rather than boats to escape terror.

Let me briefly review how far we have come. It was nearly four years ago that a military coup transformed Haiti's newborn democracy into a nightmare of repression. A violent regime took power, one that crushed its opponents and caused tens of thousands of Haitians to flee from their shores toward ours. With the support of that regime, paramilitary gangs assassinated opposition leaders and priests who spoke out. Murder, mutilation, rape, and the kidnapping of children were not just officially sanctioned -- often officially perpetrated -- crimes; they were instruments of rule. They became common tools for dealing with citizens and families suspected of supporting democracy. Meanwhile, the economy, long the weakest in the hemisphere, plummeted deeper into ruin.

For three years, the United States and other countries around the world tried everything short of force to remove the coup leaders and restore Haiti's democratically-elected

government. Persuasion, negotiation, mediation, condemnation, sanctions -- all to no avail. It wasn't until last September, when the coup leaders knew that the President had ordered U.S. armed forces into action, that they agreed to give up power peacefully.

Think for a moment where we would likely be today had we not acted:

-- The dictators would still be in power, and their campaign of murder and terror against the Haitian people would be continuing.

-- Tens of thousands of Haitians would be seeking refuge abroad, posing a threat to America's borders and to regional stability as well. The Bahamas and other small island democracies in the Caribbean would be faced with the prospect of being overwhelmed by a mounting flood of desperate humanity.

-- The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard would still be diverting massive resources, on an open-ended if not permanent basis, to manage migrant interdiction along our own coastline. These are resources that would otherwise be available to stop smuggling, protect our fisheries, reduce the flow of illegal drugs, and save lives at sea. More generally, we would be faced with more years like 1994, when we spent nearly \$300 million to deal with Haitian migrants, sanctions enforcement, and humanitarian relief. These were the costs of non-intervention, recurrent costs for which -- absent our willingness to use force -- there was no end in sight.

-- Furthermore, the enemies of democracy elsewhere in the region -- coup-plotters lurking in the shadows of other capitals in the hemisphere -- would be more inclined to

believe that they could act with impunity; that they, too, like the Haitian coup leaders of 1991, could overthrow democratically elected governments.

-- And finally, the United States and the international community would have failed to fulfill our commitments in the face of a coup that President Bush described as an extraordinary threat to our national security; that Secretary of State Baker said should not stand; and that President Clinton, the United Nations and the Organization of American States declared unacceptable.

Had it not been for the deployment of the U.S.-led Multinational Force on September 19, your Committee, Mr. Chairman, might well be holding a very different sort of hearing today -- a hearing to survey the damage sustained, and the damage to come, as a result of a crisis allowed to fester.

There was, of course, widespread controversy over our Administration's decision to use force in Haiti. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch and I made clear when we came before this Committee on September 27th of last year, we understood the concern and the skepticism. So did the President. As Commander in Chief, he considers no responsibility more serious than the one he assumes when he sends the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces into harm's way.

Thanks in the first instance to the superb performance of Generals Shelton, Meade, and Fisher, their officers and the troops under their commands, Operation Uphold Democracy has set a new standard for the degree of peace and civic order that has been kept in a peace-keeping operation.

From the moment the armed services began planning, they demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to adapt to change, to

identify and understand the problems, and to solve them effectively. When the Haitian military dictators agreed to step down, within minutes we were able to recall our assault forces, and within hours shift to a force suitable for intervention in a permissive environment. In the months that have passed, our military's accomplishments -- which have ranged from quelling initial outbreaks of Haitian-on-Haitian violence to disarming the paramilitary gangs to, literally, turning the lights back on in Haitian cities -- have been truly outstanding.

From the beginning of the operation, President Clinton instructed the military commanders on the ground that their first responsibility was to safeguard our men and women in uniform. In the five months since our troops entered Haiti, we have lost one brave American soldier in the line of duty: Special Forces Sergeant Gregory Cardott, who was shot when he went to investigate a disturbance that arose from an isolated crime at a toll-collection point.

Mr. Chairman, while we pay tribute to the American soldiers serving in Haiti, we must also remember that Operation Uphold Democracy is a truly multinational effort, with participation from 30 other nations. In this regard, I particularly want to say a few words about the contributions of the 11 nations of the Caribbean Community. Haiti's CARICOM neighbors took an international leadership role by calling for forceful action to remove the coup leaders, and each of these 11 states has matched its words with deeds, by contributing soldiers or police, or both, to the multinational force.

Mr. Chairman, the success to date of Operation Uphold Democracy was also due to the lessons that we learned from previous experiences in peacekeeping, multilateral and other operations:

-- From U.S. operations in Grenada and Panama, we learned the importance of inter-service cooperation, joint and inter-agency planning and operational flexibility. The lifting of a U.S. Army division from a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier took the concept of combined operations to a new level.

- And from the Gulf War, we learned how American leadership in multilateral fora can spur the actions of others, reduce our burdens, and enhance our effectiveness. UN Security Council Resolution 940 authorizing "all necessary means," the Multinational Force, and the handoff to the United Nations Mission are all conscious adaptations of the Desert Storm experience.

Mr. Chairman, credit for the current success of Operation Democracy is also due to President Aristide, Prime Minister Smarck Michel, members of the Haitian parliament, Mayor Evans Paul of Port-au-Prince, and other democratic leaders of Haiti. And, of course, credit is due to the Haitian people themselves. Remember, Mr. Chairman, some of the fears and warnings that were in the air at the time when this mission began: some said that President Aristide would choose vengeance over reconciliation; that Haitians would fight, rob and slaughter each other in a frenzy of lawlessness; and that efforts to rebuild Haiti's democracy and economy would never get off the ground.

Instead, in overwhelming numbers, the Haitian people have heeded President Aristide's consistent call for reconciliation. They are joining together to begin building a new society. They have shown immense resilience, courage -- and, I might add, restraint -- in the face of enormous challenges. Moreover, they have also shown a gratifying and richly deserved degree of appreciation for our troops. All across the country, from Port-de-Paix to Les Cayes, our soldiers are now greeted each day by

signs bearing three simple words: "Thank you, America."

So Under Secretary Slocombe and I come before you with a sense of confidence and optimism. But we also come with our eyes open to the magnitude of the challenge that remains -- for us and for the international community in the coming months, and, more importantly, for the Haitian people themselves in the coming years and decades. Before the coup of September 1991, Haiti was, as I mentioned, the poorest country in the hemisphere; it may take until the end of this decade for its people to work their way back even to that level.

A devastated economy is only part of the legacy with which Haiti must cope. This is a country still struggling to banish the ghosts of its past. Its people must learn new habits and new ways of working together as they try to overcome a long history of social polarization, political instability and institutionalized brutality. As President Aristide so frequently and memorably puts it, Haitians will have to work hard simply to move "from misery to poverty with dignity."

But we must also place Haiti's problems in the context of the extraordinary progress that its people have made in just five months. All that we've given to the Haitian people is an opportunity -- an opportunity for them to resume the hard work of sustaining their democratic institutions and building a viable market economy. But having been given a second chance -- after four long, lost years -- the Haitian people are making the most of that opportunity.

Today, thanks to Operation Uphold Democracy, the Haitian people live in an environment that is -- in relative terms -- safe, secure and free of political violence. They have made progress in breathing life back into democratic institutions. And they have begun to jump start their dead economy, by

initiating free market reforms, and by seeking the investments they need for long-term growth.

Let me examine each of these topics -- security, democracy, and economics -- in turn.

When the United States sent its troops to Haiti, our mission was to restore the legitimate government, and to create a secure and stable environment in which it could function. Thanks to the Haitian people's desire to end the violence that has plagued their nation and the cooperation of our allies in the multinational force, we have been largely successful.

A few statistics illustrate this point. When our troops arrived in Haiti, there were an average of 10 to 15 serious incidents of organized political violence reported each week. Those have virtually disappeared. Incidents of criminal violence remain at a very low level as well: in Port-au-Prince there are now an average of 18 violent crimes being reported each week -- a figure far below those of other cities in the hemisphere with similar-size populations.

The multinational force has recovered nearly 30,000 individual weapons, through buybacks, by seizing weapons caches, and by setting up roadblocks. There is no doubt that many weapons are still in the wrong hands. But the multinational force made the right decision not to go door to door to try to root out every criminal, gun, or thug. That was not our mission, and it would have been impossible -- and indeed illegal under the Haitian constitution, which protects gun ownership within the home. Our goals, instead, were to create a generally secure environment in which the democratic government could take hold and to establish new civilian-controlled professional security forces as the first line of protection for the Haitian people.



In this, we have made good progress. In the three months following the intervention, over 3,000 recruits for the Haitian Interim Public Security Force received transition training at a facility provided by the government of Haiti, funded by the Department of State, managed by the Department of Justice, and supported by the U.S. military. Over 900 Haitian migrants received comparable training at the camps in Guantanamo. These interim security forces are now on the streets of Haiti -- increasingly responsive to the civilian authorities and acting as public servants, rather than as official thugs.

These interim security forces are monitored and assisted by more than 600 International Police Monitors, or IPMs, spread throughout the country. These IPMs are police officers, recruited from more than 20 countries on 6 continents, under the leadership of former New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly. They are protagonists in one of the great success stories in the annals of international peacekeeping. Recruited, trained, and deployed in less than six weeks, the distinctive IPM "yellow hats" have restored the confidence of the Haitian people that police exist to serve and protect society, not to brutalize it.

In organizing the Interim Public Security Force we have worked with the government of Haiti to remove individuals involved in serious human rights abuses, or narcotics trafficking. All senior officers of the Haitian army have been released from active duty. More than 2,000 former soldiers have been enrolled in a program of counseling and job training funded by USAID, and run by the International Office of Migration. The government of Haiti is continuing to pay these soldiers' salaries as they go through the retraining process.

We have made it clear to the government of Haiti that the decision whether to retain a military is theirs to make. For our part, we are ready to work with Haitian government officials to

make sure that the process of demobilization, however far it may go, takes place in an orderly, equitable and constitutional fashion, consistent with President Aristide's emphasis on reconciliation.

Mr. Chairman, candidates for a permanent civilian police force are now being recruited and trained by our Justice Department, in cooperation with French, Norwegian and Canadian police, at the new National Police Academy in Camp d'Application, Port-au-Prince. We have insisted that all trainees enter the Academy on the basis of merit -- their performance in the entrance exams -- rather than personal or political affiliation. We regard the entrance exams as a crucial filter in breaking the cycle of personal and political security forces that have dominated Haiti's history.

The first class of Civilian Haitian Police entered in January and will graduate in May. About 350 graduates will be deployed each month, building up to a force of at least 4,000 that will replace the Interim Public Security Force. This new, accountable, professional, apolitical police force will be a dramatic improvement over the violent, corrupt security forces of the past.

For all these reasons, life in Haiti is generally secure today. The simple activities of everyday life -- street vendors plying their wares, children going to school, and families attending church services -- have come alive again. Thousands of men, women and children who were in hiding or in exile during the dark days of military rule -- from members of Parliament to mayors to clergy to entrepreneurs -- have resumed normal lives. The flood of refugees from Haiti -- which hit a high of over 3,000 per day in July of last year -- has virtually stopped. Since September 19, the Coast Guard has helped more than 13,000 Haitians -- including all but a few hundred at Guantanamo -- to

return home.

Another measure of the security of the situation in Haiti is the pace with which we are moving to turn the Multinational Force's responsibilities over to the United Nations Mission. We are right on schedule. On January 20, the MNF Commander, Major General Meade, and the member states of the multinational force reported to the UN Security Council that "a secure and stable environment" had been established. On January 30, the Security Council passed Resolution 975 authorizing the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to build up to a force of 6,000 troops and 900 police, and to take over from the Multinational Force by no later than March 31. The process of transition has already begun, and will accelerate through next month.

The United Nations Mission is enabling us to continue the draw down of American forces in Haiti. U.S. forces reached a peak of 21,000 in early October. Together with their colleagues from the multinational force, they established 27 bases and made their presence felt in each of the 133 districts of Haiti. As the situation began to stabilize in November, we started to withdraw our troops. Today there are about 5,600 American soldiers in Haiti. That number will be cut by more than half when the UN Mission begins at the end of next month.

The United Nations forces in Haiti will be commanded by an American, Major General Joseph Kinzer, and include about 2,400 American troops. Two-thirds of the forces that will comprise the UN Mission will carry over from the Multinational Force, and are already on the ground in Haiti, including the Bangladeshis, the Nepalese contingent, and the CARICOM battalion. The largest contingents still to come are from Pakistan and India. I should add that the United Nations will assume the costs for the American and international forces and the international police, costs that the United States has been paying up until now. This

means that the U.S. share of the UNMIH costs will be just over 30% until October 1, and only 25% thereafter. As Secretary Christopher noted in a broader context, when testifying before your Committee last month, "this is a sensible bargain I know the American people support."

Our success at helping the Haitian people create a secure environment has also helped Haitians to strengthen their fragile political institutions. Let me turn now to that subject.

President Aristide has set the tone of tolerance and reconciliation for his entire country. He returned to Haiti with one of the largest democratic mandates of any political leader in the Western hemisphere. Yet from the beginning, he has reached out beyond his own enormous constituency. Through his cabinet and other appointments, President Aristide is building bridges to all sectors of society, from the elite families to the residents of the slums of Cite de Soleil.

Immediately upon his return, President Aristide met with parliamentary leaders from all sides of the political spectrum to set a common, cooperative agenda. On crucial matters -- such as appointing a Supreme Court and drafting a new police law and amnesty legislation -- he has worked with the Haitian Parliament, not around them. Thanks in large part to President Aristide's leadership, the Parliament passed the first national budget that Haiti has had in five years. And he personally helped broker an agreement among all the political factions on the arrangements for the national elections that will take place on June 4.

This is a record of which any executive and legislature could be proud -- even in a country less shattered, polarized, and traumatized than Haiti. But faced with high expectations, Haiti's political leadership still confronts daunting challenges. Aristide's cabinet ministers took over ministries that the

dictators had stripped of basic supplies -- even plumbing. There are few professionals below the ministerial level to implement decisions. Haiti's judicial system, which was never strong to begin with and collapsed under the Cedras regime, must be completely renovated.

The necessary changes will not be accomplished overnight, or by any single person or political party. That is one reason why, from the beginning, our primary goal has been to promote the process of democracy. To that end, we are working with the United Nations mission and the Organization of the American States to ensure that the June legislative and local elections, as well as the Presidential elections in December, are as open and fair as possible. With this objective in mind, the responsibilities of the UN Mission will end by February 1996, with the inauguration of President Aristide's democratically elected successor.

However, no matter how successful the Haitian people are at establishing a secure environment or building democratic and legal institutions, stability will elude them without strong, steady, broad-based economic growth. Haiti has a per capita income of about \$250 a year, making it one of the poorest countries in the world. It also has one of the worst infrastructures of any country in the world, including the most expensive, least efficient port in the western hemisphere. Its roads are almost non-existent, and it has among the world's fewest telephones per capita. Bringing the economy to life will be Haiti's most difficult task, for no amount of goodwill can undo two centuries of damage to natural resources, and no amount of hard work can replace the national treasures that past despots have carted away.

For its part, the international community is doing its fair share by providing aid and technical assistance. Prior to the

deployment of the MNF, international donors and lenders met in Paris in August and determined that Haiti would need \$650 million in the first year after democracy was restored. This group met again in Paris last month to review the progress that has been made since President Aristide's return, and the general assessment of this progress was so positive that the donors actually pledged \$1.2 billion, nearly double what had originally been proposed. It is anticipated that \$900 million of that \$1.2 billion will be available over the next 12-18 months.

I should note that the non-American donors and lenders have provided over 75% of these funds, making this, from an American standpoint, the most successful instance of burdensharing in the history of the hemisphere. In Haiti, we are demonstrating that American leadership can leverage tremendous power and resources on behalf of a common good.

For our part, the United States is contributing, through the Agency for International Development, approximately \$162.2 million for fiscal year 1995. As in previous years, much of our assistance -- \$73.4 million -- will go for humanitarian aid: supplying medical care for two million Haitians, food for 1.3 million people, and providing 50,000 short term jobs until other donor job creation programs become operational. Our Jobs Creation Program will result in 1,100 kilometers of rehabilitated roads; 31,000 hectares of improved irrigated land; and 1,100 kilometers of restored drainage canals.

We will spend \$30.7 million for governance: to support municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections; establish an independent Ministry of Justice; move local governance from a system of intimidation to one of public participation; provide jobs and outplacement services to members of FAD'H who have not been retained as Interim Security Force; strengthen key institutions such as the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate;

assist in conflict resolution and mediation; and provide support to key ministries. Let me note that the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) have been participants in our democracy program. NDI is currently actively engaged in preparing for the upcoming elections, and we hope IRI will also become involved.

\$58.1 million of FY 95 AID funds will go to spur economic growth, by increasing foreign exchange availability; providing assistance in paying arrears to international financial institutions; and by supporting activities in agriculture, education, the environment, and private sector development.

This last item is, of course, particularly crucial: Haiti's real economic future lies in the private sector. That is why President Aristide has committed his government to a far-reaching program of free market reform. That program includes the nearly total abolition of tariffs; a reduction of the civil service by up to 50%; a fiscally responsible budget; and the privatization of state-held enterprises. Other steps towards a free market include the removal of most exchange controls, the modernization of commercial law provisions, and a decentralization of many economic powers of the central government. These reforms are far sighted, based on sound economics, and deserving of international support.

To encourage private investment, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation has announced that it is prepared to provide \$100 million in finance and political risk insurance to support American private investment. It is in the process of setting up loan facilities with American banks that have operated in Haiti for many years, and have already identified some good potential ventures.

At the Paris meeting last month, we proposed the

establishment of a multinational enterprise fund, similar to the ones that we have set up for Eastern Europe and South Africa. This proposal has attracted substantial international donor interest; we see it being capitalized at up to \$40 million, with funds provided by the European Community, the World Bank, the United States, and Japan. We have also asked that the Senate ratify the bilateral investment treaty with Haiti that is now before it.

On March 7-8, I will accompany a delegation of several dozen corporate CEOs to Haiti to explore ways to spur private investment. The mission will also provide the occasion for the first meeting of the U.S.-Haiti Business Development Council, which will bring together business and government representatives of both countries to strengthen private sector cooperation and development. We are also organizing nearly a dozen sector-specific business missions to Haiti, bringing more than 200 U.S. business executives in direct contact with Haitian businesses and government decision makers. In view of the significant overhaul needed for Haiti's infrastructure and manufacturing sectors, these missions will concentrate on telecommunications, power generation, transportation and the environment.

There is already evidence that the Haitian private sector is getting on its feet: more than 35 manufacturing operations have restarted in Haiti during the past month; exports of mangos and papayas have resumed; and cruise ships are once again bringing tourists to Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, I mentioned earlier that our intervention in Haiti made sense for reasons of American self-interest. That includes our economic self-interest. Of course the operation has been costly. But those costs must be judged in context, and that means, among other things, against the costs of inaction. Since September 19, the U.S. government has spent about \$700 million on



Operation Uphold Democracy, most of which are one-time-only-costs, instead of continuing to pay some \$300 million a year for the costs of non-intervention. This investment protects our borders, has helped consolidate democracy in our hemisphere, and will help Haiti become a good neighbor and stable partner in diplomacy and trade. But our intervention also does justice to America's core values and principles as well.

Mr. Chairman, the best defense of our Haiti policy is a simple one: we intervened because it was in our national interest, we intervened after every other alternative had been exhausted, and we intervened because it was the right thing to do.

Mr. Chairman, the American intervention in Haiti has been successful thus far. Now, we must see the job through, and that means until the completion of the United Nations mission 12 months from now. As I've already stressed, we cannot solve Haiti's basic problems -- the Haitian people must solve those themselves -- but we can help. Indeed, our help is essential: only we can lead a U.N. effort to maintain security in Haiti until the Haitian government fields a professional police force of its own; and only we can lead the international effort to help Haiti strengthen its democratic institutions and build its economy.

As Secretary Christopher has told the United Nations General Assembly, Haiti now has an opportunity "to take its rightful place in the growing community of democratic states; to work with the international community to solve the transnational problems we all face; and to become an inspiration to other nations, not an outcast." And American leadership in Operation Uphold Democracy has shown that the United States is willing to stand up for its own interests and for democracy in the hemisphere, and that our military is second to none, in creativity and professionalism as well as in strength and courage. This is an effort of which we, and you, can be proud. Thank you.

STATEMENT BY  
HONORABLE WALTER B. SLOCOMBE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
BEFORE  
THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
FEBRUARY 24, 1995

Since U.S. military forces entered Haiti on September 19 last year, a great deal has transpired. You will recall that OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was conducted against a recalcitrant military regime which had defied international will and demands of the United States Government since 1991 to return the constitutionally elected government to authority in Haiti.

The United States interests in this action were several:

- The military ouster of President Aristide in 1991, if allowed to stand, threatened to affect stability and democratic development elsewhere in the region.
- The outflow of Haitians seeking refuge from oppression and poverty not only threatened social stability throughout the region, but also placed significant strains on our own national security and hemispheric interests.

In response to these threats, U.S. forces entered Haiti on September 19, 1994, as part of a Multinational Force (MNF) authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 940 to use all necessary means to secure the departure of the coup leaders: to restore the legitimate, democratically-elected Government of Haiti; and to create a secure and stable environment that will allow the Haitian people to assume responsibility for rebuilding their country. The peaceful entry of the MNF was achieved only after Haiti's de facto regime realized, literally on the eve of invasion, that they were under imminent threat of removal by force.

After less than a month the coup leaders departed, and President Aristide returned to Haiti to assume control of the government. In the months that followed the U.S. and coalition presence expanded throughout Haiti, providing a more secure environment and coordinating international humanitarian assistance for the most needy Haitians. Aggressive weapons control and reduction measures were initiated that seized weapons posing a threat to the MNF and significantly reduced the number of illegal weapons in Haiti. Although we recognized from the outset that it was not feasible to attempt to search out every weapon in Haiti, these measures were clearly in the interest of promoting overall security for our mission and in establishing a secure and stable environment. In the process, the MNF has seized nearly 30,000 weapons in various categories, including grenades and explosives. I should note also that these weapons will no longer threaten the Haitian people.

Essential public services, such as electrical power, have been restored in key areas. Direct assistance to Haitian government ministries by military civil affairs specialists has been key to helping them reestablish functional governance and begin rebuilding its public institutions. As conditions improved, we repatriated over 13,000 Haitians who had fled Haiti under the military regime.

The GOH, with assistance from the United States, has established an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) of up to 3,000 vetted FAd'H and up to 1106 GTMO trainees. With routine attrition, there are now about 3,800 IPSF personnel. Their purpose is to provide a transitional police presence, under the general supervision of 655 International Police Monitors (IPMs), until a new, civilian Haitian National Police (HNP) initially to be comprised of 4,000 personnel is recruited and trained. Additionally, 250 former FAd'H are assigned to a Presidential Security Detachment, for which they await training by MNF personnel.

The IPSF has received basic police training by the Department of Justice (ICITAP), and are now under the Ministry of Justice rather than the Ministry of Defense. IPSF have been assigned throughout Haiti. FAd'H personnel who failed the vetting process have been reassigned to non-defense ministries or offered 6-month career transitional training (with pay) under a contract program administered by USAID. Thus far, 2,010 screened-out FAd'H have signed up for such training.

The new Haitian National Police (HNP) will be deployed incrementally over the next 18 months. They are selected from applicants throughout Haiti on the basis of rigorous testing. IPSF personnel may apply for the HNP, but most will not likely qualify. HNP trainees receive a full four-month training program by ICITAP. The first class of approximately 375 HNP candidates entered training 1 February, with a similar number to begin training each month until the force is fully-staffed. IPSF will be incrementally retired as the HNP is stood up.

These accomplishments are a tribute to the professionalism and dedication of our armed forces. Our military has acted decisively, responsibly, and humanely in a difficult and complex mission.

Though U.S. forces led this mission, high appreciation must go to all thirty nations whose contributions to the Multinational Force have made Operation Uphold Democracy a model of international cooperation for peace enforcement. That same spirit of cooperation will continue as we transition from a United States to a United Nations-led mission.

On January 30, the United Nations Security Council passed UNSCR 975 recognizing that a secure and stable environment now exists in Haiti and authorizing the UN Secretary General to terminate the mission of the MNF and deploy the United Nations Mission to Haiti (UNMIH). In effect, this resolution recognizes that the MNF sent to Haiti under the authority of UNSCR 940, has accomplished all of its tasks and is now ready to transition responsibilities to UNMIH. UNSCR 975 specifies that this transition is to be completed by March 31.

We are determined to meet that date. Much remains to be done but the military role is largely completed. The security environment throughout the country, though far from perfect, continues to improve as Haitians are growing more accustomed to going about their daily lives without fear. Though common criminal activity and Haitian-on-Haitian violence continues, the reported incidents are declining. Further, we know of no organized group capable of seriously threatening the Haitian Government or the international presence. Nevertheless, the MNF security posture remains alert and

prepared to respond as necessary, while preparations continue to transition responsibilities to UNMIH.

For several months we have been consulting with the UN to determine how we can best contribute to the UNMIH mission to sustain the secure and stable environment established by the MNF and to promote continued recovery of Haiti's democratic institutions. We intend to accomplish as much advance preparation as we can in order to make the actual transition from the MNF to UNMIH as seamless and as smooth as possible. In this regard, the Joint Staff has been working closely with our permanent mission to the United Nations (USUN) and with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). An UNMIH Advance Team is in Haiti operating alongside the MNF and taking advantage of that mission's experience in an effort to identify requirements prior to the deployment of UNMIH. While there are still details to be concluded, we have accomplished the following:

- Of the 6,000 troops authorized for UNMIH by UNSCR 975, we are prepared to contribute up to 2,524. About a dozen other countries are expected to provide the remaining nearly 3,500 of the force, most of which already are part of the MNF in Haiti, and are expected to continue their participation in the UNMIH.
- We are very close to agreement on a final force structure for UNMIH, however, refinements are ongoing as other participating nations determine their contributions and requirements. In any event, U.S. forces will comprise less than half of the UNMIH military force structure, but will represent critical capabilities of the mission. In addition to providing the Force Commander and 60 members of the headquarters staff, we expect to contribute a number of specialized forces such as Medical, Engineers, Transportation, Military Police, Civil Affairs, Special Forces, Aviation, Logistics, as well as a limited number of combat forces for a Quick Reaction Force. The largest portion of our contribution to UNMIH will be Special Forces for training and coalition support and a reaction force built around a light armored cavalry squadron.
- The UNMIH force commander will be an American officer. Major General Joseph Kinzer, U.S. Army has been named as the commander of UN Forces in Haiti, and he will also be designated Commander of U.S. Forces in Haiti (COMUSFORHAITI). The UNMIH Force Commander, MG Kinzer, will make all decisions involving UNMIH military operations. The UN Secretary General will provide political direction and guidance, through his Special Representative, to the UNMIH Force Commander.
- All U.S. forces assigned to UNMIH will be under the operational control of General Kinzer. As COMUSFORHAITI General Kinzer will remain under the command of Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and will report directly to him. Thus the chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander on the ground in Haiti will remain unbroken. General Kinzer will also have a U.S. Army Brigadier General who will serve as his Deputy COMUSFORHAITI. The Deputy will carry out the day-to-day management of the U.S. contingent for General Kinzer.
- We have a clearly defined end date of our participation in UNMIH. In accordance with UNSCR 940, UNMIH will end in February 1996, after Haiti's December 1995 presidential elections and the inauguration of Aristide's democratically elected successor.

The incremental cost for U.S. participation in operations in Haiti is projected to cost \$416 million in FY 1995. This funds U.S. participation in the Multinational Force (MNF) and a transition to a UN funded operation (UNMIH). The FY 1994 costs were \$200.8 million for Operation Uphold Democracy and \$173.9 million for the maritime interdiction of Haiti and the subsequent care, housing, and feeding of Haitian migrants at Guantanamo Bay.

The proposed DOD supplemental, which covers operations in Haiti among others, is crucial to maintaining current levels of training and readiness for all military services. This year's shortfall of \$2.6 billion, if not corrected in a timely manner, will have severe results. If the supplemental is not passed, commanders will be forced again to curtail training, reduce spare parts stockage levels, defer depot level and real property maintenance, and minimize fixed costs. Without a timely passage of the supplemental appropriations bill, the net effect will be a significant decrease in overall military readiness.

While the UN operation is an assessed operation, UN reimbursement to the USG will not fully cover DoD's incremental costs.

Let me conclude by saying that the way in which the MNF mission has been planned and executed incorporated many of the lessons learned in past operations. Similarly, as we assume a prominent role in UNMIH we intend to apply the same lessons. These include:

- A clearly defined mission and objectives, as well as an established exit strategy.
- Planning that integrates all dimensions -- military, political, social, and economic -- critical to the success of such an endeavor.
- A commander on the ground who has been granted the capabilities and operational flexibility he needs to protect his forces and accomplish his mission.
- Recognition that in face of the challenges involved, and the interests at stake, it is best for the United States to accept leadership of the mission and to commit the largest share of forces.
- Finally, ongoing evaluation of the overall mission objectives, activities of our forces, and their capabilities as the situation on the ground evolves to ensure that these remain mutually consistent.

These factors have contributed significantly to our success thus far in Haiti. We are now entering a new phase of the task we undertook in September of last year. Although the mission, and the U.S. role in it, will be different, our focus on ensuring a stable and secure environment that will give Haiti the opportunity to revive its economy, and rebuild its institutions of government, must remain clear. I am confident that this success will continue in the weeks and months ahead as we proceed with the transition of responsibilities to the UNMIH and as the Government of Haiti continues to assume greater responsibility for its own security and governance.

**TESTIMONY OF FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS BERNARD ARONSON**

The question of Haiti has always been more complicated than our domestic debate would indicate. The United States took the lead in mobilizing international support for Haiti's first free and democratic election in December 1990. Thus, we had a stake and an obligation to defend the integrity of that election following the coup of September 1991.

The coup in Haiti also was the first practical test in the western hemisphere of an historic and extraordinary new commitment assumed by every member state of the OAS in June 1991 at the organization's General Assembly held in Santiago, Chile. At that meeting, the nations of the western hemisphere committed themselves to defend collectively against any threat or interruption of the democratic process in any member state. That commitment--which does not exist in any other region of the world--reversed a century old principle of non-intervention and committed the United States--and our democratic partners in this hemisphere--to work together as never before to defend democracy.

The coup in Haiti was the first test case of the Santiago Declaration. Thus, how and whether the international community met that test was being watched by those in other nations in our hemisphere who might harbor hopes of overturning democracy as well. And of course, the crisis in Haiti created a refugee crisis which impacted our country directly and threatened an unending flow of boat people to our shores. Yet our ability to defend Haiti's election and meet our obligations under the Santiago Declaration were complicated by the mistakes and abuses that occurred during the Aristide government.

Honest men and women disagreed--and still disagree--about the degree to which U.S. interests were at stake in Haiti, about the wisdom of U.S. intervention, and about the decision of the President to commit U.S. forces without first seeking congressional approval. I have no doubt that members of the Committee still disagree about these issues.

But that was then and this is now. The question before the Committee and the country is no longer whether we should have intervened in Haiti. The question is: now that the United States and the international community have committed our prestige and our word to helping the Haitian people begin again their democratic experiment: how can we best meet that responsibility.

It would be a grave mistake, I believe, for those who disagreed with the original decision to intervene in Haiti to force a precipitous withdrawal from Haiti today. Now that we are there, we and the international community should stay long enough to give the Haitian people a fair chance to restart and sustain their nascent democracy.

That does not mean an open-ended commitment. Nor should it mean any change in the scheduled turnover of authority to a UN peacekeeping force. What it does mean is this: the worst outcome for Haiti would be to have committed U.S. forces and prestige and then to pull out so quickly that there is little left behind.

So far, the news from Haiti is good.

The transition to UN authority is proceeding smoothly. The recruitment and training of the new police force is also moving along well. Haiti has cleared its arrears with the international financial institutions and President Aristide's government has adopted a bold free market economic program. Perhaps most important of all, the pervasive fear that smothered Haitian society during the reign of the illegal military regime has been lifted. Haitians breathe freely and speak freely again. President Aristide, to his credit, has repeatedly counseled national reconciliation to his people and practiced that, himself, by reaching out repeatedly to the business community and to rival political parties.

Let me briefly suggest some areas of concern that the Committee might wish to consider:

- Our experience in Panama and El Salvador teaches that it always takes longer than predicted to recruit, train, and professionalize an entirely new police force. We need to maintain an international security umbrella long enough to allow the new police force to be formed and become operational.

- The future of the army is a matter for Haitians to decide. I hope that the United States will not oppose abolition of the army. From my vantage point, Haiti has no need for a standing army and would be more secure if the institution was abolished as was done in Panama. If this is done, it should be done through democratic, Constitutional means--by the vote of 2 successive Parliaments. A new Coast Guard, perhaps under the Minister of Transportation and a new border guard, perhaps under the Ministry of Finance could be created to perform the necessary functions that the FAHD used to carry out. This would create a certain balance of forces internally without maintaining an institution whose corruption and repression have rendered it incapable of serving the Haitian nation and people.

- Judicial reform and institution building has been delayed by the need to replace the Minister of Justice. Funds and programs need to flow now to begin this crucial process.

- Presidential elections scheduled for December 1995 must go forward as scheduled. Some may argue that with elections for Parliament and municipalities scheduled for June that the Haitian system is overloaded and presidential elections must be delayed. This would be a grave mistake and could provide a new crisis. The test of our policy in Haiti will be the peaceful, democratic, and Constitutional transfer of Presidential authority in February 1996.

- One of the lessons we learned in Haiti is that we celebrated the success of the elections in December 1990 prematurely and in retrospect the international monitors who provided security and stability for the elections were withdrawn too soon. We should not make that mistake again. The UN force is scheduled to leave in February 1996. I believe some significant international presence should remain in the country for at least the next 12 months to provide an umbrella of security and stability while the new government gets on its feet and a new internal balance of forces is established. That international presence might include the civilian human rights monitors and police trainers and monitors. It need not and probably should not include U.S. forces.

- The Committee should consider some temporary, special tax incentives to lure assembly sector factories that fled Haiti following the coup to return and re-establish operations. I know that OPIC is providing loan guarantees and that some assembly sector plants are back in business. Yet the sad reality is that once relocated many of these plants may never return since they can enjoy the same trade preferences under CBI in neighboring countries. Perhaps some temporary tax incentives or relief could be crafted with minimal budget impact that would provide incentive for those factories to return. These remain among the few wage earning jobs for ordinary Haitians. Dollar for dollar, this might be a more cost effective way to promote economic development than direct aid.

One final point. We Americans are an impatient people. Our attention span is sometimes short. Places and crises that once galvanized the attention of the Congress and Executive like El Salvador have largely fallen off our national radar screen. But in these countries, as in Haiti, we need to stay the course given the enormous commitment of U.S. resources and prestige that has already been expended.

During the crisis in Haiti, much was written about the Haitians who set off in leaky boats for our shores. But less was written about the vast majority of Haitians who stayed, many risking their lives and safety, to keep alive the flame of democracy. I remember well the pride and dignity that one could sense in the air on election day in 1990. And I remember marvelling as well on inauguration day in February 1991 as ordinary Haitians spontaneously scrubbed the streets of Port au Prince to celebrate their hard won freedom. The Haitian people have enormous dignity and talent waiting to be set free for the betterment of their country. We have an historic opportunity to help them begin their democratic experiment again. This may not be the most popular issue politically, but that opportunity remains a calling worthy of a great and noble country like the United States.



Testimony of Allen Weinstein  
President and CEO  
The Center for Democracy

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. My name is Allen Weinstein, and I am President of The Center for Democracy, a non-profit and non-partisan foundation, Washington-based, created in 1985 to assist in strengthening the democratic process, especially in countries undergoing a transition to democracy. Since 1991, the Center has worked in Haiti and, with Haitian leaders, in the United States to help facilitate democratization in that country through various programs. We have been working with the Haitian Parliament, cooperating with pro-democratic Haitian business and political leaders, and assisting municipal officials. My testimony today reflects personal perspectives and in no sense is an organizational statement on behalf of The Center for Democracy.

I have appended to this testimony a description of Center programs related to Haiti. These efforts have led to a half dozen personal visits, together with other Center Directors and staff, to that country since last September. Perhaps my most productive and memorable recent visit occurred shortly after the arrival of U.S. troops on the island last September. Traveling by military transport and encouraged by the Administration, our staff worked with the newly-reconvened Haitian Parliament as it debated and passed the amnesty bill, which sped Generals Cedras and Biemy into exile, clearing the way for President Aristide's return.

At that time, Mr. Chairman, Haiti was the subject of impassioned and elaborate debate in this country as pro- and anti-Aristide, pro- and anti-occupation, arguments raged in Congress and in the country. Today, for the moment, Haiti no longer dominates national debate as an issue; the argument over intervention has been overtaken by the reality of occupation. America's immediate goal, that of restoring President Aristide to power, was achieved four months ago. Unfortunately, our larger mission of facilitating development in Haiti of democratic institutions and processes, has proceeded since then fitfully and (at best) unevenly.

The burden of my testimony is to urge this Committee, the Congress and the Administration to pursue on a bipartisan basis an accelerated and focused program of support in the five weeks ahead, prior to formal transfer of troop authority on the island from United States to United Nations command on March 31, measures that will lay essential groundwork for a lasting democratic system. Now that the United States has returned Jean Bertrand Aristide to Haiti, it must use its remaining weeks of virtually-complete authority to help the Haitian people pursue the even more difficult mission of building democratic structures and habits atop the ruins of tyranny.

A decade ago, testifying before the Senate at another watershed in the struggle for democracy, I noted that the country in question prior to an historic election (in that case, the Philippines) stood poised between hope and despair. The words apply to Haiti today. Haiti confronts in the next critical five weeks the departure of half the remaining U.S. troop complement, *de jure* transfer of

authority from American to United Nations control and, most importantly, a defining moment of preparation for the parliamentary and municipal elections now scheduled for June. Disquieting revelations in the media earlier this week of the Haitian government's apparent ignoring of the vetting process to screen out human rights violators, injecting instead hundreds of police trainees without prior U.S. consultation, has only added to the unresolved questions regarding selection and control of Haiti's fledgling professional police force. This hearing is especially timely, Mr. Chairman, coming also while a new mission by President Carter, General Powell and Senator Nunn conducts its own on-the-ground review of the Haitian situation five months after "Operation Uphold Democracy" was begun and four months after President Aristide's return.

On its face, the American restoration of the Aristide government appears different from earlier U.S. ventures into military-backed democratization. In Haiti--unlike post-World War II West Germany and Japan, much less our mini-expeditionary forces to Grenada and Panama during the past decade--the United States has acted in concert with and under the framework of United Nations resolutions. In Haiti, also uniquely, the U.S. has shared authority not only with U.N. officials but with a restored President.

But in the end, as in these other instances, assuring democracy in Haiti has been and will continue to be in the foreseeable future primarily an American responsibility. For that reason, the U.S. military and civil personnel responsible for coordinating our occupation of Haiti in all ranks deserve our gratitude for the skill, tact and bravery with which they have implemented the policy.

As a result, democracy's beachhead has been secured in Haiti and at minimal cost thus far in American or Haitian lives. Now, however, in the five weeks remaining prior to turning over primary responsibility for Haiti to the United Nations, the moment has come for the United States to lead decisively the process of helping to consolidate a democratic future for all Haitians. I believe that four major efforts to be taken under American leadership, in cooperation with Haitian and U.N. authorities during the month-plus ahead, if achieved, can help to confirm an unprecedented "politics of hope" on the island. If not taken now, however, the bright promise of a new beginning which U.S. soldiers brought to Haiti while dispersing the entrenched oppressors may quickly turn to popular disillusionment. These four steps are crucial:

1. Consolidating democracy for Haiti requires immediately energizing a sluggish and divisive pre-election process. Electoral conditions minimally acceptable to the broad spectrum of Haitian political parties and leaders, whether pro- or anti-Aristide, must be created. An election constitutionally stipulated in late-1994 now slouches toward possible achievement in June '95 under U.N./O.A.S. auspices despite horrendous procedural difficulties. These include

an absence of current voter rolls and an electoral council comprised largely of partisan novices. Political parties remain disorganized and mainly unfunded. There are no campaign groundrules, and one over-riding concern permeates the entire political atmosphere--a fear for personal security.

Guaranteeing security for political candidates and their supporters remains a Herculean task in a country filled with hidden weaponry. Dealing with thousands of disbanded, discredited and largely unemployed former soliders and--at the other political extreme--angry and potentially-violent "popular" associations will require a coordinated effort by international observers and military personnel throughout Haiti. In this effort, American leadership will be required to encourage consensus among the major political groupings so that they choose to participate fully, without threat of withdrawal on grounds of unfairness should defeat loom. Persistent American oversight of every aspect of the electoral process during the weeks ahead will help to catalyze a process now assigned to United Nations responsibility.

Nor is the election of parliamentary and municipal officials in June the only concern in this respect. Haiti will elect a new President in December '95, and Jean Bertrand Aristide made a solemn commitment both prior to his return and since then not to be a candidate for re-election (something which the Haitian constitution proscribes). President Aristide has insisted that he will preside over a fair and free presidential election, handing over power (for the first time in two centuries of Haitian history) to his elected successor. The President deserves praise for this pledge, made more generous still by the years he spent while in exile deprived of his office. The international community must help Aristide assure that such a peaceful transfer of power occurs at year's end.

2. In order to reduce the residue of Haiti's historic climate of fear, iron-clad procedures must be installed for verifying that the officer corps and recruits in the country's new police force now undergoing training respond to professional and not political direction. Otherwise, we will witness the replacement of the old, blatantly oppressive military with merely a newer, subtler but no less oppressive "police." Efforts from whatever quarter in Haiti to employ alleged human rights violators, insert recruits unvetted by American experts, and otherwise undermine professional training procedures for the new--hopefully, community-based--police cadre in the country will badly injure its credibility at the outset and open the road to future abuses.

Continued close monitoring of the police training process by experienced U.S. Department of Justice and military personnel should be the norm. Any Haitian officials or government advisors incapable of adapting to this demanding standard of police behavior should be replaced. The model displayed by American troops and those of other nations in Haiti toward ordinary citizens--an

exemplary courtesy, restraint and fairness as they pursue quasi-police duties--must not be subverted in the arduous process of training the new Haitian police force. Preventing the integrity of a largely-U.S. based professional police training program from being undermined, Mr. Chairman, will require special vigilance in the weeks ahead. Here, as in safeguarding Haiti's fragile and incomplete new electoral process, American political will and leadership can mean the difference between nominal and genuine compliance with international norms.

3. Strengthening and accelerating national reconciliation is immediately essential to the establishment of democratic habits in Haiti. For two centuries, Haitian political losers have felt unsafe, going into hiding or exile--but not into domestic opposition. The practice of protected political opposition has little meaning for most Haitians. At a time when there are few political guidelines for the elections to come and a negligible number of functioning institutions, it is little wonder that many Haitians--especially those who have opposed Aristide in the past--assume that the older habits will prevail. Despite the President's admirable and continuing calls for national reconciliation and not vengeance, the degree of disbelief among his adversaries has remained high. Comparably intense, also, is the measure of anxiety among Aristide supporters concerning the potential for violent assaults upon their ranks from armed and unregenerate "attaches" or former Haitian soldiers, especially once "the Americans" have gone or been further reduced in numbers. Given the evident absence of security for ordinary Haitians of all political viewpoints, I trust it will not appear hopelessly naive on my part to suggest that the process of national reconciliation in Haiti would benefit from some immediate steps under American leadership in the remaining weeks of our mandate. These specific actions could include:

- convening (as a number of Haitian political leaders have suggested) a "national dialogue" prior to the parliamentary and municipal elections, one comparable to those which helped to develop civic links across party lines in countries elsewhere with few democratic traditions (like Haiti) such as Nicaragua;
- encouraging adoption by consensus of a formal "code of conduct" among key political, governmental, economic and civic leaders in Haiti to define the conditions and limits on political behavior during the two elections which lie ahead this year, a code which deals voluntarily with acceptable--and proscribed--conduct during the campaign months;
- recognizing the institutional legitimacy (through maintaining official contacts, for example) of the remaining handful of legally-elected Haitian Senators (with the entire Chamber of Deputies and all other Senators now up for election), thus acknowledging the Haitian Parliament's institutional continuity and importance as an independent and co-equal branch of government (rather than neglecting Parliament, as the U.S. has largely done since President Aristide's return).

These are only some of the practical steps which the United States could take in the weeks ahead to assist in national reconciliation. They would reaffirm our commitment to the primacy of democratic process and procedure over personality in Haitian policy. Such actions would have special relevance today, when there does not exist in Haiti even the beginnings of an independent and effective judicial system.

4. Helping the newly resurgent Haitian private sector, especially the pro-democratic businessmen and women anxious to rejoin the inter-American market system, is vital in developing Haitian democracy. Although economic discussion of the Haitian situation falls more properly within the realm of expertise elsewhere on this panel, it is appropriate for me to point out the courage and energy of a number of Haitian businessmen and women with whom The Center for Democracy has worked individually and through organizations such as The Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy (known by its French acronym CLED). Not only did they publicly support restoration of President Aristide at some personal risk prior to his return. Just as importantly, they have rejected the traditional Haitian "business" pattern of seeking and dispensing government-supported preferences for politically-favored entrepreneurs. If my friends within Haiti's business community--which was devastated by the embargo's impact--have a common complaint, it has been with the elephantine pace of delivering the support measures promised by the various mega-packages of economic aid periodically announced by the U.S. and/or the "international community."

Surely a country such as ours, which could draft and begin implementing assistance to all of devastated post-World War II Europe through the Marshall Plan in a matter of months, can finally in the weeks ahead respond to the job-creating proposals of Haiti's responsible business leaders. Otherwise, where do the unemployed and desperately-poor majority of Haitians turn in pursuit of a decent economic future, if not to an activated local private sector?

Each of the goals previously described, Mr. Chairman, can be addressed dramatically and effectively by American leaders in the five weeks remaining prior to handing over our unilateral responsibilities to officials representing the United Nations. Each is an interrelated factor in the overall mosaic of democratization in Haiti: assuring fair and free elections, guaranteeing personal security under professional police protection, encouraging genuine national reconciliation, and supporting the revival of a strong private sector.

Nor is funding the primary problem; rather, the major difficulty has been in reassessing the American mission in Haiti to focus on today's--not yesterday's--realities and imperatives. If democracy in Haiti is not to be left on the beachhead, American leadership must recognize that we have dawdled long enough. Sadly, we have watched while our Haitian friends did likewise. The time has come to move out: to recognize that our initial goal, that of restoring President Aristide to power beyond challenge, has been achieved. That was then; this is now.

Five weeks from now, we must leave as our legacy to the United Nations command and to the Haitian people a coordinated framework to sustain and consolidate democratic procedures in the months and years ahead. Achieving that framework will require five strenuous weeks of effort between now and the end of March, a period in which we Americans must confront our problems in Haiti as candidly as our initial success. In that fashion, we can best seize our opportunity to extend and develop what nascent democracy has already achieved in Haiti during its five fragile months of existence.

Testimony of  
Peter B. Johnson  
Executive Director, Caribbean/Latin American Action

Committee on International Relations  
U.S. House of Representatives  
February 24, 1995

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

My name is Peter Johnson. I am executive director of Caribbean/Latin American Action, a private, non-profit group dedicated to promoting economic development in the Caribbean and Latin America. C/LAA is familiar to some of you, since we have worked together frequently over the years on issues pertaining to the Caribbean Basin, but I would like to state for the record that Caribbean/Latin American Action was founded to help people in Caribbean Basin countries become more prosperous through the growth of trade, investment and other business activities reflecting vigorous and progressive private sectors and supportive public policies.

I am here on behalf of the Board of Trustees of C/LAA to express our deep concern over the increasingly desperate unemployment situation in Haiti, and to urge you to consider what types of actions on the part of the U.S. Government might most easily and most quickly put Haitians to work. Unless the urgency of this situation is recognized and some remedial action is taken quickly, there is a grave danger that everything the United States is trying to do in Haiti will be lost.

My testimony today will focus on three things: the current situation and prospects in Haiti, the importance of the assembly manufacturing and light agricultural sectors for jumpstarting the Haitian economy, and the need for a more pro-active U.S. approach toward restarting those sectors.

#### The Haiti Challenge--An Update

Let us first look briefly at the situation that confronts U.S. policymakers in Haiti in light of the stated objectives of the U.S. intervention. Both the military intervention and the embargo that preceded it were intended to uphold the principle of democratic government in the Hemisphere by restoring President Aristide to his elected office and by creating the conditions for lasting democracy in Haiti. It was clear from the outset that ousting the military usurpers would be, at best, the beginning and not the end of that ambitious assignment.

To institutionalize democracy in a nation whose entire history has been hostile to it, at a time when its always-poor economy lies in total ruin, is an enormous undertaking, fraught with uncertainties and defying cheap or quick solutions. No one can be sure any policy will achieve the desired end. But a well designed policy can go far toward making success at least possible, by trying to remove the impediments that make failure almost inevitable.

In Haiti the survival of democracy translates into simple, primitive short-term objectives: the survival of President Aristide, the survival of his government throughout its constitutional term, the survival of the fragile constitutional process itself by the timely and proper holding of the elections, and the peaceful transition of power to his successor.

Over the medium to longer term, we are talking about developing and securing all the day-to-day institutions through which free people govern themselves: party politics in which opposition is not dangerous to one's health; an independent judiciary; a working balance between legislative and executive powers; a military subordinated to civilian authority; a police force that maintains order without abusing citizens' rights; a national civil service unencumbered by massive corruption; an interested citizenry participating not only in national elections and local government but in the network of business, labor, community and voluntary activities that offer citizens in a democracy an outlet for leadership.

These are things that we can easily take for granted in this country. In Haiti, several very real impediments have made them almost unimaginable.

- First, the eclipsing of all civilian authority by an unaccountable, abusive and corrupt military establishment.
- Second, the absence of competing civilian institutions or the mechanisms, skills, resources or incentives to create them.
- And third, the grinding poverty that for most Haitians has turned life into a daily struggle for survival, leaving them little stake in their country's future and less time or energy to worry about building democracy.

U.S. policy has focused on the first two problems but has yet to seriously tackle the third. The U.S. intervention broke the power of the entrenched military, and the American troops and the international force set to take over for them have filled the gap to maintain law and order until Haiti evolves a homegrown replacement. This is still a formidable challenge. I'm not here to comment on the peacekeeping issues or prospects, but at least those making the decisions are seized with the issue and are applying the resources and timetable they judge to be most appropriate.

The same is true of the challenging task of building civilian institutions from scratch. We now have armies of consultants, technicians, trainers and aid-providers helping the Haitians with the nuts and bolts of such things as running elections, training the police, organizing unions, distributing relief supplies, and upgrading municipal services. This is essential work and needs to be done, and I am glad the U.S. Government is helping to do it.

But in the case of the economic challenge--which is probably the greatest threat to Haiti's immediate stability and longterm democratic prospects--the U.S. policy response is simply not facing up to the reality of the situation. After several years of carrying out a policy specifically intended to bring Haiti's economy to its knees--and succeeding enormously in the economic if not the intended political impact--we then reversed gears with the intervention, creating huge expectations that democratic government and U.S. assistance would bring, if not immediate prosperity, at least some easing of poverty's grip. This has not happened. The joblessness, the hunger, the lack of medical care and other basic necessities, have continued unabated, with little visible signs of improvement. Already desperate people have become more desperate. If anything, frustration levels are higher because of the rising expectations that have been created.

Employment is the key. Without jobs, nothing we could do to address other social problems is going to make a real dent in the people's living conditions. Conversely, rising employment will contribute to the solution of virtually every other problem.

It is estimated that today over half of Haiti's work force is unemployed, and as much as 85 percent underemployed. Unemployment and underemployment--already a serious problem before the embargo--rose steadily under the weight of the embargo's impact. U.S. policy has helped to create a situation which has added millions to the already high ranks of Haitians without means of support for themselves and their families. In a country with an almost non-existent social safety net, no work means no food, no care for the critically ill, no decent place to live, often no education. As we know, during the embargo, in this country so close to our own, Haitians--especially children--literally starved to death.

This situation is intolerable in itself. But it also undermines any hope of building a stable political system or--ironically--of attracting the future trade and investment that would generate more jobs in the long term. Hunger and hopelessness lead to desperation.

This is the more tragic in the face of clear evidence that Haitians want to work. Companies with past experience in Haiti testify to the dedication, industriousness and productivity of Haitian workers. The same desire for a chance to earn a decent living can be seen in the hopes generated by the arrival of U.S. troops, and the willingness of so many in recent years to risk their lives to find work beyond the seas.

Though expectations after the return of Aristide have run high, the Haitians' demands have not been unrealistic. Their patience has in fact been rather remarkable. No one there was expecting jobs for everyone overnight. Seeing even a small percentage of the unemployed back at work would have an important psychological effect on the others still idle, giving them reason to hope. But they are not even getting that.

The current situation is socially explosive. There is a limit to how much deprivation people can endure before giving up on the political process and becoming easy prey to those who would resort to crime, violence, drugs, corruption, or armed conflict. Despite the high hopes for democracy, and the courage and commitment to the political process shown during the Aristide election by even the poorest Haitians, the new government faces a precarious future trying to function and survive against such formidable economic and historical odds. Social breakdown and political turmoil are real dangers. As withdrawal of U.S. troops continues on schedule, security concerns are increasing rather than diminishing.

Creating jobs will not only meet the immediate need of putting money in people's pockets. It will also have a beneficial effect on many of the other problems the country is trying to address through U.S.-assisted public programs. Putting money in the pockets of individuals will counteract hunger, malnutrition and the resort to environmental degradation at the grass roots level. It will create effective demand for housing, medical care and other basic services. It will create purchasing power in the local economy, creating other jobs in turn. And it will give people a stake in the system, and a base for political participation and leadership.

The urgent need for job creation is clear. The questions for U.S. policy should therefore be: What will create the most permanent jobs in the shortest time and at least cost to the U.S. taxpayer, and what U.S. policies can best make that happen?

#### The Role of the Assembly and Light Agro Sectors

This brings me to the second major point I plan to discuss today. Given the situation just described, where do the needed jobs come from? And then, how can U.S. policy help?



In a country of seven million people, no public jobs program can hope to scratch the surface in providing employment for the country's workforce. Haiti's civil service, the second largest employment sector in the economy, only employs some 45,000 people. The answer obviously lies in the private sector.

Within the business economy, one must ask which industrial sectors have the greatest capacity to generate broad employment opportunities, and to do so quickly. The answer is no mystery. There are two that come immediately to mind. The first is the assembly manufacturing industry, primarily but not exclusively apparel, which at its peak in the 1980's employed 100,000 to 150,000 Haitian workers. The other is light agriculture, enabling many otherwise underemployed workers in Haiti's rural economy to earn a real living.

Both these sectors have been heavily oriented toward exports to the United States, and a large portion of the employment has been with U.S. firms or with Haitian firms producing for U.S. contracts. These U.S. firms are not your Fortune-500 transnationals. They are typically small, low-capital enterprises producing labor-intensive products, which they in turn market to larger companies.

Attracting this type of business--whether in apparel, electronics, sports equipment, leather goods, and the like--has been an important part of the economic development strategy of all Caribbean Basin countries. None have adopted it because they want to see their manufacturing sectors permanently limited to or concentrated on low-end assembly operations, for which the disadvantages are well known: the low value-added exports, the limited opportunities for worker advancement, the ease with which companies can pull up and run. Rather, these developing countries want to attract these industries for their equally well known advantages: their ability to start up quickly with little capital investment, their ability to employ large numbers of unskilled as well as skilled workers, their ability to establish a foothold from which local manufacturing can grow into a more diversified and integrated industry as the economy advances.

In the case of Haiti, the urgent need for immediate job creation on as broad a basis as possible makes this strategy even more compelling than for its Caribbean neighbors. It also has an important base to start from--a nucleus of over a hundred U.S. firms that have already operated in Haiti. It is only logical to start with them.

We at C/LAA have had a great deal of contact over the past several years with U.S. firms operating in Haiti, as they have struggled to survive and to maintain the jobs of their Haitian and U.S. employees during the difficult days of the embargo. I am therefore in a position to speak of many of the firms from a standpoint of personal knowledge.

These are companies that were able to develop good businesses in Haiti despite the many economic and political drawbacks making Haiti a difficult business climate during the whole succession of governments under which they have operated. They managed to put up with dismal infrastructure, unreliable utilities, inefficient bureaucracies, corrupt politicians, high port costs, high political risk, and--given the global competition for markets--modest returns. The one bright spot in their often uphill efforts were the Haitian business partners and workers themselves. The American business people we deal with are virtually unanimous in testifying to how impressed they were with the performance of their Haitian employees--their diligence, trainability, reliability and loyalty.

The American companies, in turn, developed strong commitments and loyalty to their Haitian employees. They maintained an excellent labor record, paying higher than the minimum wage and, in fact, at or above the higher minimum wage President Aristide had proposed before the coup. Workers in these plants received not only good wages but benefits, vacations, and often transportation.

For the sake of their employees, many of these companies stayed open and operating long after the embargo had made these operations unprofitable. Finally, after key customers had been scared away and unavailability of power and supplies made operations impossible, many continued to pay benefits and even wages after shutting down. Finally, in the last days of the embargo, virtually all the U.S. companies were forced to give up production in Haiti.

The remarkable thing is that many of these firms, after suffering millions in losses, are willing and even eager to return to Haiti. This is the more remarkable--almost ironic--given the widespread fear of assembly industries on the grounds that they have no roots and will cut their losses and skip a country at the first sign of difficulty. These companies have a proven commitment to Haiti and the Haitian people.

It should also be noted that, because of their previous experience and contacts, they know Haiti and would be able to restart and rehire much more quickly than would be the case for new companies coming in for the first time.

Nothing would bring a quicker infusion of the much needed jobs into the Haitian economy than getting as many of these firms as possible back into Haiti and operating at their maximum capacity. At their peak, the assembly and light agricultural sectors employed twice as many Haitian workers than are today employed in public sector jobs at all levels throughout the country.

Haiti needs these jobs back. The companies want to come back. It would clearly serve the interests of U.S. policy to have them come back. But given the crushing losses they have just been through, they are not able to overcome the obstacles they would face without some encouragement and help. U.S. policy should provide that encouragement and help.

What sort of obstacles stand in their way? They fall into three categories--problems in the operating environment in Haiti, problems in raising start-up capital, and the problem of high risk.

First, despite the desire of the Haitian government to attract industry, the operating environment in Haiti is extremely difficult. Electric power is running about 10 percent of need, sometimes available for as little as an hour-and-a-half a day. This not only makes it impossible to operate a factory at capacity, but the absence of lighting has led to increased looting and other crime at night. Telephone service is poor. Security is a concern. Business-government consultations are taking place in an effort to make government policies more friendly to business, but many business people remain unconvinced that the government is serious in its talk of privatizing public enterprises.

Port costs are astronomical. One of the agricultural companies we work with reports, for instance, that it pays \$1.30 per box to ship mangoes out of Haiti, compared to 70 or 80 cents per box out of Honduras. Thanks to port surcharges in Port-au-Prince, a sporting goods firm told us that it costs \$3,600 to ship a 20-foot container from New York to Haiti, whereas the same container could be shipped to Hong Kong for \$2,200.

At C/LAA's Miami Conference in December, President Aristide promised a 50 percent reduction in port costs by mid-January. To date, however, no changes have been made.

Despite all these difficulties, many of the companies would be willing to tackle the challenge if they were financially able to do so. These are small companies without a great deal of money flexibility. They need working capital to start up operations and build inventory. Because of the crunch they experienced during the embargo, many have no reserves to draw on and are in a weakened position to seek commercial credit.

One of the reasons financing is difficult is because political risk in Haiti is high. The companies, their bankers and shareholders are aware of the risks involved. The postponement of the elections, the departure of U.S. troops, the rising crime and stagnating economy, all create fears for a secure future. A major apparel company that once employed 600 workers in Haiti is in the process of trying to return. But it was a hard sell even within the company. As one of the executives put it, "Why risk another loss or disruption if the peace does not last?" He added that "some of our customers question if their supply of product from us can be counted on if we return to Haiti."

The combined result of the difficulties on the ground, the unavailability of capital, and the political uncertainty is that some of the companies have begun operating again in Haiti, but at a very reduced level. One sporting goods firm that once employed 600 is now employing 40 workers, another that once employed 400 is now employing 80. A manufacturing firm that has employed 750 at full capacity currently employs 200. Another manufacturing firm that could employ 225 now has only 20 workers. The majority of these companies' operations are with Haitian contractors and do not involve their own factories.

Just this week, we surveyed a list of a hundred U.S. companies that had been in Haiti, and reached about a third of them. We found that most would like to rebuild their operations in Haiti, but have been able to do so to only a very marginal degree. Helping them reach capacity represents the best way I know to expand Haiti's employed workforce by a significant number over a very short period of time.

This is an area in which U.S. policy can help. It is not the only way we should be promoting job-creation in Haiti, but it is a good place to start.

#### How U.S. Policies Can Help

Let us, then, look at what the U.S. Government is trying to do about jobs in Haiti, and what it could do that is not now being done, particularly in the case of the apparel and light manufacturing sectors.

The U.S. Government has announced a number of programs designed to intervene in Haiti's economy and put Haitians to work. Those I am aware of include the following:

- AID has been funding since 1993 a program of short-term public works jobs that employed 35,000 a day by last October, is expected to reach 50,000 a day next month, and then will start phasing down. These jobs involve tasks such as moving garbage, clearing drainage ditches and repairing roads. Another short-term jobs program, that AID is carrying out jointly with the Government of Haiti, will begin in March and employ 70,000 people.
- AID's technical assistance to the Government of Haiti is intended to include help on implementing a plan to

privatize state-owned companies. An assessment of the private sector and its needs is also in the works.

- AID plans to contribute to longer-term IDB and World Bank programs that will eventually replace the AID-funded jobs programs. The projects will include support to agriculture and labor-intensive infrastructure repair. Start-up later in 1995 is anticipated. Some of the jobs would be temporary; others could be multi-year, continuing as long as the particular rehabilitation project was underway.
- A Microenterprise Fund would make extremely small loans (in the \$100 to \$300 range) to support entrepreneurship at the grass-roots level. There is also talk of a broader "Enterprise Fund" for small to mid-size firms, an expanded version of the Micro Fund which would take its place, but only if AID finds other donors to join in funding it.
- U.S. assistance to the Government of Haiti for major improvements to infrastructure--electric power, ports, roads, administration of justice and other public sector institutions--is designed in part to enable the economy to support new business and industry, and permit existing firms to operate at maximum capacity.
- Finally, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation announced at the recent Miami Conference on the Caribbean and Latin America a special program to stimulate U.S. investment in Haiti. The program includes setting aside \$5 to 8 million or more for loan guarantees for projects in Haiti. Special rules would permit two exceptions to usual OPIC requirements: the loan amounts could be less than \$2 million and could be used for working capital. The guarantees would support up to \$50 million in loans from the Bank of Boston and up to \$25 million from Citibank, both selected because of their branch operations in Haiti.

On the face of it, this sounds like a major U.S. commitment to job creation in Haiti. Unfortunately, it looks very different from the ground in Haiti. The U.S. effort is missing the mark in several ways. The timing is just not fast enough. The focus is not reaching the sectors that could make the most difference. And there appears to be an underlying lack of awareness of the urgency of this task.

First, the timing. Four months after Aristide's return, there is little evidence that unemployed Haitians are being put back to work. The AID-funded temporary public works jobs are due to end. The Microenterprise Fund is due to start soon, but the concept of a broader Enterprise Fund is still in limbo. The promised Private Sector Assessment won't be getting started for another two months. Major infrastructure projects, by their nature, require long periods of advance planning. Money from OPIC loan guarantees is also still a ways off. Negotiations between OPIC and the banks are expected to be completed in early March, but the company application process--involving approvals first by OPIC, then by the bank--would then just be beginning.

Meanwhile, little improvement has yet been seen in the operating conditions that make it difficult for private companies to create jobs, and that U.S. advice and assistance are supposed to be addressing. The problems with the ports have not improved. The restoration of electric power has foundered waiting for off-again-on-again barge deals to become reality. The Interim Police Force lacks the equipment or the backup of a real justice system to create a climate of genuine security. All these things tend to push serious job creation into some time in the future.

Aside from the delays in startup, the U.S. programs are not focusing on the most important sectors where jobs must be created. Very small-scale enterprise is being targeted. Large-scale infrastructure projects are being targeted. The critical medium-sized manufacturing and agricultural firms are not being reached. They are large enough to be able to employ large staffs quickly, but not so large as to have the resources to do it without help.

Even the OPIC-guaranteed loans are in danger of missing these critical companies. Several of the companies we have spoken with have submitted applications to OPIC, but there is general concern that many may be ineligible under current criteria. OPIC only guarantees 75 percent of a loan. Banks may be unwilling to lend to low-equity assembly firms, especially those whose finances and credit were severely damaged by losses due to the Haiti embargo, unless all or most of the remaining 25 percent is also guaranteed.

The OPIC credit guarantees contemplated with the Bank of Boston and Citibank are important and creative new approaches, but they will not pick up the numerous companies, both Haitian and American, which made up the overwhelming part of the pre-embargo assembly and light-agro sectors. Representatives of these banks have made it clear that their interest under the new OPIC program will not address the light industry sector.

Incredibly, the U.S. Government seems to be missing the mark in addressing the challenge of job creation in Haiti because of an overriding unawareness of the seriousness of the problem. U.S. officials seem to be under the impression that the manufacturing and agricultural sectors are up and running in Haiti, and that the companies do not need assistance. When a top official of AID's mission in Haiti was asked recently what AID was doing in terms of job creation, he replied that it "was not part of AID's portfolio." The Commerce Department has several times referred to the "success story" of more than 35 manufacturing firms that have restarted operations in Haiti. The list, compiled by a Haitian business organization, in fact reflects just how marginal these operations remain. It includes, for instance, a sports manufacturer operating at 7 percent, an agro exporter operating at 10 percent, and some at zero percent.

These companies have repeatedly stated that without some form of assistance or incentives, they cannot continue to operate in Haiti, or come back at previous levels. Almost all say U.S. Government assistance and encouragement would facilitate their return.

There are a number of specific things that the U.S. Government could do make these jobs happen, and happen more quickly.

- It can plug the gap in the OPIC guarantee strategy by creating a mechanism to cover the exposed 25 percent of the loans, thus making them bankable with Citibank or Bank of Boston. This could be done, for instance, by making a \$5 million dollar loan to a Haitian intermediary institution, such as SOFIBDES (Société Financière Haïtienne de Développement, S.A.), or a Haitian governmental entity, which would use the \$5 million to guarantee the other 25 percent of loans from Citibank or Bank of Boston. A mechanism such as this would make up to \$20 million available for these kinds of projects.
- The U.S. Government can also help by promoting the early conclusion of a Tax Information Exchange Agreement with Haiti, making business projects there eligible for 936 funds, including the small-scale loans mediated through the Partners for Progress.

- The U.S. could also consider some form of tariff break or tax holiday for U.S. companies returning to Haiti, or incentivize new trade and investment there by extending duty-free treatment to Haitian products, such as apparel, leather and footwear, that are currently dutiable because not covered under the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
- It is worth mentioning in that connection that early passage of the Crane Bill, now pending in the Ways and Means Committee, would in itself also help Haiti. The bill would give products from CBI beneficiary countries similar benefits to those from Mexico on a 6-year interim basis until the countries are ready to become full partners in NAFTA. Passing this legislation would not give Haiti a special advantage over its Caribbean neighbors, but would make it, along with them, better able to compete with Mexico for new jobs and plants.
- The U.S. Government can also help create jobs in the assembly and agro industries in Haiti by pushing harder for economic reform and infrastructural improvements on the part of the Haitian Government. While these decisions are not directly within U.S. control, we must assume they are at least within the range of influence of the AID-funded advisors and technical assistance being provided to the Government of Haiti. It is also worth noting that AID funds are being devoted to assist labor organizing in Haiti, a process greatly enhanced by the existence of jobs with workers to organize. As a Caribbean labor official once emphasized at a C/LAA conference, you can't organize a union of the unemployed.
- In those programs which are within AID's control, it can try to place a higher priority on job-creation as an outcome. It can prioritize infrastructure projects that will immediately relieve impediments to private industry, such as power and port services. It can try to speed up projects where jobs won't happen until later stages. It can make sure that job creation is back in its mission's "portfolio."

U.S. firms that want to produce in Haiti do not require a great deal of help. The measures I have suggested are modest. Above all, they are looking for some signal--to themselves and to their customers--that the U.S. Government believes they have a long-term role to play in Haiti's economy. Even on a symbolic level, a greater U.S. commitment to the assembly and light-agro sectors in Haiti would do much to build confidence in Haiti and in the companies on the part of the customers they must attract.

Hope and confidence in Haiti's future is something we would all like to see. But it must be based on realistic awareness of the urgency of the present situation, so realistic efforts can be undertaken to address it. Haiti's future--if unemployment is allowed to remain at present levels--is nothing but a timebomb waiting to go off.

The time to do something is right now. The withdrawal of U.S. troops is likely to make security concerns and political uncertainty worse, not better. The moment will be a critical one for the new Haitian government to begin filling the vacuum with its own institutional legitimacy. It is no time to have that precarious effort undermined by a volatile economic environment. A new political community cannot be built on hunger and desperation.

The United States has nothing to lose and everything to gain by encouraging U.S. firms and their Haitian partners and counterparts to build up the country's strangled assembly and agro sectors as quickly as possible. The progress that has been made in restoring peace and legitimate government has been very gratifying to all; much would be lost--by the Haitian people, but also by the U.S. Government in its international prestige--if the effort were to fail now.

Beyond the foreign policy arena, our own economy can only gain and has nothing to lose by encouraging the return of U.S. companies to Haiti. When the embargo forced these companies to shut down in Haiti, some had to lay off U.S. employees too. New operations in Haiti will help keep these companies healthy, growing, and better able to maintain their U.S.-based operations as well. As they recover and are able to deepen their operations in Haiti, new opportunities will open up for other firms, Haitian and American alike.

The U.S. military involvement, existing business relationships, and the continuing U.S. role in Haiti's political development, are likely to forge even closer economic ties between the two countries. A prosperous Haiti could be an important market for American production. For now, of course, prosperity for most Haitians is a long way off.

In the long term, a vibrant democracy and a prosperous economy can only be achieved by the Haitian people themselves. It is in the U.S. interest to help in whatever appropriate ways we can. C/LAA believes that helping generate immediate employment by boosting the rebirth of the assembly and light agro industries is one of the most important and most appropriate ways the United States can help. I hope Congress will join in looking for ways to maximize that effort by encouraging the Executive Branch to make it a priority, by fully funding any programs requiring such funds, and by looking favorably on any trade legislation or agreements that would enhance Haiti's competitive position.

The role of this Committee, charged with oversight of U.S. foreign policy and assistance programs, can be particularly critical to the evolving U.S. perception of what is at stake, what is possible, and what is required in Haiti. I would therefore like to encourage all the members of this Committee, as I know you have done, Mr. Chairman, to get to know personally some of the American and Haitian business people whose decisions and experiences could play so important a role in giving Haiti's economy a chance. It is from them that we at C/LAA have learned our sense of urgency and deep concern--but also our hope, our confidence, and our conviction that the future of Haiti is worth our effort.

Thank you.

February 24, 1995

Written Statement of  
Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
Full Committee Hearing on U.S. Policy and Activities in Haiti

The subject of today's hearing of the Full Committee on International Relations is Haiti, a tiny Caribbean nation where the United States has made an extraordinary investment of military resources, international credibility, and \$850 million in U.S. tax dollars.

According to President Clinton's February 1 Report to Congress, we have spent well over \$850 million in the last 16 months responding to this crisis, including about \$400 million in incremental costs of the military intervention that he ordered last September without Congressional authorization and without the support of the American people. Of course, the loss of one American serviceman on January 12 represents an inestimable cost to our nation.

The task before this Committee is not to pass judgment whether this policy has succeeded or failed. Any such assessment, by anyone, would be premature. Indeed, for most of us, the question of occupying Haiti was never one of whether we could, but whether we should.

The question today is whether the Administration has adopted a strategy that promises the best return on the tremendous investment it has made in Haiti. For example, we cannot truly help Haitians by making them dependent on aid programs with a short-term, short-lived benefits.

And, we should look to strengthen all of Haiti's democratic institutions so that democrats who have struggled in vain for decades finally get the chance to rebuild their own country. That, after all, was the stated objective of invading, occupying, and effectively running Haiti.

In order to clarify the enormity of the commitment President Clinton has made in Haiti, I offer just a few illustrations:

- o While the military operation launched in Haiti on September 19, 1994, has been described as a "multinational force," let there be no mistake that American troops have assumed most if not all of the risk: the first token forces did not land in Haiti until after our forces had secured the country. Troops have been contributed by Bangladesh, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guatemala, the Philippines, Nepal, St. Kitts, and St. Lucia. With all due respect to these nations, it is clear who has done the heavy lifting in Haiti.



- o Moreover, U.S. taxpayers not only paid \$400 million to field our own forces: in exchange for UN authorization of a "multinational force," the Clinton Administration committed us to pay for deploying the troops and police monitors from more than a dozen other countries. To date, we have paid \$60 million for this third-country support.
- o U.S. forces provide security for Haiti's government ministries. The men checking in visitors at Haiti's National Palace are the same Marine security guards that protect U.S. embassies overseas.
- o Until recently, under Operation Light Switch, U.S. forces ran the country's power plants; when they were turned over to local management, the lights went out.
- o Under a \$50 million program of the U.S. Department of Justice, we have established a national police academy just outside of Port au Prince. USAID is training justices of the peace and prosecutors.
- o Roads are being patched and gutters cleared under U.S.-funded jobs programs.
- o The UN will run Haiti's elections this year, and we will pay for them.
- o U.S. special forces, based in 27 towns, improvise to solve problems and resolve conflicts: in some cases, they have even instituted traffic fines or coordinate garbage collection.

The examples of the broad and daunting challenges we have taken on in Haiti are too numerous to list -- some might say just too numerous.

I hasten to add that the superb performance of our military merits the praise and gratitude of all Americans. The fact that casualties have been miraculously low is a tribute to their skillful planning and execution. The Administration also has established and -- to its credit -- adhered to a timetable for the steady drawdown of U.S. forces. Today, there are 6,000 U.S. military personnel on Haitian soil.

By March 31, the U.S.-led "multinational force" will turn its operations over to a UN peacekeeping mission ("UNMIH"). Let it be clear, however, that the U.S. military commitment is expected to continue: The President has decided that about 2,500 U.S. military personnel should remain in Haiti to participate in UNMIH through February 1996.

In my estimation, Congress will not interfere with that momentous commitment. Instead, we must and will exercise strict oversight in order to help make the most of the extraordinary U.S. investment in Haiti and to justify -- and, above all, limit -- the risk to our troops.

I would like to share a few observations and recommendations that I hope will serve as the basis for a bipartisan, sustainable Haiti policy that, quite frankly, does not now exist:

On a key economic issue, in order to jumpstart factories, regenerate sustainable jobs and begin to meet dangerously high expectations among Haiti's desperate poor, immediate incentives for the private sector are still needed. Many of my colleagues and I are disappointed that this key sector was virtually ignored in original U.S. emergency aid plans - although since the occupation, some new programs are being developed.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) must deliver now on *incentives that will reassure and aid U.S. and Haitian businesses that are indispensable to a national recovery*. OPIC is developing a lending facility for which many of these key companies may not qualify because of their present financial condition. USAID should reprogram aid now to prime the pump for an "enterprise fund" to encourage immediate investment and trade, and the Small Business Administration should be called upon to provide working-capital financing for small business exports.

We should also consider creative ways to revive Haiti's key agricultural sector, such as adapting the sort of public-private partnership that is now being implemented in the former Soviet Union. This program leverages limited amounts of USAID funds to encourage sustainable joint ventures between American agribusiness and NIS partners. This approach not only facilitates market access for U.S. companies, it transfers relevant technology to local businesses that will have a benefit long after U.S. aid is spent.

*Regarding Haitian politics, U.S. policy must be evenhanded -- strengthening all democratic sectors and institutions.* Not all of Haiti's democrats serve in the executive branch or follow the *Lavalas* movement. To the extent that any Haitian perceives U.S. favoritism, we undermine our stated objective of institutionalizing democratic pluralism.

It is alarming to note that five months after the U.S. occupation, Haiti's duly elected Parliament had received virtually none of the technical or material assistance that has been routinely provided to executive branch ministries.

President Aristide *has pledged publicly to stay "above the fray,"* refraining from stumping for any candidate or party. He would further reassure many democrats in Haiti by reserving any major executive initiatives until after a new Parliament is elected in June.

Regarding the elections, *immediate steps should be taken to help ensure a "level playing field" and secure environment leading up to parliamentary and presidential elections this year.* I am pleased to note that the delegation of former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell are in Haiti pursuing this and other issues right now.

The OAS and UN should quickly deploy human rights observers throughout the country to help protect the rights of all Haitians on monitor the campaign and balloting. In addition to fielding election observers, the international community should encourage political and civic leaders in Haiti to draft a simple "code of conduct," spelling out the "rules of the game" that will be respected during the parliamentary, municipal, and presidential campaigns this year. We should then hold all sides accountable for abiding by these terms.

In light of the ample U.S. financial support, we should take care that no resources of the Haitian state go to any particular candidate or party.

Now and for the duration of U.S. involvement, the leaders and *members of the new Haitian National Police and Army must be chosen based on merit and not loyalty to any particular political movement.* Any effort to "pack" these forces with partisans or to place them under the command of persons known to have violated human rights will undermine sound programs intended to establish a professional security force.

Let me affirm in the strongest terms that I will continue to encourage the Administration to ensure the integrity of our police assistance programs and will monitor developments closely.

These are just a few key issues that I hope our witnesses will address this morning. Progress in these areas will be scrutinized as Congress evaluates the soundness of a sustainable Haiti policy.

OPENING STATEMENT  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
HEARING ON HAITI -- FEBRUARY 24, 1995  
CONGRESSMAN DONALD M. PAYNE

Thank you Mr. Chairman, members of the Congressional Black Caucus expended considerable energy along with other colleagues on this committee to restore democracy to Haiti. Therefore, it seems fitting as the new Chairman of the Caucus, to extend on their behalf our appreciation to you for holding this hearing. Not when we have problems -- not when we wish to celebrate victory for democracy -- for this would seem premature; but when we need to exercise our oversight responsibility.

The present success in Haiti will have a stronger chance to stay "on track" with the continuous involvement of congress, so again, I congratulate you for scheduling this important hearing today. America made a commitment to restore the democratic elected government in Haiti. This time we were joined by the international community through the United Nations and the Organization of American States. It was a historic change in America's mode of operation in the Western Hemisphere. A change from the days of "big stick" diplomacy to an enlightened sensitivity to the sovereignty of each nation and the hopes and aspirations of humankind everywhere.

It was further consistent with the new world order called for by President Bush at the beginning of the Gulf War, when the premise was made that the strong have an obligation to protect the weak.

The recent pledging of 1.2 billion dollars in Paris for Haiti's recovery program by the international community is testament to the good feeling other nations have about America's leadership. Usually when a country takes the lead as we did in Haiti, they end up assuming the bulk of the financial burden. The good news here is that our share will be only about 20 percent. To keep this partnership "on track" is a bi-partisan responsibility.

I wish time permitted me to mention other things that must be kept "on track" like the 50,000 public sector jobs per day to give breathing space until a strong free market economy can take hold. I understand our Agency for International Development is now up to 40,000 a day and will be at 50,000 in a matter of weeks. While at the same time AID has been feeding one million Haitian children and women per day. With 70 percent unemployment in the urban areas, I wish more could be employed. We all know the consequences of "idle youth" and with Carnival Time coming the end of this month it will not all be celebration, but also a time to settle "old scores".

Our military, which has performed in a most professional manner, will need to be on the alert as never before. While I hope our troops continue to be reduced on schedule, we can not schedule the unexpected. I also hope there will be reasonable judgement exercised to maintain the level of troops needed until we are assured the UN Forces will be adequate for maintaining peace and security.

There is also an urgent priority to reform Haiti's legal system. Judges and Prosecutors should undergo an intensive training program and then be properly compensated so that they are not subject to bribes to maintain a livelihood as has happened in the past. There is also need for "culling" out of Judges who have violated human rights which is now being accomplished with the new police force.

While the press has recently had much to say about the "downsizing" of the Haitian Military, I not only support President Aristide's actions, but compliment him on his skill and sensitivity in weeding out the most corrupt human rights violators, plus offering early pensions for others to retire. Stay "on track" President Aristidel

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I wish to commend President Clinton whose courage and concentration with this issue, has lead us to a more hopeful state of life for the Haitian people than there has been in a long time.

We cannot let it slip away.

We can no longer be detached from a neighbor's misery.

**Opening Statement of Rep. Christopher H. Smith**

I have several thoughts about the United States intervention in Haiti and about the current situation in that troubled country.

First, the success or failure of our efforts will ultimately be judged not just by whether we "restored democracy," but also by whether all Haitians are allowed to live in freedom and safety.

Second, judged by this standard, the effort thus far is a qualified success. I believe that Haiti is one place, perhaps the only place, in which the Clinton Administration has done the right thing from the standpoint of protecting human rights. After some initial hesitation and a few policy reversals, President Clinton finally chose to follow his own best instincts and go against the great weight of bureaucratic opinion. In the President's memorable phrase, they were "chopping people's faces off down there." This is no longer happening, and the United States deserves much of the credit. I only wish that President Clinton had given human rights the same weight in China, Cuba, North Korea, Bosnia, and Chechnya that he did in Haiti.

Third, the human rights record of the Aristide government in the brief period before the 1991 coup left much to be desired. Nevertheless, President Aristide's years in exile in the United States, and the strong support he has been given by the United States during the last three years, appear to have changed his attitude on these matters. In the months since the restoration of the elected government there have been no apparent reprisals against anti-Aristide partisans, and the government has announced free market economic policies and a willingness to work with his former opponents. These policies are fundamental prerequisites to the peace and prosperity Haiti so badly needs.

Finally, the United States military has done its job in Haiti. The next step is a speedy and orderly transfer of peacekeeping authority to a multilateral force, and ultimately to the elected government itself.

I welcome our distinguished witnesses and look forward to hearing their testimony.

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## Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-1011

Opening Statement

By

Congresswoman McKinney

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Mr. Chairman,

In a simple sentence: Haiti is an American success story. The Republicans cannot stand the fact that a Democratic Administration has successfully managed one of history's most positive foreign policy endeavors without one single shot fired against an American soldier upon arrival on Haiti's shores. My colleagues on the other side, unfortunately, have cried wolf at every successful turn of this mission – and we all know what happened to the little boy who always cried wolf.

The positives in Haiti outweigh the negatives by light years and many Majority colleagues cannot stand that. It seems, however, that some people on the other side of the room are ineducable on Haiti. There is no reason for them to be ineducable since they have not been deprived of school lunches and a good education.

Now, let me see if I can help educate them. Haiti is now on the road to democracy. President Aristide is ably restoring peace, confidence, and nation-building – daunting tasks in a land previously without hope, human rights and justice.

Yes, there are growing pains, but they are just that – growing pains. President Aristide and the Haitian people have continually demonstrated their commitment to the principles of democracy and June Parliamentary elections.

The US-led force will hand-off to the UN in March. Issues surrounding the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) were expeditiously resolved and a commission to review the military is in place. In consultations with the Administration, the army Commander-in-Chief and 42 officers have been retired. President Aristide and the Haitian people are working with us every step of the way.

Our non-Haiti believers must stop crying wolf and accept the success of our Haiti policy once and for all.

## Commentary

### PERSPECTIVE ON HAITI

# A Peacekeeping Job Half-Done



The U.S. effort is failing because it neglects the nation-building that's necessary to secure a free, democratic society.

By F. ANDY MESSING JR.

**P**ORT-AU-PRINCE—In spite of almost \$1 billion, valiant efforts and even lives, America's peacekeeping effort in Haiti appears to be failing.

The recent killing of an Army Special Forces sergeant illustrates the latent hostility of a segment of the Haitian population that is increasingly frustrated by current events. The collision of sociopolitical, economic and security concerns will generate new problems for U.S. policy. The repatriation of 53,000 Haitians from refugee camps in Guantanamo Bay into an economy that cannot absorb them will add to the anarchy. Jobs are scarce and the disintegration of the remaining infrastructure means that security will be about as effective as it was in Somalia.


Since the withdrawal of U.S. military forces began, crime and corruption have risen and drug trading is resuming, largely because our conventional military units did not conduct the nation-building efforts they were capable of. As in Somalia, our entry reduced turmoil temporarily as security was established. But our military should have engaged in aggressive, proactive civil-affairs measures, as it did in Grenada, Panama and Kuwait. Reconnecting a society to functioning health-care, postal and banking

systems is what makes that society work. Judicial and police systems are important, but so are trash collection, producing clean water and functioning telephones and power grids.

Since U.S. Army engineers turned over the Port-au-Prince power system to their Haitian counterparts, electricity generated daily has dropped from 70 megawatts to 30, leaving the capital and surrounding area blacked out for most of the day. To make matters worse, \$15 million of U.S.-donated oil for the power plant is running out. Meanwhile, food spoils and workplaces remain shut. "The economy can't even begin to crawl," a factory owner said. "It won't be long before the people storm the palace."

Military planners should start to understand that "peacekeepers" must always have a rifle in one hand and a shovel in the other hand for this type of mission. Sadly, this approach was neglected by the Pentagon because of short-term monetary and nebulous political reasons generated by a pusillanimous Congress, confused over America's future role in the post-1989 world. It's the fault of the military leadership for not implementing the dual strategy of security and nation-building.

The continuing costs of our restoring President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power, in keeping a combined U.N.-U.S. force of 6,000 in Haiti, will be an additional \$30 million a month. The emphasis of this force will be to ensure security, not to rebuild an overtaxed infrastructure. That task mainly falls on the disorganized Haitian government



JERRY ROBINSON, New York City

Jean-Bertrand Aristide

Parliamentary elections are to take place soon in a society where the primary concern is feeding one's children and finding clean water. Democracy is irrelevant to those merely trying to survive. One missionary put it best: "A hungry flock doesn't listen hard."

The future of Haiti and of peacekeeping should be predicated not just on protecting the helpless, but also on picking them up. Realizing this will save more money and more lives.

F. Andy Messing Jr., a former Special Forces officer, is executive director of the National Defense Council Foundation in Alexandria, Va.



# No Time for Defense Downsizing

by F. Andy Messing, Jr.

On October 21, 1993, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Ronald Dellums (D-California), and this author debated whether our military should be downsized, given the worldwide threat against America. The chairman's position was that in view of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the threat had been altered and reduced, and, therefore, we should cut our force—a position supported by many defense experts, the General Purpose Force (GPF)/conventional force-oriented Pentagon, and esteemed academics.

The counterargument was that, while there had indeed been an alteration, a quantum expansion of conflict had also taken place to the extent that we should reorient our military, not contract it. Before the bipolar world of the 1945-1989 era collapsed, the average number of wars per year was between 32 and 35. These contests were mainly spin-offs of the confrontation generated by the Soviets and the Americans,

plus a few random conflicts.

Now, in 1994, with the United States the sole superpower, the conflict count has risen to 63 per year. Emerging and hidden vectors of yet future imbragios and conflagrations are rocketing toward an intersection that may raise the count.

Four years ago, John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene stated in their book *Megatrends Two Thousand* that there would be a reduction in conflict. Four years later, after the dust has settled from the fall of the Berlin Wall, Alvin and Heidi Toffler outline in their book *War: Anti-war* a future far different from these wildly optimistic and erroneous views.

The Tofflers dissect conflict, then analyze how to cope with it in a realistic way. This realism reflects an open-mindedness that translates into solutions. It is one that conveys the old adage "Forewarned is forearmed" and the idea that just disarming is not the way to go to enhance America's security.

Yet, in President Clinton's present military budget, person-

nel strength will be cut from the pre-Gulf War figure of 2.1 million to as low as 1.4 million by 1997. The Army's active divisions would go from 14 to 10. The Air Force would slip from 28 fighter wings to 20. The Navy would be slashed from 440 ships with 14 aircraft carriers down to 340 ships with 12 aircraft carriers. Military spending would go down from \$302 billion in 1990 to about \$233 billion in 1997. This will occur without a reorientation of the military to this changing scenario of increased conflict.

## THE DANGEROUS CENTURY

What may make warfare in the twenty-first century even more dangerous than in all of previous history are several situations that are coming into play.

These are:

- Nuclear, biological, and chemical proliferation, in the hands of small states down to terrorist entities,


- Unregulated access to all types of technological advances;
- Uncontrolled multinational corporate and private paramilitary organizations;
- Media-driven warfare, which negates strategy and compresses reaction time;
- Personality- and faction-generated conflicts.

In the proliferation area alone, there may be a nuclear, biological, or chemical detonation killing thousands in the near

future. This prediction is based on the "dark-side" capitalistic ventures of scientists and former Soviet military who are selling their knowledge, services, and even whole weapons systems to irresponsible, often anti-Western individuals and groups for profit. It is just a matter of time before these zealots exercise their will.

In regard to technological matters, with the rush of former defense industries to convert to civilian uses in this downsizing

exercise, many will sell "dual-use" technology on the open market. Many countries and terrorists that were previously denied certain types of equipment will now have ready access to it. To be specific: Robots and sensors unique to land, air, and maritime warfare, electronic communications and masking equipment, new armor and like materials, new or improved engines, and space-based assets (particularly information for intelligence and navi-



■ *May Day in Moscow, mid-1980s: From the late 1940s until 1990, the United States needed to maintain a large military due to the Soviet threat.*

**ONGOING ARMED CONFLICTS**
**EUROPE AND FORMER SOVIET UNION**

1. Armenia/Azerbaijan  
Territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh region.
2. Bosnia-Herzegovina  
Ethnic, territorial warfare between Croats, Serbs, and Muslims.
3. Croatia  
Ethnic, territorial warfare between Croats and Serbs.
4. Cyprus  
Ethnic conflict between Greeks and Turks.
5. Georgia  
Territorial warfare between Georgians and Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatists.
6. Moldova  
Territorial warfare between Moldovans and Russian and Ukrainian populations.
7. Russia  
Ethnic, territorial conflict between North Ossetia and Chechen-Ingusheta regions.
8. Spain  
Terrorism by various groups.
9. Tajikistan  
Civil war between Russian-backed government and Islamic fundamentalists.
10. United Kingdom  
Terrorism by Provisional Irish Republican Army against U.K. targets across Europe and political/sectarian violence by both Catholic and Protestant groups in Northern Ireland.

**SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

11. Angola  
Civil war between UNITA rebels and MPLA-led government.
12. Botswana/Namibia  
Territorial dispute
13. Chad  
Insurgency against Deby government.
14. Djibouti  
Ethnic conflict.
15. Ethiopia  
Ethnic-based insurgencies.
16. Burundi  
Coup and tribal rivalry.
17. Liberia  
Civil war with ethnic violence and involvement of other West African armed forces.
18. Mali

gation, and later artillery) will be among a deadly assortment of goodies.

Then, to really complicate matters, multinational corporations, for the most part unrestrained by governments, boundaries, and conscience, may use hired combat-trained personnel, technology, and purchased or self-generated intelligence to undermine countries and other groups for the sake of greed.

Drug dealers and private individuals engaged in nefarious sub-rosa business efforts will provide another dynamic for generating turmoil. Speed and flexibility will be their hallmark because of the vast amounts of monies available to them.

The media, with their propensity for seeking out conflict to spice up their journalistic endeavors, may unwittingly intensify some conflicts just by their coverage, through increasing the stakes and reducing the time required to exercise all options effectively. In many cases, state- or religion-controlled media may be used to actually initiate or manipulate warfare scenarios—for a variety of political, socioeconomic, and security outcomes.

In conjunction with the media, megalomaniacal individuals and parochial groups feeding on publicity may cause cataclysmic violence equivalent to full-blown war.

**GENERAL-PURPOSE FIASCO**

Ironically, the fictitious

James Bond scenarios of the 1960s are coming true, and the *Star Trek* plots of the future are just taking shape. Meanwhile, our Pentagon generals and admirals will be mainly contemplating Desert Storm conventional warfare in spite of the obvious pandemonium surrounding them. This will be reminiscent of the French generals during the 1930s, who focused primarily on the lessons of the previous war, building structures that were circumvented by technology and imagination.

The politics of protecting the American military's GPF budget will be the main preoccupation of senior officers, as it represents the historical essence of our defense structure. This attitude, along with the officers' distaste for elite forces, will combine to rule out approaches that do not involve the GPF element.

Recently, Defense Secretary Les Aspin told Congress that the defense budget will be heavily influenced by "macroeconomics" rather than "threat perceptions." These dynamics will be reflected in a minimum of thought about the rapidly changing environment requiring other force mixtures.

For example, our Special Operations Forces (SOF), specifically designed for engaging in threats of lesser magnitude, will probably be continually downplayed and/or misused (as in the case of Somalia). Instead of redesigning or restructuring the whole force to be capable of han-

Insurgency by Tuareg tribesmen.  
 19. Mozambique  
 Insurgency by RENAMO.  
 20. Niger  
 Insurgency by Tuareg tribesmen.  
 21. Nigeria  
 Political resistance to military rule.  
 22. Rwanda  
 Ethnic conflicts and border dispute with Uganda.  
 23. Senegal  
 Insurgency by Casamance separatists.  
 24. Sierra Leone  
 Warfare with Liberian rebels.  
 25. Somalia  
 Clan-based civil war with involvement of foreign troops.  
 26. South Africa  
 Political and ethnic violence.  
 27. Sudan  
 Ethnic and sectarian-based civil war and border conflict with Egypt.  
 28. Uganda  
 Insurgency in northern districts.  
 29. Zaire  
 Ethnic violence.

#### MIDDLE EAST

30. Afghanistan  
 Civil war.  
 31. Algeria  
 Terrorism by Islamic Salvation Front.  
 32. Bahrain/Qatar  
 Territorial dispute over Hawar Islands.  
 33. Egypt  
 Terrorism by Islamic fundamentalists and border dispute with Sudan.  
 34. Iraq  
 Insurgencies by Kurds and Shiite Muslims.  
 35. Israel  
 Political violence and terrorism in Israel proper and occupied territories.  
 36. Lebanon  
 Armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon-based terrorist groups.  
 37. Turkey  
 Insurgency by Kurdish separatists.

#### SOUTH ASIA AND PACIFIC RIM

38. Bangladesh  
 Insurgency.  
 39. Bhutan  
 Ethnic unrest.  
 40. Burma (Myanmar)  
 Insurgencies, ethnic conflicts, and drug violence.  
 41. Cambodia  
 Civil war by Khmer Rouge.  
 42. India  
 Sectarian violence between Hindus and



■ *Missile on the march in Iran:* Today's world is still a dangerous place, with dictatorial regimes from Pyongyang to Tripoli.

ding small, unique, often dangerous and immediate missions—in terms of political and socioeconomic consequences—the military will mainly be planning, training, and appropriating for the “big” wars, which are really aberrations in the usual form of conflict.

Surrounding America will be a constant clatter of “small wars”—low-intensity conflicts (LICs)—that will erode our national psyche and drain our national treasure. Expensive ad hoc attempts at dealing with LICs by applying the GPF will continue to occur. Sometimes

Muslims, terrorist separatist movements by Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir, Sikhs in Punjab, and Assamese and other tribes in India's easternmost regions.

43. Indonesia  
Insurgencies and ethnic violence.

44. Laos  
Insurgency by Hmong Lao and drug violence.

45. Pakistan  
Border conflict over Kashmir region with India.

46. Papua New Guinea  
Insurgency by the Free Papua Movement.

47. Philippines  
Insurgency by New People's Army.

48. South Korea  
Border intrusions by North Korea resulting in limited combat.

49. Sri Lanka  
Ethnic-based insurgency by Tamils.

50. Thailand  
Civil unrest as a result of military rule and drug violence.

#### SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA

51. Bolivia  
Insurgencies.

52. Brazil  
Drug violence.

53. Colombia  
Insurgencies, terrorism, and drug violence.

54. Ecuador  
Unresolved border dispute with Peru.

55. El Salvador  
Drug violence and banditry by demobilized soldiers and guerrillas.

56. Guatemala  
Insurgencies.

57. Haiti  
Internal conflict as a result of military rule.

58. Honduras  
Insurgency by MPLC.

59. Mexico  
Drug violence.

Insurgency near Guatemala border.

60. Nicaragua  
Regenerated insurgencies by former Contra and Sandinista troops.

61. Panama  
Drug violence.

62. Peru  
Insurgency by Shining Path guerrillas.

63. Venezuela  
Drug war on Colombian and Brazilian borders.

these approaches will be successful because of their massiveness, but often not.

This is because the adjudication of small wars requires a quality effort versus a quantitative one. One only has to look at Panama and Somalia to see that positive effects were only temporary. In other words, most small wars require the use of surgical tools instead of tanks.

Between the U.S. military think tanks and the service schools, several hundred million dollars are spent each year trying to project into the future. Unfortunately, their impact is normally disregarded or minimized in any conceptualizing about LICs and the associated Special Operations Forces and tactics involved. This is not true for the GPF—as the GPF is considered the sacred cash cow in the system.

The only ideas that freely emerge on the overall worldwide threat and how to deal with it correctly come mainly through independent military-oriented publications (e.g., the *Proceedings*), written by courageous but thoroughly frustrated junior-grade officers who see the metamorphosis.

#### SMALL-WAR STRATEGIES

The resulting problem is that we have a SOF that must deal with an escalating panoply of conflict against America. The SOF is a force of between 45,000 and 47,000 out of 1.6 million, depend-

ing on what units are in the mix, and is on the edge of our active defense. It expends only 1.2 percent of the total defense budget, but it is among the most deployed elements of the military. In 1992, the use of the SOF increased 35 percent for both covert and overt missions. Burnout and divorce rates are high, and reenlistments are dropping in these elite units because of their overuse. One would think that someone in the Pentagon would be pressing for increasing, upgrading, reorienting, or redistributing forces to relieve the pressures on the exist-

■ *Well armed and well trained:* America's future safety could depend on the rapid deployment of special forces like the Navy SEALs.



ing SOF, rather than espousing cuts by poll-driven politicians.

It is true that technology has reduced the need for certain aspects of quantity in our GPFs, and maintaining the capability to fight two large-scale conflagrations at the same time by GPFs is important. What remains unclear is how much is enough in an expanding universe of warfare. Accordingly, augmenting our ability to deal with the smaller fires using the SOF can reduce the costs in terms of political risk, lives expended, monetary investment, and time, reducing the need for the application of our GPFs.

America must recognize several facts about the future military force:

- Less military does not mean better, only overused, given the

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**Neglect translates into the flag-draped coffins of our young soldiers, sailors, and airmen, squandered in an attrition strategy that past great civilizations have followed to their demise.**

■

increasing conflict scenario.

- The military needs to train and equip proportional to the threat, while retaining a surge capability for the big war.
- There is never enough usable,

lawful, real-time intelligence to head off situations or gain the advantage with the appropriate mix of forces.

- Congress has a responsibility to fund a military consistent with the threat.
- The president needs to educate the public that, in an era of a "no-sanctuary planetwide battlefield," being strong and prepared is the only course for America. Cutbacks in the military will be reflected in cutbacks in our economic, sociopolitical, and security capabilities.

The above list could go on and on, reiterating many of the lessons learned during the recovery from the former period of malaise generated during the Carter years.

Neglect translates into the flag-draped coffins of our young soldiers, sailors, and airmen, squandered in an attrition strategy that past great civilizations have followed to their demise. Invigorating our security approaches now, even contemplating the defense of the outer space surrounding us, will mean our generation will have met its responsibilities for securing our grandchildren's future. ■



*Former Special Forces officer Maj. F. Andy Messing, Jr., has observed 27 armed conflicts worldwide. He currently is executive director of the National Defense Council Foundation in Alexandria, Virginia.*

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE  
STROBE TALBOTT

Question:

As you know, both houses of the Haitian Parliament passed an election law this year. President Aristide did not promulgate this law, but instead has promulgated another election law with provisions somewhat more favorable to pro-Aristide candidates. Apparently President Aristide's position is that Parliament did not comply with all the rules necessary to make the earlier law binding, and that certain provisions of Parliament's law (for example, educational requirements for candidates) were unduly restrictive. What is the United States government's position on the two conflicting election laws? Is this a sign that President Aristide intends to "rule by decree"?

Answer:

The Haitian Parliament made several amendments to the draft electoral law proposed by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) early this year, altering provisions regarding candidates' residency requirements and the candidacy of priests. Since the Haitian Constitution itself defines conditions for candidacy, there were questions raised regarding the constitutionality of the Parliament's changes. The Parliament returned the law to the executive branch just before the term of office of the lower chamber of Parliament expired. Under the Haitian constitution the President normally would have resubmitted the draft law to the Parliament with his suggested alternatives, but he could not do so because of its expiration. Consequently, he consulted with the CEP, which is duly authorized to supervise the electoral process, and then promulgated the law as it was originally drafted by the

council. The CEP concurred in all the changes made by President Aristide, and he made only the changes suggested by the CEP. The constitution does not address the situation in which Parliament is not available, but President Aristide's decision to consult with the CEP and follow its guidance seems a reasonable approach under the circumstances.

President Aristide and Prime Minister Michel have taken the position that in general the Haitian government will operate on the basis of existing laws. Emergency situations may call for the Government to take action by decree, however, as was the case when President Aristide extended the mandates of local government officials beyond February 4. It should be noted, however, that when the last Parliament adjourned it had completed its most important work. Many of its members are seeking re-election.

Question:

President Aristide has been quoted to the effect that he intends to be only a "referee" in the next election and not actively campaign for any candidate. How firm a commitment is this? Does the United States take the position that this commitment is important to the future of democracy in Haiti?

Answer:

As the country's legitimately elected head of state, President Aristide acts and represents himself in public as the President of all Haitians and has refrained from campaigning for particular candidates. This posture is consistent with the themes of reconciliation and political tolerance which he has steadfastly pursued since his restoration last October. We believe President Aristide's staying above the fray of the campaign will help to ensure the integrity of the upcoming elections and contribute to the further consolidation of democracy in Haiti.



Question:

Representative Dan Burton has spoken eloquently about the deplorable situation in Haitian prisons. This raises the general question of human rights, and especially of possible retribution by members of the two major political/military factions against their opponents. Has there been violence or other mistreatment of anti-Aristide partisans under the new government? Or by the remnants of pro-coup forces against supporters?

Answer:

The overall human rights situation has improved dramatically in Haiti since President Aristide's return, as the Department has previously reported to Congress. In the case of the Haitian prisons, in which conditions have long been appalling, an intensive reform effort is now underway with the support of the international community.

Haiti is in a transitional period, especially as regards law enforcement and justice. Although the old system of repression by the military and their paid auxiliaries was essentially brought to a quick end thanks to the efforts of the U.S.-led Multinational Force (MNF), gradual deployment of Haiti's first professional, civilian police force was only able to begin in June 1995. The MNF and its successor, the UN Mission in Haiti, have helped Haitian authorities maintain security and keep crime, general lawlessness and score-settling to a minimum. The messages of

"reconciliation," tolerance and political peace preached by President Aristide have also been helpful factors.

There have, however, been several apparently isolated attacks and killings in which a political motivation cannot be ruled out. The victims in five or six of these still unresolved cases were former military officers who had opposed President Aristide's government. The prominent anti-Aristide lawyer and politician Mireille Durocher Bertin was assassinated on March 28. Other ex-military officers and opposition politicians have complained of receiving threats against their safety. Supporters of the President have also reported receiving threats and attacks in recent months from their political opponents, particularly in the context of the ongoing election campaign. Such incidents -- whether described as "left on right," "right on left," or otherwise -- are not widespread, however, and we do not see them as posing a serious threat to the overall integrity of the electoral process.

**QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE  
STROBE TALBOTT**Question:

What continuing role, if any, does the Administration expect former President Carter, Senator Nunn, and General Powell to play in the Haiti transition process? Have they consulted with the Administration on their recent visit? Does the Administration support this continuing involvement?

Answer:

President Carter and the Carter Center have offered their assistance to the Haitian government and political parties in preparing for the upcoming parliamentary and local elections campaign, as well as in monitoring the actual voting. We understand that former President Carter's staff consulted with the Department before his recent visit to Haiti and President Carter communicated his impressions of his recent Haiti trip to the Administration.

Question:

Is the Administration concerned that the electoral law promulgated by President Aristide deleted several sections that had been approved by the Parliament? What specific sections were deleted? Was the law promulgated consistent with Haiti's constitution or as an executive decree?

Answer:

The Haitian Parliament made several amendments to the draft electoral law proposed by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) altering provisions regarding candidates' residency requirements and the candidacy of priests. Since the Haitian Constitution itself defines conditions for candidacy, there were questions raised regarding the constitutionality of the Parliament's changes. The Parliament returned the law to the executive branch just before the term of office of the lower chamber of Parliament expired. Under the Haitian Constitution the President normally would have resubmitted the draft law to the Parliament with his suggested alternatives, but he could not do so because of its expiration. Consequently, he consulted with the CEP, which is duly authorized to supervise the electoral process, and then promulgated the law as it was originally drafted by the council. The CEP concurred in all the changes made by President Aristide, and he made only the changes suggested by the CEP. The constitution does not address the situation in which Parliament is not available, but President Aristide's decision to consult with the CEP and follow its guidance seems a reasonable approach in the circumstances.

Question:

What are the consequences of having no parliament in Haiti (since their term ended on February 4) until after the elections in June? Has the Administration suggested to President Aristide that he limit his initiatives in this period so as not to be perceived as taking advantage of this institutional vacuum?

Answer:

President Aristide and Prime Minister Michel have assured us the Haitian government will operate on the basis of existing laws. Emergency situations may call for the Government to take action by decree, however, as was the case when President Aristide extended the mandates of local government officials beyond February 4. It should be noted, however, that when the last Parliament adjourned it had completed its most important work. Many of its members are seeking re-election.

We have encouraged President Aristide to institute an informal consultative mechanism involving Haiti's political and Parliamentary leaders, as well as the executive, to ensure stability and cooperation through the electoral campaign.

Question:

Does Haiti's 1987 constitution have any provision for "rule by decree"?

Answer

No, nor do we consider the current government to be functioning on such a basis. The Haitian Constitution envisions lengthy periods when Parliament is not sitting. The regular legislative sessions of the Chamber of Deputies are supposed to run from the second Monday of January to the second Monday of May, and from the second Monday of June to the second Monday of September. The Senate may adjourn under the Constitution but not during the regular legislative sessions. During the periods the Parliament is not sitting -- and now, when in effect Parliament does not exist -- the Government of Haiti operates on the basis of existing laws.

Question:

What sort of support is the United States providing to the electoral process: Are other donors contributing as they promised to support this process?

Answer:

USAID will provide a total of approximately \$10.8 million to assist in the parliamentary, local and presidential elections. About \$9 million is being provided through the UN Electoral Assistance Unit and will be used for voter registration, civic and voter education, training of pollworkers and political party pollwatchers, technical assistance to the Provisional Electoral Council, and candidate and national party fora. Approximately \$2 million will be provided to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), which is responsible for the procurement of ballots.

Others donors which have pledged to cover the costs of the election are: Canada - \$1.5 million, France - \$1 million, Japan - \$650,000 and the EU - \$1.3 million. We are urging donors to make their payments as quickly as possible.

Question:

What type of international observation of the electoral process is contemplated?

Answer:

The Organization of American States, through its International Civilian Mission (ICM) in Haiti, has taken on the primary responsibility for election monitoring and observation. In early February the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy sent five election specialists to Haiti who will remain there to coordinate the monitoring effort for the parliamentary and presidential elections. The ICM director in Port-au-Prince and heads of field offices have already begun meeting with party leaders to establish lines of communication to insure prompt investigation of reports of political violence and intimidation during the electoral process.

The ICM had 99 foreign personnel in Haiti as of March 20 and is in the process of more than doubling its election monitoring presence, making the observation mission in Haiti the largest observation mission in the hemisphere since the 1990 elections in Nicaragua. OAS member states have offered to contribute observers to the OAS effort in Haiti, insuring a large and broad based observation mission.

Question:

Should civic and political leaders be encouraged to draft a "code of conduct" under which the parliamentary, municipal, and, eventually, presidential elections will be held?

Answer:

A representative of the Provisional Electoral Council informed our Embassy on March 20 that the political parties have agreed that their candidates will follow the code of conduct which was used in 1990. In addition, we understand the monitors of the UN/OAS International Civilian Mission are prepared to receive complaints from the parties about any irregularities, and these will be investigated.

Question:

Are municipal authorities continuing to operate despite the end of their mandate? Are we aware of any exception, in which mayors or municipal authorities have been "dismissed" or "replaced" by President Aristide?

Answer:

The President issued a decree on February 24, noting that the expiration of the terms of all mayors in Haiti left a void in local government. In order to assure the security of local government institutions, the decree undertook to appoint "interim executive agents." The operative article declared that certain named citizens are appointed as mayors and deputy mayors to administer 124 of Haiti's 135 communes until the investiture of officials elected in the upcoming municipal elections.

Our Embassy is in the process of comparing the names of those chosen to the names of municipal officials elected in 1990, as well as to the names of those actually occupying the various city halls according to information from MNF personnel. Once we receive the Embassy's analysis of this information, we will be pleased to share it with your staff.

Question:

Do we have any doubts that President Aristide will step down next February as required under Haiti's constitution? How would we react to this sort of development?

Answer:

President Aristide has stated clearly that he will not stay on as President beyond the end of his term in February 1996. We have no reason to believe his firm position on this point has changed. A unilateral extension of his term, or amendment of the Constitution by the new Parliament to permit such an extension, is highly improbable. We therefore see no need to comment hypothetically on how we would react if such a situation were to arise.



Question:

President Aristide has pledged on numerous occasions to stay "above the fray" and not support, directly or indirectly, any political party or candidate. Do we think this is a good idea? Has President Aristide been keeping that pledge? Is it a good idea to hold him to that pledge so that one political party does not have unfair advantage given the vast external support the government is receiving?

Answer:

Our first concern is that the elections in Haiti be free and fair, and that they take place in a secure and stable atmosphere. USAID and the United Nations are working closely with the Haitian government to ensure that the election process meets these criteria. The Multinational Force established secure and stable conditions and the follow-on UN Mission in Haiti, will ensure that they continue during the elections campaign.

In a February 7 speech to the Haitian people, President Aristide said that "when there is democracy, there is a ballot for an election in which everyone expresses his choice" and spoke further of the rights of political parties to operate freely. We have urged the President to engage the political parties in a dialogue on the elections. We have also suggested that the parties agree on a code of conduct for the elections.

HAITI: ASSISTANCE TO PARLIAMENTQuestion

What specific forms of material and technical assistance were provided to the Parliament between September 19, 1994 and February 4, 1995?

Answer

During the period included in the question, the U.S. Government facilitated the return of 11 parliamentarians exiled in the United States and Canada so that they could take part in parliamentary deliberations and other actions. The U.S. provided security so that Parliament could conduct its business.

AID provided immediate assistance in the form of office supplies, typewriters, radios and a computer in response to requests from Parliament.

Negotiations were conducted during this period which will lead to the award of grants to the Center for Democracy and the Congressional Human Rights Foundation to train the permanent staff of the parliament, as well as new and returning members following the June elections.

HAITI: MESSAGE OF LACK OF TANGIBLE SUPPORTQuestion

What message did this lack of tangible support send to those Haitians about our stated objective of restoring "democratic institutions?"

Answer

The premise of the question is entirely wrong. During the period September 19 - February 4 a principal focus of U.S. action aimed at restoring democratic institutions was to encourage the Haitian government to hold parliamentary elections at an early date in a fair and open manner which would be so perceived by Haitians and the international community.

Haitian officials in the administration of President Aristide and in the Parliament itself were well aware of the importance the U.S. Government places on this issue. The Embassy closely followed developments and strongly encouraged the Haitians to take early legislative and administrative action to authorize and organize an Electoral Council and other elements needed to carry out elections.

The mandate of nearly every member of the Haitian Parliament expired on February 4 and new legislators will take their seats following the June 4 elections. The U.S. Government provided security to assure Parliament could convene on September 28, 1994; provided funding to the Center for Democracy and the Congressional Human Rights Foundation for assistance to Parliament; and provided material assistance to Parliament itself including computer and other office equipment and supplies.

HAITI: SUPPORT FOR JUDICIAL BRANCHQuestion:

What sort of support have we provided to Haiti's judicial branch?

Answer:

Assistance to the Haitian justice system thus far has included following elements:

- initial assessments conducted by USAID and US Army Reservists of the status of the justice system including personnel, physical facilities and procedures used in the judicial system;
- delivery of equipment and supplies such as a fax, computer hardware and software, basic office supplies and furniture to be used by the Ministry of Justice;
- a series of five-day training programs organized by USAID and conducted by personnel from Haiti's Ministry of Justice, the U.S. Department of Justice and the National Center for State Courts for judges, prosecutors and justices of the peace reaching about 200 judicial officers to date;

- a judicial mentor program currently underway using about 30 U.S. Army reservists who will be replaced by civilian mentors on May 1;
- a court facilities rehabilitation effort at two sites, intended to serve as a prototype for additional renovation sites;
- a penal systems rehabilitation program, developed by working closely with the UN Crime Branch, the UN/OAS Civil Mission and the UNDP, and scheduled to begin in mid-April;
- a longer-term, more comprehensive training and technical assistance program for judges and prosecutors being planned for implementation over an 8 - 12 month period following the completion of the short-term programs;
- other assistance expected to include programs to increase access to justice, compile and reform legal codes and improve court administration.

Police/Army IssuesQuestion:

Are we satisfied with the performance of the IPSF? Are they actually patrolling the streets or is that task falling to the international forces?

Answer:

The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) orientation has provided officers with basic skills that can be honed and developed through active duty. The force is an interim solution only, but is in fact engaged in patrols. We believe that the gradual replacement of the IPSF with a new civilian national police force -- as more and more officers finish ICITAP training -- will give Haiti a professional and accountable law enforcement team.

The International Police Monitors (IPMs) served to oversee and advise the IPSF, which has provided basic law enforcement for Haiti, including patrolling the streets. They frequently accompany the IPSF on patrol, but their mission does not include independent patrolling.

Question:

Is the Government of Haiti paying the IPSF reliably so as to encourage them to do their jobs adequately?

Answer:

Salaries for the IPSF have been paid through February. The GOH understands that prompt salary payments are basic to good morale and professional loyalty within the IPSF. While funding for many activities in Haiti is a serious problem, we are working closely with the Haitian leadership to ensure that salaries are of the highest priority.

Question:

What are the qualifications for the Interim Public Security Force and for applicants to the National Police Academy? Do these qualifications apply to their commander and officer corps?

Answer:

Three thousand of the 3,700 man IPSF were chosen from members of the existing Armed Forces of Haiti who were vetted by USG and GOH representatives to eliminate known criminals and human rights abusers. They also had to be physically able to meet the demands of the job. ICITAP gave all of them a one-week orientation course in October-December, 1994. Members of the new national civilian police, who will receive 16 weeks of training at the National Police Academy, are being selected by a more rigorous standard. Numerous people have applied, so Haiti can be very selective. A few highly qualified ex-members of the Interim Public Security Force will be allowed to apply as individuals. The political leadership of the Ministry of Justice and the senior commanders of the national police will not necessarily be graduates of the Academy, but will be qualified under the appropriate provisions of the laws of Haiti.

Question:

What "screening" system has been established to ensure that applicants to the National Academy or members of the IPSF are qualified and not chosen for their political loyalties?

Answer:

We are working closely with the GOH to identify strong candidates for the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) training at the National Academy. The selection process includes the "vetting" of names against a USG list of individuals known to have a human rights abuse or criminal record. All candidates must take a written exam, be interviewed by a panel, and also meet strict physical and educational standards. The GOH understands that unsuitable individuals will be denied entry into the Academy by U.S. authorities.

Question:

What type of equipment has been provided to the IPSF or will be supplied to the Academy-trained force? For both groups, who pays their salary and provides uniforms, supplies, or equipment?

Answer:

Through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) program, the IPSF and the new, Academy-trained national police are receiving basic equipment such as vehicles, communication devices, and essential police equipment. The French and Canadians are also funding basic equipment needs to help the police get started, while the GOH has assumed responsibility for salary payments. We will recycle some equipment to the IPSF as the International Police Monitors relinquish their equipment and depart Haiti.

Question:

Who provides the training at the National Academy? What does the curriculum cover? How long does training last? Will graduates be subject to periodic evaluation once they are deployed?

Answer:

Training at the National Academy is administered by the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). The French, Canadians, and Norwegians are also providing instructors. The four-month basic training course is centered around the principles of community policing. Additional instruction may be provided in the future to cover other requirements such as Border Guards and Ministry Security. We are also working with the GOH to develop an effective mechanism for regularly evaluating officers' work once they are actually on the job.



Question:

What costs of the National Academy are paid for by the U.S., by the international community, or by the Government of Haiti?

Answer:

The French and Canadian governments have contributed training personnel to the Academy. The government of Taiwan has made available \$3 million in funds, some of which may be used for the Academy or security forces. The Haitian government pays the salary of all Haitian personnel involved in the operation. USG ICITAP funding in FY 1995 is \$23 million. The money is used to support the overall police project in Haiti, of which the National Academy is a part. It will also be used to develop the infrastructure for the police.

Question:

Are Pierre Cherubin, Pierre Neptune, Richard Salomon, and Dany Toussaint still in the employ in [sic] the Haitian security forces or any other agency? What position, if any, do these individuals hold? Do any of them have de facto or de jure responsibility for Haiti's security forces? Is our government aware of any evidence linking any of these individuals to human rights abuses or drug trafficking?

Answer:

Major Dany Toussaint is currently chief of the interim public security force. Cherubin, Neptune, and Salomon are separated from the Haitian armed forces and hold no official positions with the Haitian Government, nor any de facto responsibility for Haiti's security forces. Cherubin has ceased to work in the Presidential Palace or to function as an official adviser to President Aristide. We have seen reports, so far unconfirmed, that Cherubin will be named to head the state-owned telephone company and that Salomon will be named as port director in St. Marc.

There are a number of reports implicating Salomon, then a police lieutenant, in the brutal killing of five young men in July 1991, and further implicating Cherubin, then a lieutenant colonel and Chief of Police, in covering up for Salomon. A civilian magistrate subsequently cleared Salomon of all

charges. (Although Neptune was responsible for shooting one of the youths -- apparently during an altercation -- and arresting all five before then turning them over to Salomon, we have not seen any evidence linking Neptune with the killings.) There are also reports that Cherubin told prison officials to execute Roger Lafontant extralegally, during or just prior to the September 1991 coup against President Aristide.

Information about both these incidents was transmitted to the Congress and made a matter of public record in the 1991 and 1992 Human Rights Reports, and the one-time Report on the Participation or Involvement of Members of the Haitian Government in Human Rights Violations Between December 15, 1990, and December 15, 1994. This latter report was transmitted to the Congress on December 30, 1994.

We have received unconfirmed reports that Toussaint may possibly have been involved in past wrongdoing, including drug trafficking. We intend that the screening procedures we and the Haitian Government put in place to vet personnel will exclude anyone involved in narcotics trafficking.

Question:

Will the Haitian Government prosecute persons against whom there is credible evidence of involvement in notorious human rights abuses? Are we prepared to share any evidence we might have?

Answer:

Questions on eventual prosecutions should be referred to the Government of Haiti. We note, however, President Aristide's establishment late last year of a truth commission to investigate human rights violations, as well as the efforts we, Justice and AID are currently pursuing under the Administration of Justice Program to reform Haiti's justice sector, and in particular the criminal justice system

The U.S. Government may be in a position to make available evidence we have for selected investigations or prosecutions of human rights abuses in Haiti. We cannot, however, answer such a question definitively until we receive a request in an appropriate form from a competent Haitian authority, and we are able to determine what resources would need to be expended in searching for, declassifying, and furnishing the information which may be responsive to the request and releasable under U.S. law.

Police/Army IssuesQuestion:

When did U.S. officials first learn that Haitian authorities placed "unscreened" persons in the IPSF? Whom do we believe was responsible for making this decision to place these individuals in the IPSF and replace "screened" persons? How many persons were added to the IPSF ranks unilaterally, and how many had been dismissed unilaterally.

Answer:

In early January, the U.S. Embassy in Haiti and the MNF received information that some individuals who had been trained by International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) in special six-day courses last year to be members of the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) had been dismissed by the Government of Haiti. At that time, confusion had also been created through the existence of two separate IPSF rosters, one of 2,000 individuals designated as IPSF and another of 1,500 who were listed as members of the IPSF but who were designated for membership in a new Haitian Armed Forces should one eventually be established.

The Embassy, in conjunction with the MNF, undertook a thorough review of the composition of the IPSF and created a computer database. The Embassy asked the GOH to consolidate their various lists and to present one consolidated list for the IPSF. The GOH provided such a list of 3,413 personnel.

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The Embassy and the MNF then made a comparison of that list with the comprehensive list of all personnel who had been screened for human rights abuses and trained by ICITAP in their six-day courses. That resulting database revealed that approximately 1,200 persons on the GOH list of 3,413 had not been trained by ICITAP and screened, and that over 1,000 personnel who had been trained by ICITAP and screened were not on the GOH list of 3,413. (The initial figure of 1,700 for non-ICITAP trained went down to 1,200 as names were more carefully cross-checked.)

In early February, these discrepancies were brought to President Aristide's attention. He immediately directed that no non-vetted, non-ICITAP individuals should be permitted on the IPSF rolls. On February 16, President Aristide, in the presence of the U.S. Ambassador, instructed his officials to work with the U.S. Embassy in order to fully resolve the remaining discrepancies between the USG and GOH lists.

It appears that President Aristide was unaware of the issue before we brought it to his attention. Once we were able to document the discrepancies, he took decisive action to correct the problem. Following February 16, joint teams, composed of U.S. Mission officials, MNF representatives, and GOH officials, travelled throughout the country to recompose the IPSF lists to ensure that only ICITAP-trained and screened personnel are members of the IPSF. All those who were not ICITAP-trained and screened were informed that they could not serve in the IPSF.

Police/Army IssuesQuestion:

Did this unilateral decision, which surprised the U.S. officials who designed this program, constitute a breach of faith by the Haitian government?

Answer:

We are satisfied that President Aristide, once apprised of the situation, took appropriate measures to rectify the situation.

Question:

What specific steps have Haitian and U.S. officials taken to correct this situation?

Answer:

After a meeting with our Ambassador, President Aristide took immediate steps to address the IPSF problem. The unvetted, untrained former military personnel were immediately removed from duty, pay was withheld until the roster issue was resolved, and the vetted ICITAP trainees were reinstated.

Question:

When the Administration agreed to UNSC Resolution 940, did we anticipate that virtually no other country would make a significant contribution to that mission and that we would shoulder virtually all of the costs?

Answer:

Thirty countries have contributed troops and police to the MNF phase of the Haiti operation and thirty-seven will contribute to the UNMIH phase. This is a record of participation unheralded in Hemispheric history, and is a testimony to how much attitudes have changed since the 1980's, when the United States had to go it alone in Panama and Grenada.

The U.S. government recognized that we would assume the major burden of financial costs for the first phase of this operation while the UN, under Security Council Resolution 940, accepted these responsibilities for the second. While the United States has picked up most of the costs for the military and police component of the MNF, we are assuming less than 25% of the costs of developmental and humanitarian assistance. These costs -- \$1.2 billion over two years -- are being borne principally by other donors, in the best example of burdensharing in this sphere in Hemispheric history.



Would the UNSC have authorized a multinational force if we insisted that it be funded, at least in part, out of UN coffers or that we be credited for our contribution? If so, why did we agree to assume all the costs?

Answer:

In his report dated July 15, 1994, the Secretary-General put forward three possible options for the Haiti operation. One was an expanded UN Mission in Haiti, to perform all the tasks carried out by the MNF and UNMIH; the second a coalition of states to carry out those tasks; and the third (which was chosen) of a "hybrid" of a multinational force followed by UNMIH. The Secretary General warned in his report that "the assembly, equipment and deployment of ... option one is beyond the present capability" of the United Nations. UN Security Council Resolution 940 specified that all costs of the MNF phase would be borne by its participants. This language was insisted upon by other UN Security Council members, and the resolution would probably not have passed without it.

We far from alone in our support of the MNF. Thirty countries have contributed troops and police to this phase of the Haiti operation and thirty-seven will contribute to the UNMIH phase. This is a record of participation unheralded in Hemispheric history, and is a testimony to how much attitudes have changed since the 1980's, when the United States had to go it alone in Panama and Grenada.

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DrugsQuestion:

Are there persons whom we believe have been associated in any way with the drug trade in Haiti that could be brought to justice now that a more friendly government is in power?

Answer:

We have received reports of drug trafficking activity and of drug-related corruption among government and military personnel for many years.

Cooperation with Haitian police and military personnel in combatting narcotrafficking was necessarily limited in recent years under the de facto regime. The return of the legitimate government of President Aristide and the development of a new, independent, civilian police offer great promise for future cooperation, but will take considerable time to develop. Recently, the GOH assisted us in detaining and returning to the U.S. two fugitives from U.S. justice. We look forward to a more fruitful enforcement relationship. This in turn will facilitate investigations and prosecutions.

**Question:**

What is the current human rights climate in Haiti?

**Answer:**

Local human rights groups and the UN/OAS human rights monitors - the ICMS - agree that human rights conditions have improved dramatically since the arrival of the MNF. Historically, the police and military (Forces Armees d'Haiti or FAD'H), paramilitary groups, and the judiciary have been the major violators of human rights. The MNF troops and International Police Monitors (IPMs) have virtually eliminated FAD'H-perpetrated human rights abuses, the MNF effectively disbanded the paramilitary Front for Advancement and Progress in Haiti (FRAPH), and a USAID program is assisting the Haitian Ministry of Justice to restructure itself to assure competent administration of justice.

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council that there were still some areas of concern, but that in general "there is a feeling of liberty and a sense of security which did not exist previously." The embassy is working with the ICM and the local groups to monitor the continued protection of Haitian citizens.

In a further move to defend the new climate of respect for human rights President Aristide announced the establishment of a truth commission which will investigate human rights violations from the time of the coup up to the present. The U.S. has supported this move in a resolution at the recent 51st session of the UNHRC in Geneva. The Government of Haiti has not yet elaborated on the structure or mandate of the commission. In general, truth commissions that have been established in other countries and tailored to each one's unique circumstances have helped those countries emerge from their non-democratic pasts and break the cycle of impunity for perpetrators.

Question:

How do we explain the delay in deploying OAS/UN human rights observers since September 19? How many observers have been and will be deployed?

Answer:

The director of the International Civilian Mission (ICM) returned to Haiti immediately after the deployment of the Multinational Force. The rest of those observers who had been expelled in July by the defacto government returned shortly after President Aristide returned to Haiti. This included all of the ICM observers who had remained on call since their expulsion. The mission has been gradually increased since that time. As of March 20, 92 observers and seven ICM staff members had been deployed in Haiti. Some 200 could be deployed under existing plans. Two factors explain current deployment below that level: improved security conditions in Haiti, and a reassessment of the role of the ICM in this changed environment. Among the new functions of the ICM will be the monitoring of elections in Haiti: this will require substantially more observers than the 200 already anticipated.

Question:

How many reports has the ICM issued since September 19, 1994? What has been the gist of its reporting?

Answer:

The director of the ICM (International Civilian Mission) returned to Haiti at the same time that the MNF deployed there. Once he returned, he was able to assess the security situation to determine whether it was safe for his personnel to return. The 16 personnel who were still employed with the ICM went back to Haiti shortly after President Aristide's return in October. Over the course of the several months since they returned, they have built their personnel level up to ninety-two observers, and nine support staff. They have not released any official reports of their activity since then, but are preparing to issue a report through the OAS covering the first six months since their return.

The ICM continues to prove to be invaluable in the process of peace-keeping and reconciliation. Because of the high level of trust they enjoy among Haitians, the people regularly bring their problems of perceived injustices to the local ICM monitor. Playing a preventive role, monitors have spent up to half their time mediating a variety of disputes such as arguments between governmental authorities and grass roots popular organizations, or individual land disputes. This sort of conflict resolution doubtless contributes dramatically toward minimizing clashes which could easily escalate into vendettas.

Are we aware of numerous reports of abuses that appear to be aimed at members of Haiti's Parliament?

Answer:

After the dismantling of the de facto government's mechanisms of repression, there has been a notable increase in criminal acts. There are allegations that some of these acts are in fact politically motivated, and therefore human rights issues, and not simply common crimes. MNF, IPSF, and, in some cases ICM personnel investigate these incidents, but conclusive results have been very difficult to attain in the Haitian context. Haiti has never had a functional system wherein competent police legitimately investigated criminal acts and pursued prosecution through a reliable judicial system. Legitimate investigative techniques are new to both Haitian security personnel and the Haitian public, and those charged with conducting investigations lack both experience and expertise.

In the lone killing of a former parliamentarian, the case of Eric Lamothe, MNF investigators concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to determine that the murder was politically motivated. Available evidence concerning the March 28 murder of outspoken Aristide opponent Mireille Durocher Bertin clearly indicates a political motivation. This incident is under intense investigation, with the participation of the FBI.

Question:

What has our Embassy or other agencies reported about the origin of anti-Carter graffiti that appeared just before his February visit?

Answer:

According to an Embassy report, the graffiti which sharply attacked President Carter were probably the work of one or more Aristide partisans. However, there is insufficient evidence to link the graffiti with President Aristide or the Haitian government. In drawing their graffiti against President Carter, the author(s) appear to have been motivated by their disdain for President Carter's negotiating efforts last September with the coup leaders.

Question:

Were U.S. companies ever ineligible to compete for UNMIH contracts? During that period when local procurement standards were in effect that failed to list the United States as an eligible country, how many contracts (with what total value) were let to other companies? How many contracts (with what total value) have been granted under UNMIH to U.S. companies? How many contracts (with what total value) have been granted under UNMIH to Cuban companies?

Answer:

It appears most unlikely that any U.S. firm was barred from competing for local UNMIH contracts as a result of the UN action. The original notification on local procurement from headquarters was received by UNMIH procurement staff in Port-au-Prince on Thursday, February 23. Two days later, on Saturday, February 25, UNMIH local procurement staff received the notice from headquarters removing the geographical limitation. We are told that UN officials in Port-au-Prince considered the original order a mistake that would soon be corrected--as it was--and made no changes to their purchasing plans, which included extensive sourcing from the U.S.

There is no question now that U.S. firms are free to compete for contracts let locally by UNMIH.

The Administration has long maintained that the geographical restriction for local procurement in peacekeeping missions is unnecessary. Local bidders have obvious advantages in bidding on certain services which the UN needs (e.g., rental of housing and office space) and may have a built-in advantage for transport costs. But those are not reasons to close off the possibility that a bidder from outside the local area may be able to offer goods or services at lower cost than a bidder from inside the local area. We are very pleased that USYG Connor's decision ends the geographical restrictions for all UN peacekeeping operations.



Question:

1. What steps have we taken to ensure that known human rights abusers are not in the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) and do not end up in Haiti's new police force?

What vetting procedures are in place for the IPSF? For the permanent force?

Have there been attempts to circumvent the vetting process?

What has been done in response to any individuals being added to the force who did not pass through the vetting process? Do we have a veto over who we will accept to train and who we will not?

Answer:

IPSF members and police academy applicants are vetted against a U.S. Government list of known human rights offenders and criminals, as well as a similar list provided by the Haitian government. We work closely with the GOH to identify suitable applicants for the permanent force. Other than the January event described in response to previous questions, we are unaware of attempts to circumvent the vetting process.

Question:

2. Who within the United States government has primary responsibility for training and oversight of the IPSF and for the new civilian police?

Who will take responsibility for the IPSF and the new police when the mission is transferred to UNMIH?

What type and length of training do the police receive? Do we think it is adequate to establish a professional police force?

Answer:

Our Ambassador in Haiti has overall responsibility for the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) training offered to the IPSF and officers who will serve in the new civilian police force. About 3,000 individuals from the Haitian military -- vetted to disqualify known human rights abusers and criminals, and trained by ICITAP -- now serve as the IPSF until ICITAP can train enough new police to replace them. International Police Monitors (IPMs) have overseen the work of the IPSF; under UNMIH, civilian police (CIVPOLs) will succeed the IPMs to perform the same function.

For the permanent police, ICITAP plans to admit one class of 375 students every month to a four-month course, so that at full capacity there should be about 1,500 police trainees at the academy in the various stages of training. The goal is to graduate 4,000 new police by March 1996; the final, total number of police has not been established. We consider that this training will provide a sound basis for the eventual development of a professional and accountable police force in Haiti.

**QUESTION:**

What rule of law programs are we running in Haiti today? Why did these programs take so long in getting started? Are other donors involved in working on judicial reform projects? If so, who is coordinating activities on the ground so they are not redundant?

**ANSWER:**

Upon returning to office, President Aristide immediately made the establishment of a functioning justice system which protects the rights of all Haitians one of the highest priorities of his administration. Within 12 weeks of Aristide's return to Haiti, USG justice assistance programs were operational. The January 26th, 1995 designation of internationally respected Jean Joseph Exume as Minister of Justice displayed again serious GOH intent to solidify the rule of law in Haiti.

To assist in the reform of the justice sector in Haiti, the USG has begun a four-pronged strategy (outlined below)--training, judicial "mentors", basic legal kits, and emergency court and penal facilities rehabilitation--for the nine departmental capitals.

- The emergency training program for judges and prosecutors was launched on January 17 jointly with USAID and the Ministry of Justice, including trainers from DOJ and the National Center for State Courts. The program helps create an interim justice system, paralleling the interim police force. To date, the program has trained nearly 250 judicial personnel and will reach approximately 500 by the end of April.
- The judicial mentor program, which parallels the International Police monitors, began in February through the Civil Affairs Brigade to provide ongoing technical assistance for judges throughout the country.
- A team of 15 reservist lawyers, prosecutors and judges have been deployed to the regional capitals to help with local problem solving and the practical application of the emergency training program of judges.
- The team is currently carrying out a survey of the courts and prosecutors' office which will provide 1) essential information on the education and experience of judges, prosecutors and their staffs, 2) an inventory infrastructure, equipment and supplies, 3) an overview of administrative practices, 4) information concerning the legality of their appointments, and 4) an estimate caseload and distribution.
- Legal kits are being distributed as the short-term training of judicial personnel is completed and trainees are graduated.

- USAID sponsored teams are now renovating court facilities at two sites, intended to serve as prototypes for additional renovation sites.
- Engineering assessments of the 15 national prisons have been completed by the International Committee for the Red Cross. Additionally, USAID worked closely with the U.N. Crime Branch, the UN/OAS Civil Mission and UNDP to create a multilateral prison strategy which addresses systemic problems and identifies concrete, actionable steps. USAID will finance the program through an agreement with UNDP.
- The USG is also training a new, civilian-led police force. Four thousand recruits will be trained over an 18-month period. A four-month program, every 30 days a new class of 375 recruits is introduced with eventually four cycles of classes of 1500 students on going at any given time.
- Several donors have indicated their interest in financing rule of law activities in Haiti: France will place two experienced jurists in the Ministry of Justice as advisors and plans to assist with the creation of a judge's school; Canada aims to start immediately with quick impact activities but is still determining the nature of those activities; and, the United Nations is interested in a penal reform program. The Minister of Justice is sponsoring monthly donor coordination meetings to ensure that activities are complementary. To date, the meetings have involved representatives from UNDP, the International Civil Mission, France, Canada, and the USG.
- To coordinate donor activities, it was agreed at the Consultative Group meeting in January that sectoral working groups would meet to develop common approaches and strategies, ensuring that our assistance is not redundant. USAID is taking a leading role in the justice sector, along with France and Canada. The Minister of Justice has already chaired one such meeting in Port-au-Prince and a second is planned for April.

Question:

4. Who is responsible for coordinating U.S. police training and judicial reform programs so they reinforce each other in our attempt to establish effective rule of law in Haiti?

Answer:

Economic assistance, training, and other forms of assistance are coordinated in Haiti by the U.S. Ambassador, and provided by AID, ICITAP, and other U.S. agencies. An interagency process established last year specifically for Haiti (EXCOMM) seeks to ensure coherent police training and judicial reform programs designed to establish effective rule of law in the country. Further coordination is provided by the Administration of Justice subgroup of the permanent Interagency Working Group on Democracy and Human Rights, co-chaired by the State Department Bureaus for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). We are moving to strengthen coordination between the two programs by appointing a single official, resident in Haiti, responsible to the U.S. Ambassador, and an official in Washington responsible to the NSC Executive Committee on Haiti to integrate and maximize the effectiveness these programs.

Question:

How many individuals does the Multinational Force have in detention? Why were these individuals detained? Who will be responsible for them once the mission is turned over to UNMIH?

Answer:

The Multinational Force had no one in detention at the time of the transition to UNMIH. As of February 20, 1995, all detainees had been turned over to Haitian authorities, and the MNF detention center had been decommissioned .

While the MNF was in Haiti, there were several dozen individuals taken into detention at various times for various periods. These individuals were detained on the basis of reliable information that they posed a threat to personnel attached to the U.S.-led Multinational Force (MNF), or a threat to the legitimate Government of Haiti. The detentions were carried out pursuant to the MNF's rules of engagement and the authority contained in UN Security Council Resolution 940 to "use all necessary means" to establish and maintain a stable and secure environment in Haiti.

Question:

Does Haiti currently have a functioning judicial branch? A functioning legislative branch? Under the Haitian Constitution, can the government and/or democracy exist without functional judicial and legislative branches? Has democracy in Haiti been restored? Has the Government of Haiti been restored?

Answer:

The judicial branch of government in Haiti has suffered from years of neglect, particularly under the illegal military regime. At present there are judges and courts operating in Haiti, but judicial personnel lack expertise and resources. We are implementing an administration of justice program to attempt to improve the Haitian judicial system.

Following the entry of the Multinational Force into Haiti, President Aristide called the Parliament into session to consider a number of urgent legislative matters, including a police bill and an amnesty bill. Along with the police and amnesty laws, the Parliament adopted an election law and a government budget for 1995 before it adjourned on February 4. A new Parliament will convene following the elections in June. Because of the circumstances of Haiti's immediate past of authoritarian military rule for three years, there have been delays in organizing the parliamentary elections and there is a longer gap than normal between the adjournment of the old Parliament and the convening of a new one. In all democratic countries there are periods when no legislative body is in session, which in and of itself does not negate a country's democracy. Democracy has been restored in Haiti. The government of President Aristide and Prime Minister Michel and his cabinet is fully functioning and is fully supportive of the democratic electoral process that is underway for a new Parliament to be elected in June.

Question:

Are U.S. soldiers and other acting agents of the U.S. Government still performing functions in lieu of the Haitian Government doing so? Which functions? Are U.S. agents assisting the Haitian Government in performing basic functions? Which functions? Has the Government of Haiti been restored?

Answer:

The Government of Haiti has been restored and all ministries are performing their normal functions. The Multinational Force is assisting the Government of Haiti in maintaining a secure and stable environment, a task which the United Nations Mission in Haiti will assume on March 31 and continue to perform until February 1996. The U.S. Government is implementing an assistance program for Haiti which has three components: humanitarian assistance, governance and democratic institution building, and economic recovery. This assistance is for the most part provided through contractors.



Question:

Have you investigated reports of continuing politically motivated violence and intimidation against non-Lavalas Haitians? Have Haitian elected officials (parliamentarians and mayors in particular) of all political orientations been "able to carry out day-to-day government functions routinely" in a "secure and stable" environment, as the 1 February report suggests?

Answer:

Although there have been a number of acts of violence committed against politically active persons, investigations conducted by the embassy, the MNF, the IPSF, and the ICM have not been able to conclusively identify either perpetrators or political motivations in any of them. In its recent official report on the murder of former Parliamentarian Eric Lamothe, the MNF stated, "Since the return of President Aristide, no solid evidence of organized political violence has been proven . . . over the deaths of several persons with right wing associations." Most of the cases remain open, but the investigative capacities of both Haitian and international authorities are highly limited. The MNF continues to act under its mandate to maintain a secure and stable environment. We are satisfied that, with MNF assistance, the Aristide Government is providing all public officials with the highest level of security of which it is capable. We believe that the vast majority of Aristide adherents are following his frequent calls for reconciliation.

Parliament is no longer in session, and available evidence does not indicate any extraordinary threat against or harassment of parliamentarians. When the terms of elected mayors expired in February, President Aristide issued a decree to establish interim executive agents so that local government could continue to function legitimately until the elections. In most cases he appointed incumbents to continue in office, while in others (notably the case of the Cedras collaborator Deputy Mayor of Port-au-Prince) he appointed a new official.

Question:

4. Recent reports indicate that there have been attempts by President Aristide to "politicize" the police force. What steps are being taken to ensure that the police force does not become a private, American trained army for the Lavalas?

Answer:

In early January, when the U.S. Embassy learned of the officers on the police force payroll who were not screened or trained by ICITAP, we brought it to the attention of President Aristide. It seems clear that President Aristide was unaware of the issue before that time. In the presence of the U.S. Ambassador, he instructed his officials to work with the U.S. Mission in order to fully resolve this issue. All those who were not ICITAP-trained and screened were informed that they could not serve in the IPSF.

The United States, France, and Canada, in close cooperation with the Government of Haiti, are assisting in the training, equipping, and deploying of a competent professional civilian police force which will embrace democratic principles of government under the rule of law. We are also working to develop institutional accountability at all levels within the judicial system by assisting the Ministry of Justice in the development of plans and policies which will enable it to exercise control and oversight of the justice system, and the police in particular. The training we provide is basic orientation for a civilian police officer similar to that given to police in the U.S.

Question:

Does the membership of the CEP reflect the spectrum of political parties in Haiti? Does the staffing at local election bureaus reflect the spectrum of political parties in Haiti?

Answer:

Prior to the formation of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), President Aristide hosted three meetings of political leaders to discuss possible candidates for the CEP. Drawing on the results of those meetings, the President, the Parliament, and the Supreme Court each named three members for the CEP. The broad consultation in advance of the naming of the CEP allowed for input from all political parties in the selection process.

The principal local election offices are the Departmental Electoral Offices (BEDs), Communal Electoral Offices (BECs), and Registration and Voting Offices (BIVs). The three-member staffs of the nine BEDs were chosen by the CEP. The CEP and the BEDs are in turn choosing the three-member staffs of the 133 BECs, which are choosing staffs of the 3,000 BIVs. The total number of personnel in all of these offices is at least 3,426. We have not made a study of the political affiliation of all of these persons, but it is fair to say that many of them are undoubtedly supporters of President Aristide. Given his popularity, this would not be surprising. We are working with the UN Electoral Assistance Unit and non-governmental organizations to ensure that the electoral process in Haiti will be conducted in a free and fair manner, which is after all the principal objective.

Question:

What are the prospects for free and fair elections in which Haitians of all political parties feel safe and able to participate as candidates and voters?

Answer:

Helping the Haitians to conduct free and fair elections in a safe and secure environment is a principal objective in the near term. We have invested considerable resources in the UN Electoral Assistance Unit for the purpose of ensuring that the elections are orderly, free and fair. To address the issue of safety, a security working group was formed, composed of representatives from the Multinational Force, the International Police Monitors, the UN Civilian Police, the Interim Public Security Force, and the Provisional Electoral Council. This group approved a security plan in February, which is being implemented.

Taking everything into consideration, we believe prospects are good for the Haitians to hold free and fair elections in a climate that provides security for voters and candidates.

**QUESTION:**

Knowing the Administration's interest in the "healthy and vibrant private sector" in Haiti, what is being done to spark private sector development directly? Have American firms been encouraged and permitted to return to Haiti? Since what date?

**ANSWER:**

Since the return of President Aristide to Haiti, USG has been working vigorously to promote private sector development in Haiti. The USG's objective is to facilitate the creation of a sound business climate in Haiti which will encourage business investment. Our balance of payments support and help with clearing arrears to international finance institutions have helped establish macroeconomic stability, an essential requirement for the operation of the private sector. In addition, among direct support initiatives taken so far are:

- Providing financial and technical support to the Presidential Commission for Economic Growth and Modernization, which will draw on expertise from the private sector to introduce measures to strengthen budget and monetary policy, modernize the investment code and regulations, mobilize capital and savings, improve banking practices, and upgrade the regulatory framework under which business and commerce operate.
- Continuing policy dialogue resulting in the following recent actions by the GOH:
  - reduction of import duties from a maximum rate of 57 percent to a maximum rate of 15 percent.
  - elimination of a requirement for forced surrender of foreign exchange.
  - A process has begun to privatize nine public enterprises, including several which have given the public sector a monopoly over the manufacture of key products (cement, flour, cooking oil) and others whose inefficiency has imposed costs on the manufacturing sector (power, telephones, ports).
- Providing financial support to the Trilateral Commission to facilitate dialogue among government, labor and private sector leaders in Haiti.
- Working with other key donors to develop a Multinational Private Enterprise Program, announced earlier this month

during the Presidential Business Development Mission to Haiti. This fund will provide interventions at several key points in the financial sector outlined below.

- A guarantee Facility will provide incentives for commercial banks to expand their rick horizons and make more loans to Haitian businesses in productive sectors. The guarantee facility will also cover lending by commercial banks to the agricultural sector, and to microcredit institutions, to markets commercial bank have not entered.
- Institutional Strengthening will help micro-finance institutions to reach more small and microenterprises, and for commercial banks to expand their small loan portfolios.
- Recapitalization of non-bank intermediaries lending to microentrepreneurs will provide capital infusions to these important institutions for the near term, until they are able to access more formal capital markets.
- A Project Development Facility will help entrepreneurs develop projects in bankable terms, further enhancing access to credit for new businesses. This facility will operate on a cost recovery basis on fees charged to successfully finance businesses, and will be self-financing after start-up costs. (USAID will particularly focus on assistance to small and medium sized firms).
- facilitating discussions between AIFLD and the Caribbean and Latin American Action (CLAA) to resolve concerns over workers rights, AFL-CIO interests, the return of assembly plants to Haiti, and avoidance of labor strife.
- The creation of an "on-lending" facility supported by the OPIC that will make \$65 million in working capital and loans available through the Bank of Boston to commercially viable business ventures in Haiti. OPIC is guaranteeing \$50 million of the facility which will make small and medium-size loans on commercial terms to expand businesses in Haiti engaged in manufacturing and providing services to the local economy. a similar \$25 million program is still under negotiation with Citibank.
- The Presidential Business Development Mission to Haiti, led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, during March 6-8 highlighted the importance of private sector involvement in Haiti's development. The Mission was comprised of some 30 U.S. firms from a broad spectrum of industries.
- The Department of Commerce opened its office in Haiti on February 6. The U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service will

provide on-site trade and investment counseling and facilitate commercial services to U. S. exporters and investors interested in doing business in Haiti.

- A Memorandum of Understanding was signed on December 16 between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Haitian Ministry of Finance creating a U.S.- Haitian Business Development Council.
- A Tax Information Exchange Agreement is being submitted to the Senate for ratification.
- Haiti's textile quota has been reinstated.

Question

Is the U.S. paying foreign countries to maintain foreign troops in Haiti? Specifically, how much is the U.S. paying to individual countries, what are we paying for, and which department's budget do these funds come from? How will these arrangements change once the UNMIH mission takes over?

Answer

The U.S. is paying a \$988 per person per month personnel reimbursement rate to governments of all non-OECD countries participating in the Multinational Force in Haiti. The U.S. is also paying \$1.50 per day for incidental expenses to soldiers and police monitors from non-OECD countries who are stationed in Haiti as part of the Multinational Force. In addition, the non-OECD countries have received approximately \$50 million in U.S. equipment from Department of Defense stocks under the presidential drawdown authority of Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act. The above-mentioned payments to governments of non-OECD countries, as well as the payments to soldiers and police monitors of non-OECD countries, are funded by the State Department's Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations Account. These payments, which are based on the minimum UN scale, are designed to reimburse the incremental deployment costs for developing nations which have volunteered to participate in the MNF phase of the Haiti operation. Much of the \$50 million of drawdown equipment will remain in Haiti to be used for other purposes after the recipient units depart. All payments will cease with the transition to UNMIH as the UN will take over payment and equipment provision for all contingents participating in UNMIH.



Question:

9. Noting that the report contains a specific plea from the Administration for support of the Defense Supplemental to cover the costs of the Haiti operation (among others), to what degree has U.S. readiness and training been jeopardized by the significant commitments made to operations in Haiti?

Answer:

The degree to which the readiness and training of U.S. Armed Forces has been jeopardized by the significant commitments made to operations in Haiti can best be evaluated by the Department of Defense.

The Administration has also requested supplemental funding for the Department of State and USAID to cover costs to those agencies of the Haiti operation. Here too additional funds are required to support diplomatic readiness. We have had to take funds from countries where we have significant foreign policy interests in order to meet the emergency requirements in Haiti. Without a supplemental, funding for those programs will not be restored, resulting in a loss of flexibility and potential for strained relations.

Question:

As the transition is made to the UNMIH mission, what are the anticipated rules of engagement? What will the mission objectives of the UNMIH operation be? Do you anticipate a shift from combat level arming to "light" arms for our troops?

Answer:

UNMIH's Rules of Engagement allow the use of force in self-defense, defense of UNMIH personnel, defense of key personnel and installations, and in assisting the Haitian Government in carrying out its responsibility to maintain a secure and stable environment. UNMIH personnel are to use the minimum force necessary for these purposes. UNMIH's rules of engagement are slightly different from those of the MNF, but in the most essential respect the two forces are the same: they have the equipment and mandate necessary to protect the lives of those carrying out its mission, and to protect the mission itself.

According to UN Security Council Resolution 940, UNMIH's mission is to assist the democratic Government of Haiti to sustain the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and protect key international personnel and key installations; and help professionalize the Haitian security forces, including creating a separate police force. UNMIH will also help the government of Haiti organize free and fair elections for the Haitian Parliament and President.

Combat forces assigned to UNMIH include two company-sized units of light cavalry (with armored HMVEES) and twenty infantry companies. This is equivalent to the numbers of such units currently assigned to the MNF. Some of these units may be more lightly equipped than their MNF counterparts, but we are confident that the overall force will be equal to the missions assigned it.

Question:

Is February 1996 an unconditional date certain for the departure of the UNMIH mission and U.S. troops operating under that umbrella?

Answer:

Yes. The UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti will end in February 1996, and all U.S. troops, as well as all others then assigned to UNMIH, will depart.

Question:

12. How many Haitians remain in safehaven in Guantanamo? What is their immigration status under U.S. law, and will they be admitted to this country? We understand that several hundred may have diseases that will bar them from admission to the United States. Is this the case, and what will happen to this group?

Answer:

Nearly all of the more than 21,000 Haitians interdicted since June have been returned to Haiti. As of March 22, only 546 Haitians remain at Guantanamo. As Guantanamo is not a territory of the United States and U.S. immigration law therefore does not apply there, the Haitians at Guantanamo do not have any immigration status under U.S. immigration law. There are no plans to admit these Haitians to the U.S.

The Attorney General on occasion has admitted Haitians into the U.S. through exercise of her parole authority. However, these were exceptional cases where the Haitian in question was in need of medical treatment or, in the case of unaccompanied minors, when the minor's parent was found to be in the U.S.

Of the 546 remaining Haitians, 294 are unaccompanied minors who remain in safehaven while efforts continue to locate their relatives or make other arrangements for their long-term care and maintenance. UNHCR has a child-protection expert in

Guantanamo who is working with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Government of Haiti and Save the Children Federation to reunite these children with family in Haiti. 27 Haitian houseparents and their dependents are also attached to the minors camp.

70 Haitians have presented INS officials sufficient information in support of their request for continued safehaven to justify further review, which is underway. Another 113 are being treated for various illnesses, such as tuberculosis or small póx, and will be returned along with their accompanying family members to Haiti once they have completed their medical treatment.

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
SUBJ: U.S. Policy and Activities in Haiti  
24 February 1996

QFR 1

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Q: Can you give us the details of the January 12 killing of a U.S. serviceman?

A: On January 12, 1995 outside the city of Gonaives in northern Haiti, two U.S. Special Forces sergeants were involved in an incident that resulted in one U.S. fatality. Sergeant First Class Gregory Cardott of San Mateo, California was shot and killed as he approached the vehicle of a former Haitian military officer who had refused to pay a toll at a toll booth. The other U.S. sergeant was injured in the arm, but escaped life-threatening injury. The gunman was killed in the incident by the surviving U.S. soldier, and the driver was taken into custody. Although there is no evidence that this action was premeditated or directed specifically against the MNF or Americans, MNF reinforcements were sent to the area as a precaution.

Q: How many incidents of hostility against U.S. forces have occurred since September 19, 1994? How are such reports handled within the MNF? Are each of these incidents reported in the President's monthly reports to Congress?

A: Since the 19 September introduction of U.S. forces into Haiti, U.S. military and Coast Guard personnel have been involved in four incidents in which weapons fire or the use of force was directed against them:

On September 24, 1994 a USMC squad exchanged fire with members of the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd'H) at the police headquarters in Cap-Haitien. One member of the U.S. military was wounded (a U.S. Navy corpsman), and ten Haitians were killed.

On October 2, 1994 one U.S. soldier was wounded when an unidentified individual(s) fired shots over a wall in Les Cayes.

On December 26, 1994 roughly fifty (50) former Haitian enlisted men gathered outside the FAd'H headquarters in Port-au-Prince to ask questions about their pay and their future. The gathering turned into a spontaneous demonstration, and someone opened fire, which touched off a melee. A U.S. infantry unit was called to the scene, and U.S. soldiers used their individual weapons to restore order. Three FAd'H members were killed, apparently by the demonstrators, while five were wounded. It is not certain if any of the Haitian fatalities were caused by U.S. fire.

On January 12, 1995 the first operationally-related U.S. fatality took place in the city of Gonaives in northern Haiti. Sergeant First Class Gregory Cardott was shot and killed as he approached the vehicle of a former Haitian military officer who had refused to pay at a toll booth. SFC Cardott's teammate was wounded but escaped life-threatening injury. Although there is no evidence that this action was premeditated or directed specifically against the MNF or Americans, MNF reinforcements were sent to the area as a precaution.

All incidents involving U.S. forces are reported by standard operating procedures through the chain of command. Incidents of significance, to include the four cited above, have all been included in the President's Monthly Report to Congress.

Q: Are we concerned that the proactive, problem-solving role that the Special Forces have routinely performed in the MNF phase might be inconsistent with the new Chapter VII, peacekeeping mission?

A: The role that the Special Forces performed in the MNF phase will remain consistent with UNMIH's peacekeeping mission. The mission and operations of the Special Forces in Haiti to date have focused on conflict resolution and the application of force only when the situation required it.


Q: For how long and where will the Special Forces be deployed in the isolated rural communities?

A: The exact locations of the Special Forces units is classified. However, for comparison, at their peak during the MNF period the Special Forces maintained 44 locations--as conditions warranted, the number of locations was reduced to twenty-four. During the initial UNMIH deployment they will maintain 20 locations--14 of which will be in rural areas. The duration of their deployment will be based on the specific circumstances of the area in which they are located, draw down will take place as conditions improve.

Q: In light of the fact that the UNMIH deployment plan calls for the forward deployment of infantry units near towns where Special Forces will be deployed, why are these Special Forces so irreplaceable? Why can't other countries' troops pull this duty?

A: U.S. Special Forces troops are unique in their ability to interact with foreign nationals. They are trained in civil as well as military skills. They have skills organic to the unit (engineer, medical) that are valuable in assisting the local populace to help themselves. Neither U.S. nor third country infantry units have these same organic capabilities.

More importantly, Special Forces have a unique functional emphasis. They normally seek to facilitate conflict resolution before a problem arises, whereas an infantry unit serves as a containment force after the problem manifests itself. The economy of force afforded by the presence of Special Forces makes them a valuable asset, with different capabilities and missions from the infantry.



Q: What will be the explicit mission of UNMIH?

A: The UNMIH is charged to maintain a secure and stable environment; protect international personnel and key installations; assist the GOH in creating and training a civilian Haitian police force; and to assist the legitimate constitutional authorities in Haiti.

Q: What will be the rules of engagement of UNMIH forces? Will U.S. forces have the authority and equipment needed to defend effectively against any foreseeable threat?

A: The rules of engagement (ROEs) for U.S. forces in UNMIH will remain essentially the same as those established for the MNF. The right to self-defense is paramount and is fully protected under the UNMIH ROE at all times. UNMIH U.S. personnel will have all the equipment, including weapons that they would have under similar unilateral U.S. missions. The ROE and equipment are sufficient to provide for the protection of our forces.

Q: Can you describe the composition of the U.S. contribution to UNMIH? Where will our forces be deployed, and what will their primary missions be?

A: The U.S. contingent of approximately 2,500 troops will make up less than half of the total UNMIH military force structure, but will provide critical capabilities for the mission. The U.S. contingent will perform three broad roles in UNMIH: Security, Logistics Support, and Technical Support. It will be deployed primarily in Port-au-Prince, but Special Forces units, with approximately 550 personnel, will be deployed in locations dispersed throughout the countryside. In addition to providing the Force Commander and 60 members of the headquarters staff, we will contribute a number of specialized forces such as Medical, Engineers, Military Police, Special Forces, Aviation, Logistics, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, as well as a limited number of combat forces for a Quick Reaction Force. Another key part of our contribution to UNMIH will be a 700-man reaction force built around a light armored cavalry squadron.



Q: What other countries are contributing forces to UNMIH?

The UN has received more offers to participate in UNMIH than it can accommodate. So far, there are 3,600 non-U.S. participants in UNMIH, from the following countries:

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Canada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Netherlands, Nepal, Pakistan, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Another component of the UNMIH will be made up of 900 civilian police trainers and monitors. Nations participating in this program are:

Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Canada, Djibouti, Dominica, France, Guinea Bissau, Grenada, Jordan, Mali, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Senegal, Suriname, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Togo.

Q: Can you describe the force structure of UNMIH and how various units will be deployed throughout Haiti?

A: The UNMIH force will be made up of approximately 3,500 troops from 11 nations and a U.S. contingent of approximately 2,500 troops. The force deployment concept is to disperse units throughout Haiti at 6 battalion-sized geographic locations (Cap Hatien, Gonaives, Port-au-Prince (2), Jacmel, and Les Cayes) with five outlying company-sized camps. In addition US Special Forces units will be deployed to 14 rural communities as well as in several major cities. During the operation, force disposition will be adjusted based on operational requirements.

**Q:** What will the cost be to the United States of our contribution to UNMIH from April 1, 1995 until February 28, 1996? Are we contemplating making any unreimbursed, in-kind contributions of logistical support or materiel to UNMIH (vehicles, communications, air/sealift)?

**A:** We expect to be fully reimbursed for all support that we provide to the UNMIH operation, and it is Department policy to seek such reimbursement. There are also costs associated with U.S.-unique requirements which are not reimbursed by the United Nations. Currently, these costs are estimated to be between \$1 - \$2 million per month. These expenditures will cover such requirements as meeting U.S. quality of life and food ration standards (which are higher than UN standards), and providing support to U.S. government agencies that is not covered by the UN. This is our best estimate of the mission requirements at this time. In addition, to these costs, the U.S. will pay its UN peacekeeping assessment in support of UNMIH.

**Q:** Will all U.S. forces remain under command of U.S. officers at all times?

**A:** The military commander for UNMIH will be an American General Officer, Major General Joseph Kinzer, USA. As UNMIH force commander, General Kinzer will work for the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Brahimi, and will have operational control over all UN forces in Haiti. General Kinzer will also be designated Commander, U.S. Forces Haiti (COMUSFORHAITI), and will exercise command and control over all U.S. forces assigned to UNMIH. As COMUSFORHAITI, he will be under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. As COMUSFORHAITI, General Kinzer will also have a U.S. Army Brigadier General as his Deputy. The Deputy will actually oversee the day-to-day management of the U.S. contingent.



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