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THE
HAYTIAN QUESTION

BY
VERAX

PRICE, 25 CENTS.

NEW YORK
LOUIS WEISS & CO., PRINTERS AND PUBLISHERS
No. 116 Fulton Street
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1891

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THE HAYTIAN QUESTION.

Day after day, the Haytian Question is forced upon public notice; and all on account of the affair of the Mole Saint-Nicolas.

It is no new thing, indeed, for a minor State, placed by the mere accident of its latitude and longitude upon the disputed ground of international competitions and rivalries, to acquire a sudden celebrity disproportionate to its place in history or its territorial importance. The Eastern Question, for example, which for so many years past has agitated the Old World, and which to-day is apparently as far from solution as ever, has given rise to innumerable subsidiary questions which have attracted the attention of the world to obscure peoples hitherto known merely as abstract geographical or ethnological names. Hence the mass of pamphlets and studies devoted to the Danubian Principalities, to Bulgaria, Servia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Crete; to the Marronites, the Druzes, the Fellahs, etc. Hence the avalanche of abuse, or the flood of eulogy, according to partisan interests and passions, which we see embodied in the thousands of articles published upon men and things in the petty territories coveted by such and such great continental or maritime power.

Calumny, bad faith, abuse and threats hold full sway, at a time when it is thought desirable to hoodwink public opinion in regard to the real causes of certain diplomatic incidents, and to conceal the blunders of short-sighted statesmen or political adventurers.

It is a matter for earnest felicitation when a Government, after having instituted or allowed to be undertaken a campaign of injustice and insult against a smaller, defenceless nation, perceives in time its error, and the necessity of reversing a policy at once discreditable to itself and dishonest towards the feebler State.

As a pendant, so to speak, to the Eastern Question, a new and formidable one, that of the Occident appears on the horizon, about to propound itself to the nations of the world. The piercing of the Central American isthmus, sooner or later, by an inter-oceanic canal—whether at Panama or at Nicaragua—with the enormous economic interests engaged and to be developed by that enterprise, must inevitably make the sea of the Antilles, with its encircling isles, the cynosure and strategic point of the principal maritime and commercial powers of Europe, and of the great Republic of the United States of North America.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the greed and jealousies already awakened in regard to certain points in the line of route through the Antilles, should prepare international difficulties acting more or less directly upon the political régime and destinies of the small West Indian republics, anxious to preserve their autonomy and their complete independence side by side with their mighty neighbor to the north, and the sometimes turbulent colonies of the various European powers.

These preliminary reflections may be not altogether valueless in establishing clearly the situation of the Haytian Republic in this affair of the Mole Saint-Nicolas,—the latter place being at the northwestern point of the island of Hayti, pointed like a cannon upon what must necessarily be the European line to the inter-oceanic canal, whether this be completed at Panama, or eventually, at Nicaragua.

Now, amidst the chorus of maledictions showered by the American press, during the past two months, upon the unhappy little Republic of Hayti, in consequence of the miscarriage of the Blaine-Tracy-Gherardi diplomacy, it is somewhat remarkable that nobody appears to have considered the possibility of an error on the part of the Americans.

It is necessary that we enter into some details here, in order to place the question upon its true basis.



STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION.

Hayti, it is scarcely necessary to remark, is a nation numbering not over a million inhabitants, as against the sixty-four millions of the United States: in view of which fact it would seem clear enough that whatever the Washington Government might see fit to ask, the "black republic" could not oppose a refusal without laying itself open to the charge of insolence

Nevertheless, it is to be observed that the little nation of the Antilles is not the only one in the New World whose strength is in pitiful disproportion to that of the United States; she is not the only one which may have to look up to the colossus of the North, and to ask herself what she may expect from that quarter, good or ill.

The *Haytian Question*, then, should be regarded as of a nature to create a precedent, the importance of which the other American nations, particularly the more feeble ones, will not fail to recognize, inasmuch as it affords a guarantee of what they may hope from the *sincerity* and *integrity* of the people of the United States.

Mr. Blaine, or Mr. Harrison, and the Government, may shape their exterior policy as they see fit—that is not the most important point in the relations of the United States with foreign peoples. For these latter, the capital question is entirely in the *American public opinion*; and of this opinion, the press is, or ought to be, the organ. It is known, abroad, that the American people are sincerely republican, profoundly imbued with the democratic spirit; and that, consequently, no international action ought to be taken by the Government without the popular consent.

It is also known,—or, at least, it has been always believed—that American public opinion is generally on the side of justice and truth; and for this reason the other nations of the New World have been accustomed to regard the growing power of the United States as a protection, rather than a menace. For this reason the Monroe Doctrine has been ever regarded, throughout Latin America, not only as an assurance against European intervention in cis-Atlantic affairs, but above all as an efficacious guarantee of independence to the old-time colonies. In a word, this is the reason why the Monroe Doctrine of the United States has had the enthusiastic adhesion of all the other American nations.

Is it now to be revealed to these Latin colonies, to these younger American nations—who also have shed their blood in external and internal strife to win a place in the sunlight of freedom, and to assure to themselves the benefits of a democratic regime—is it now to be revealed to them that the Monroe Doctrine is a fallacy, a mirage, serving but to withdraw them from all political relations, from any friendship with the great European powers, so that they may be the more completely isolated and left defenceless against foreign covetousness, and under the domination of the United States? Are they to behold the republic of Washington, of Franklin, of Hamilton, passing insensibly into the condition of a *conquering nation*, and abdicating the proud part it has hitherto played in the world's history in conforming to the spirit of its founders, who meant to make it “the hearthstone of liberty?” No! it is not to be believed that such a deviation from the old principles of the Union is possible in the minds of the American people.

Loud has been the clamor about the “breach of faith” on the part of President Hyppolite, who, it is alleged, first promised and then refused to cede the Mole

Saint-Nicolas to the United States. There is complaint, moreover, of this “ingratitude,” and of the “insolence” or “ill-will” of his government towards that of the United States.

We will examine, presently, these divers points, and get at the truth of the matter, supported by the official documents; but let this principle be recognized, to begin with, that throughout this affair two *sovereign nations*, independent of one another, are engaged, the one of which is in possession of an object that the other wishes to acquire. The United States, the nation making the demand, is beside the other, Hayti, like a giant beside a little child. But is it not at this time, more than ever, that sincerity and loyalty of conduct should be a question of the national dignity? Whatever the disproportion of the two nations, they are none the less, in their relations towards one another, two absolutely sovereign States.

Now, if there is one undisputed principle of modern international law, it is that the sovereignty of a State, consisting *essentially* in the independence of all foreign influence in the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, *ought*, by its very nature, to be exercised not only without regard to the age of the State, to the form of its constitution or government, to the established order of succession to the throne or the seat of executive power, to the rank and title of the State or its sovereign, but also “without taking into account the extent of its territory, its population, its political importance, its customs and religion, the condition of its general culture, the commerce of its people, etc., etc.*”

In virtue of this principle, the Haytian people, unable to support any comparison whatever with the United States, should be permitted, by right of their very

* See “The Modern Law of Nations,” by Klüber, revised and completed by Obt; “History of Modern International Law in Europe and in America,” by Wheaton, etc.

feebleness, to count more particularly upon the equity and the chivalry of Americans.

However insignificant in the extent of its territory, the number of its population, and in its political importance, the Republic of Hayti, like all the other American republics, is in possession of a dearly bought independence. She is jealous of this independence, and of the integrity of her territory. Her just desire is to remain a sovereign republic, and not to become a dependent one.

Surely the American people would not, in the honesty of their conscience and the depth of their democratic convictions, make a crime of the Haytians' patriotism, their attachment to their national independence and the integrity of their territory.

It is to be remarked here, that, in order to mislead American opinion upon this story of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, there has been, and still is, in the utterances of political circles, a lack of frankness as to the exact nature of the demands made upon the Haytian Government.

How is it that the press of the United States, whose mission it should be to enlighten the people upon the veritable sense and import of the acts of the national Government, has in this instance failed in its duty? Certainly not for want of the official documents, communicated to Congress, and published by the Federal Government itself. Why has this same press supplemented the unfair reproaches and false insinuations upon the affair of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, with violent attacks upon the past history of the Republic of Hayti, and against the negro race, with gross and ridiculous insults to President Hyppolite? It is a curious problem, not to be solved at the present moment. But if this be not the time for investigating such a question, it may be proper to take a calm and dispassionate survey of essential points, as follows:

1st. To re-establish the historic verity regarding the alleged promise of cession of the Môle Saint-Nicolas, said to have been made by President Hypolite to Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State under the Cleveland administration. (So-called Elie mission. Mission of Dr. Auguste Nemours.)

2d. To say a few words as to what has been characterized as the intervention of the United States in Haytian affairs.

3d. To present the real story of the Môle, and to make known the exact nature of the demand addressed to the Government of Hayti by the Washington Government under the Harrison-Blaine administration (Douglass-Gherardi mission).

4th. To state why this demand had to be refused by the Haytian Government.

5th. To furnish some indications as to the parties or factions in the Republic of Hayti; and, in replying to certain accusations, to endeavor to ascertain what, from our point of view, would be the policy most desirable for the United States to pursue towards the Government of General Hypolite.

Appended to this pamphlet will be found, moreover, the text of the principal official documents, in support of the explanations and statements herein submitted.

THE AFFAIR OF THE MOLE SAINT-NICOLAS.

§ 1.—THE ALLEGED BAD FAITH OF GENERAL HYPOLITE.

In the month of December, 1888, according to the American newspapers, General Hyppolite, chief of the revolutionary party of the North, feeling that his cause was compromised, dispatched to Washington an envoy extraordinary, in the person of Mr. Ch. Fred. Elie, Haytian merchant, charged with the proposition of certain arrangements.

These arrangements, it would appear, were not only known to the American press, but an alleged actual copy of the authorizations and powers of Mr. Elie has been published.

He was, it seems, to obtain from the United States: 1st, A naval demonstration, in Haytian waters, in favor of the Hyppolitists; 2d, Authorization to procure, in the United States, the vessels, arms and munitions of war needed for the defense of Hyppolite's party; and, 3d, The intervention, if necessary, of American war-ships to assure to the belligerents of the North the benefit of the common law of nations.

In return, General Hyppolite was understood to have promised: 1st, The removal of certain tonnage duties levied upon American merchant shipping in Haytian ports; 2d, A reduction of 20 per cent. of the duties upon importations of textile goods; and finally, 3d, Permission to the Federal navy to have a naval station on the coasts of Hayti, with entire freedom of entry and exit, and the privilege of establishing coaling sta-

tions without further expense or formality than might be enjoined by the local police regulations.

And this is not all. An additional paragraph in the *copy* of these pretended "powers" provided that if, in the course of the negotiations, the American Government should ask further privileges or advantages not mentioned in the preceding instructions, but which might be considered acceptable, the envoy Elie was empowered to accord them, subject to ratification by the provisory government.

Finally, in this *copy* of the alleged powers rested in Mr. Elie, it was set forth that the Haytian Government promised, upon the honor of the Republic, to ratify and faithfully execute whatever might be signed by the said plenipotentiary Elie, merchant and Haytian citizen, and to accord the presidential sanction to these promises in the very terms in which they were made.

This famous document was, it is affirmed, signed by General Hyppolite, and countersigned by M. A. Firmin, in charge of the department of foreign affairs.

We have, therefore, definite ground upon which to proceed with our inquiry, since it is this same M. Firmin who, as Minister of Foreign Affairs at Hayti, has conducted the negociations relative to the Mole question with Messrs. Frederick Douglass, resident United States Minister at Hayti, and Bancroft Gherardi, rear-admiral of the United States Navy, and envoy plenipotentiary.

It is to be observed, in the first place, that the pretended copy upon which the accusations of bad faith brought against General Hyppolite are based, makes no allusion whatever to the cession of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, but merely speaks, in vague fashion, of the right of the American navy to have a station with freedom of entry and exit.

Let us suppose, however, that it is really a question of this particular station, the Mole Saint-Nicolas. What is the reply of M. Firmin, to whom is imputed the

countersigning of the articles promising the cession of the Mole by General Hyppolite to Mr. Bayard? Does he find himself confounded, embarrassed, at a lost for words to explain himself? Not at all! He formally denies, in the name of the Government of General Hyppolite, this pretended promise, published by the American press; he formally protests against that assertion, qualifying it as false and lying—and that in his official response to the demand for the cession of the Mole presented by the American agents Gherardi and Douglass.

Listen to him. After having explained why it is not permissible for the Haytian Government to accede to the demands of the United States, he adds: “Even supposing that the national constitution offered no obstacle to the accession to the demand presented by your Excellencies in the name of the President of the United States, the Haytian Government could hardly, under the circumstances, enter into negotiations for the giving up or letting of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, without appearing to yield to foreign pressure, and thus compromising, *ipso facto*, our very existence as an independent people; the more, in that several American journals, with whatever undividable object, are making a mendacious propaganda to convey the impression that signed agreements have been made between the President of Hayti and the United States of America, for the cession of this same bay of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, which his Excellency President Harrison desires as a station for the use of the American navy.”

We are willing to leave it to any man of good faith and good sense: is this the language of a minister who, under any circumstances whatever, could have lent his signature to a document promising this identical Mole Saint-Nicolas to this same Government of the United States? There can be but one answer. M. Firmin's language is evidently that of an honest and sincere

man, speaking from conviction, and he could never have put his signature to a document analogous to that now in question.

Furthermore, if the American Government could be for one moment held responsible for the reports of this "promise" by General Hyppolite, M. Firmin's response would have to be taken as an outright defiance, being a formal, official and solemn contradiction to President Harrison and Mr. Blaine.

In such case, too, it would be the imperative duty of Messrs. Douglass and Gherardi to take up immediately this portion of M. Firmin's letter, and prove that he had actually made, in conjunction with President Hyppolite, the said promise, the assertion of which he unhesitatingly qualifies as a calumny of the American press. Nor could it be reasonably doubted that the American negociators would have been provided with duplicate copies of this portentous promise, had it ever existed.

Now, the two American negociators have replied to M. Firmin; and what do they say? After the commonplace locution acknowledging receipt, etc., are the two following paragraphs, and nothing more:

"We regret that the Government of Hayti finds it necessary to offer a refusal to the friendly request of the President; the more so, as it is to be feared that this refusal will not be received by the United States Government as a testimonial of the American sentiments which should subsist between the two republics, and govern their relations.

"While compelled to express our disappointment at the grounds taken by the Government of Hayti, permit us to offer you, Monsieur le Ministre, the expression of our highest esteem and consideration.*"

Such, then, is the reply of the two plenipotentiaries of the United States Government to M. Firmin. Not only do they refrain from any allusion to his peremptory

* See appended pieces and justificative documents.

denial, not only do they leave the American press under this indignant accusation of calumny, but they tender to this same M. Firmin, the supposed signer of the alleged promise of the Mole, the assurance of their *highest esteem and consideration*.

What conclusion is to be drawn from this ?

That if the original of the document in question is not to be found, it must be considered as never having existed.

The pretended copy published in the newspapers is, then,
THE WORK OF SOME FORGER.

But if this paper is not genuine, has it not at least a plausible look ? And M. Elie, who was charged, as it is said, with a mission to Mr. Bayard, in the month of December, 1888—may he not have been, or supposed himself to have been, authorized to formulate certain propositions, amongst which may have been included the promise of the Mole Saint-Nicolas ?

It is somewhat singular that throughout this entire affair, the newspapers talk incessantly about the Elie mission, and never about that of Auguste.

We will not discuss the question as to whether or not M. Elie was really charged with a mission of any kind to Mr. Bayard. What is known, however, as a fact, is that Mr. Bayard, as President Cleveland's Secretary of State, not only accepted nothing and promised nothing, but declined even to receive M. Elie.

It is known, also, that this pretended mission of M. Elie is in flagrant contradiction to the authentic mission of Dr. Nemours Auguste, who, on his part, was received by Secretary Bayard, in that same month of December, 1888.

And, finally, it is known that M. Auguste exposed the views and intentions of General Hyppolite, not only verbally in the official interview which he had with Mr. Bayard, but also in writing in a document addressed to the Secretary of State, at his request, and which was

officially published and communicated to the two houses of Congress. *

Now, in this document, M. Auguste is at pains to declare in a manner as clear, categorical and formal as may be, that it was in no wise within the intentions of General Hyppolite and his adherents to cede the Mole Saint-Nicolas to the United States, nor to any other nation.

Here are the precise terms employed by this official envoy of General Hyppolite. The passage is of such importance, that it must be cited entire :

It is said, and repeated with too much earnestness not to have in this regard some foundation of truth, that General Légitime has promised to the Count de Sesmaisons the Môle St. Nicholas, which has been so much coveted.

WE, to whom the Mole St. Nicholas belongs, could not either promise it or sell it, but we can propose to a friendly Government stipulations of another character, which would give to it more decided advantages. A treaty of commerce and friendship already unites us to the American Republic. We would be happy to draw the ties closer and render more intimate the relations of the two countries. We buy from the United States a large number of manufactures for which the commerce of England is a formidable competitor. To secure to the American commerce the markets of Hayti and deprive the English of it a diminution of the customs duties upon these goods will suffice, and immediately the importation of American manufactured products will increase to considerable proportions.

Could anything be more explicit? “*We, to whom the Mole Saint-Nicolas belongs, could not either promise it or sell it.*” This is what is printed in the book of “Documents upon recent occurrences in Hayti,” officially published at Washington for the members of the Federal Congress. Is it not pertinent to inquire: Who is mistaken here?

But supposing we admit, for a moment, that certain propositions concerning the Mole Saint-Nicolas were actually made by M. Elie. To whom could he have addressed himself, since Mr. Bayard, the then Secretary

* Recent Occurrences in Hayti, pp. 234, 235.

of State, declined to receive him, and since there is nowhere any mention either of M. Elie or his propositions? *

And even though M. Elie had addressed himself to some official personage, what would that signify? If it be taken into consideration, that M. Elie is not a Haytian, as the pretended copy of the "powers" maldroitly says, but a French merchant constantly doing business in the United States; that he may have solicited of the revolutionists of the Cape some sort of mission to fulfil in the United States in order to give himself importance in the eyes of his correspondents at New York; that this satisfaction may have been accorded him on account of the financial services he had rendered to the revolution;—if all this be taken into consideration, it will be easy to understand that this merchant could venture much, shielded as he was, the case occurring, from the wrath of the Haytians.

Dr. N. Auguste, on the contrary, was a citizen of Hayti, personally engaged in the revolution, intimately acquainted with the intentions and ideas of his companions, and actually, expressly, nominatively *sent* to the United States with the purpose of soliciting the recognition of the Northern party as belligerents.

Certainly these are facts which no serious diplomat can ignore. Comparing the political position of the officious self-appointed envoy, and that of the *official* envoy, there was at least cause to distrust, in view of the formal repudiation by Dr. Auguste, the vague concessions promised (?) by M. Elie, including the cession of the Mole Saint-Nicolas to the United States. And if it be that some subordinate functionary of the State Department was possibly misled into taking seriously the pretended propositions of M. Elie, what

* See the Memorandum of the Bayard-Auguste interview, in the appended articles and justificative documents.

are we to think of such a functionary's diplomatic capacity and aptitude for international politics?

It is useless to dwell further upon this point. Not only is the paper in question false, but it is also shown to be not even plausible.

Nevertheless, in order to give the utmost satisfaction to those who have made such an outcry about this affair, we will go further, and examine a third aspect of the question.

In case that precise negotiations had actually taken place upon the subject of the cession of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, could this non-fulfillment of that promise furnish just grounds for taxing General Hyppolite with bad faith?

For the sake of our argument, let us assume to admit the verity of the Elie mission, and suppose to be authentic the copy of a document which we have shown to be false and unplausible. We may then employ the weapons of our adversaries, saying: So be it! M. Elie has been here, and offered the Mole Saint-Nicolas to the United States, on behalf of General Hyppolite.

What then? To whom did he make the offer? Who accepted it? Let us have the name of the American diplomatic official with whom the affair was treated. The offer must have been of some importance to the United States, since, according to the American newspapers themselves, the affair has been on the *tapis* no less than forty years already; and there must be, somewhere, records or traces of these negotiations. Where are these records? If agreements have been entered into, they must have been signed. Where are the papers of those agreements? Where are the signatures?

Since it is question of good or bad faith, let it be shown if the American press has acted in good faith—not by means of vague allegations and suspected

documents, but by furnishing precise facts, exact dates, authentic signatures, real and reciprocal agreements—in a word, fixed and substantial covenants.

But all that is impossible, because none of these things exist—because if any propositions have been made, they have been neither discussed, nor accepted, nor signed. And they could not be discussed, accepted or signed, because it was perfectly understood at the State Department that the envoy of General Hyppolite was not, and could not be, vested with powers to engage in negotiations upon this subject; and because it was perfectly well known at Washington that General Hyppolite, had he really meant to promise the Mole Saint-Nicolas, could no by any title whatever, simply as President of the provisory government of Northern Hayti, undertake engagements which he would not be able to fulfill as official president of the Republic of Hayti.

It were perhaps idle to discuss at further length this third point. We have upon the subject, moreover, an official document which makes short work of all the hypotheses and fantasies which certain American publicists can bring forward. It was during the Cleveland administration, and under the Secretaryship of Mr. Bayard, that the pretended Elie mission took place, and the alleged propositions of General Hyppolite were made. Now, if we wish to know what Mr. Bayard thought of the nature of the relations which he then believed might be entertained with the two belligerent parties of Hayti, we have only to consult the *Memorandum* of the conversation which he held at that time with M. Auguste. Here is the official resumé of the opinion formulated by Mr. Bayard :

The Secretary of State said in reply that the titular government of Hayti under President Salomon, having been overthrown by revolution and followed by a division of the revolutionists themselves into two hostile factions, each exercising local control in a part of the

Haytian territory, the Government of the United States could not be called upon hastily to conclude or even to give an opinion as to the *de jure* character of the claim of either faction to represent the will of the people of the Government of Hayti. The state of things in Hayti, unfortunately, was not novel, and experience had shown that *the only thing to do was to await the progress of events, and defer any formal recognition until it could be given to an established government, evidently representing the will of the Haytian people.*

And later, speaking about the commercial advantages offered to the United States by the Envoy of General Hyppolite, mentioned before; "*the Secretary of State said that was a question to await the event.*" (1)

"Await the event"—such is the invariable response of Mr. Bayard. And if he declined to receive M. Elie, whatever pretext the latter may have employed in seeking to obtain an interview, President Cleveland's Secretary of State was simply acting in accordance with his fixed policy in Haytian affairs, which was: "Make it up between yourselves; I, America, will wait." Why, then, so much talk about a secret treaty, the promise of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, an agreement on the part of Hyppolite, the original lost and a copy remaining, and, finally, about bad faith? All this is pure phantasmagoria. The entire structure so audaciously built up by a group of mercenary or misguided publicists falls to the ground the instant we take the trouble to look into the original sources and consult the official documents.

Putting things in their very worst aspect, admitting the Elie mission and its pretended commission of powers, could the American Government sincerely suppose General Hyppolite to be *bound* to any obligation towards it, through its possession of a mere *copy* of these pretended powers, which have no authentic character, and which General Hyppolite would have the right to *repudiate*, even if it were a true copy of the powers given to M. Elie, since nobody in the United States possessed the original paper, with which nobody,

in consequence, could guarantee the conformity? Not a man in the United States—not a diplomat or a publicist, however little versed in international questions and the law of nations, would venture to support such a supposition.

Thus, the famous document which has given rise to so many recriminations, upon which so many attacks and insults have been based, is not genuine. Instead of being certified as true, it has been denounced as *false* by M. Firmin, without protest on the part of Messrs. Douglass and Gherardi. It is not even plausible—as the Auguste mission demonstrates. Finally, if it were genuine, it is insignificant, as the Elie mission would have miscarried, and since a non-certified copy, without original, is worthless in international law.

From whatever side this question may be pressed, then, the alleged bad faith of General Hyppolite absolutely fails to appear.

§ 2.—THE INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

But, say the American journals, it was on account of those promises that the United States lent their support.

This idea, too, is erroneous.

In order clearly to understand the situation, it will suffice to read attentively: 1, Mr. Haustedt's *letter* to Mr. Bayard; 2, the *memorial* addressed to the Government of the United States by the central revolutionary committee of the North of Hayti; and, 3, the letter of M. Auguste to Mr. Bayard—three official documents which will be found further on amongst the appended papers, and which are extracted from the book upon "Recent Occurrences in Hayti," (official documents communicated to Congress).

Now, the authors of these three documents, in setting forth the history of the situation, recommend to the United States to treat the partisans of Hyppolite as belligerents, and upon the same footing as the partisans of Légitime.

Here is a succinct resumé of the documents.

The tyrannical conduct of President Salomon, which had caused a first uprising as early as 1883, having provoked a new insurrection of the departments of the North, headed by General Thélémaque, the 5th of August, 1888, with the co-operation of the departments of the South under the leadership of General Boisrond-Canal, President Salomon decided to abandon the executive power and quit the country. A first provisory government was then formed, comprising, among other members, the generals Boisrond-Canal, Thélémaque and Légitime, with the mission of convoking eighty-four constituent-electors to elect the president and revise the constitution.

The elections were duly held. When it was found that the majority of the electors had declared in favor of Thélémaque, representing chiefly the three departments of the North, his competitor, General Légitime, representing the departments of the South, resolved to seize the power by a coup d'Etat.

On the night of September 28-29, 1888, General Thélémaque, then residing at Port-au-Prince, mistrusting nothing, and almost without body-guard, was attacked by the troops of Légitime. This attack, made without the slightest pretext, was so sudden that no defence could be organized. At the very outset of the affray, Thélémaque was killed by the discharge of a mitrailleuse, which poured a rain of bullets into his house.

As soon as quiet was restored at Port-au-Prince, Légitime, calling together those of the constituent electors of whose partisanship he felt sure, and who

numbered only about thirty, had the executive power conferred upon himself, without the least color of right or authority.

The first provisory government had retired; but the indignation caused by the assassination of General Thélémaque led to a new uprising throughout the greater part of the country. Of the five departments into which Hayti is divided, (North, Northwest, Artibonite, West, and South,) three departments, the North, Northwest, and Artibonite, together with the arrondissement of Jacmel (West), took part against Légitime, resolving at any price to resist the usurpation and to do their utmost to assure the legal election of a president. Meanwhile, a provisory governmental committee was appointed, which chose as its president General Hyppolite.

The resistance was rapidly organized in the departments of the North. Unfortunately, the usurping government of Légitime, profiting by its presence at Port-au-Prince, the capital of Hayti, where all the public functions are concentrated, and where the diplomatic corps reside, succeeded in giving itself the appearance, in the eyes of some foreign ministers, of a quasi-regular government. Hence certain difficulties for the belligerents of the North, who did not have access to the representatives of the foreign powers.

Furthermore, utilizing to his ends the two gunboats of Port-au-Prince, Légitime, without giving the official notification due, declared a blockade of the northern ports of Hayti. It was an irregular, not to say grotesque, blockade, there being no available naval forces whatever to render it effective. But, under this pretext, the two Haytian gunboats from Port-au-Prince set out in pursuit of the merchant-vessels that sought to enter the northern ports of Hayti, and seized several, notably some American ones, which they took to Port-au-Prince. In fact, it may be said that, in defiance of the common

law of nations, the Haytian gunboats coursed the seas in the interest of *Légitime*.

It was under these circumstances that, in the month of December, 1888, Mr. Haustedt's letter was sent to Secretary Bayard, accompanying the Memorial of the revolutionary committee of the North of Hayti; to that time also belongs the official Auguste mission, as well as the pretended officious one of Elie.

These facts established, we can better comprehend and seize the real import of what is called the intervention of the United States.

While recognizing the right of the Northern party as belligerents, and treating them upon the same footing as the partisans of the usurper *Légitime*, the American navy had of course the right to cruise in the sea of the Antilles and about the Haytian coasts to protect and assure the liberty of American commerce. This it did. Nor could it be blamed for delivering from the hands of *Légitime's* partisans the American vessels unjustly and illegally captured by them. But is this a reason, because under these circumstances it looked after the interests of American commerce—is this a reason why it should claim to have earnestly intervened in favor of General Hyppolite?

So much for the demands addressed to the Government of the United States by the partisans of General Hyppolite. But if, furthermore, we consult the compilation of official documents upon the events of Hayti, it will be seen that as early as the 29th of October preceding, the State Department at Washington had been informed by a long dispatch from Mr. Thompson, then United States minister to Hayti, of the political situation in that republic, of the illegality of the alleged election of *Légitime*, of the irregularity from the international standpoint of the *soi-disant* blockade of the Northern maritime ports, and above all of the capture of the American steamer *Haytian Republic* by the

Haytian war vessel *Dessalines*—a capture which at the time caused great excitement in the American commercial world, and directly brought about, dating from that very day, the 29th of October, the decision to send the United States warship *Boston* into Haytian waters, to compel respect for the American flag, and to protect the commercial interests menaced by the cruisers and gunboats of *Légitime*.

It is, then, in reality, to this affair of the *Haytian Republic*, and to the reiterated demands of Minister Thompson and the American consul Goutier, at Cape Hayti, that the so-called intervention of the United States must be credited, which, through the unconciliatory course of *Légitime's* gunboats towards the American ships, turned to the benefit of the Hyppolite party, and eventually enabled them to put an end to the government of the usurper.

The preceding, as well as that which is to follow, on the subject of the actual affair of the Mole Saint Nicolas, abundantly demonstrates that the intervention of the United States in Haytian affairs was far from having the specially Hyppolitophile character so gratuitously lent to it by many American journals.

§ 3.—THE TRUE STORY OF THE MOLE.

The real history of the steps taken by the Federal Government to obtain the CESSION of the port of the Mole Saint-Nicolas from the Haytian Government begins with the inauguration of the Harrison-Blaine-Tracy administration, and no earlier.

Not but that, for a long time past, the United States had cast an envious eye upon this point, which is as the key to the passage between the Gulf of Mexico and the sea of the Antilles. The archives of the State and

the Navy departments at Washington are full of documents on the subject. Volumes of hundreds of pages would hardly suffice if it were desired to publish all that has been written about the Mole Saint-Nicolas, the Samana Bay, the Island of St. Thomas, etc.—in short, about all the stations coveted by the American Government with a view to establishing its supremacy in the Antilles, and securing prime control of the projected Central American Canal.

Already, twelve years ago, the United States had acquired extensive sites, destined for the establishment of naval stations, at two important points upon the Isthmus of Panama: one in the bay of Chiriqui, on the Atlantic coast, the other in the gulf of Dulce, on the Pacific—two points commanding, between them, the passage of the Isthmus. When the American Government secured possession, it was realized that here were not only two of the most spacious ports in the world, at the very gateways of the interoceanic canal, but also inexhaustible mines of coal, awaiting only the miner's pick.

Have the United States, to secure a naval station in the Antilles so long sought for in vain, fallen back upon the need, in their pan-American relations, of a place where they can harbor their fleet and take in coal, as well in view of certain eventualities, have they then forgotten that double acquisition? which, nevertheless, gave rise to talk enough at the time.

At all events, a naval station in the heart of the Antilles has been for nearly half a century the object of the maritime policy of the United States. As far back as Polk's Presidency, with what end in view has never been clearly defined, but which from that epoch aroused the susceptibilities of the Haytians, the late Admiral Porter, then a lieutenant in the Federal navy, was sent by the then Secretary of the Navy, Mr. George Bancroft, upon a special and secret mission to Hayti. He

traversed the entire island, and upon his return made a detailed and very favorable report upon the various resources of the country. Ten years later, under the Presidency of Pierce, George B. McClellan, afterwards major-general of the United States army, accompanied by other engineers, was in his turn sent by the War Department to survey the peninsula and bay of Samana, at the northeastern point of Hayti. Captain McClellan selected a site suitable for a coaling station; but in the course of the negotiations which ensued between the Republic of St. Domingo and the United States on the subject of the cession of this site, the State Department at Washington was made aware that the representatives of England, France and Spain were hostile to the project, and the matter was dropped.

At the same time, in the official report which he rendered to Jefferson Davis, then Secretary of War, upon his mission to Samana, Captain McClellan inserted this significant passage:

“It is to be observed that the Haytian ports of the island possess more good harbors than Dominica; that of the Mole of Saint-Nicolas is, from its position, the most interesting to us, commanding the windward passage even more completely than that of Samana, the Mona passage. It is so well known that I will merely mention that it is a good harbor for large vessels, and was, under the French, strongly fortified.”

The negotiations for the cession of the bay of Samana were resumed in 1866 by Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, and again in 1868, when Baez, the President of the Dominican Republic, proposed to President Grant the annexation of Saint Domingo to the United States. The scandals associated with these latter negotiations are still fresh in the memory of the public.

If the negotiations relative to Samana came to naught, the eyes of Washington remained none the less fixed upon the two little independent Republics of the An-

tilles, and the first care of Mr. Blaine upon assuming charge of the State Department in 1889, was to take advantage of the internal strife of the Haytians to bring up again the question of the Mole Saint-Nicolas.

As we have said before, it is not with Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State under President Cleveland, but with Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State under President Harrison, that the veritable story of the efforts of the American government for the cession of the Mole begins.

If we are rightly informed—and we do not believe we shall be disputed upon this point at Washington—it was as early as the month of March, 1889, that is to say, only a few days after Mr. Harrison's occupation of the White House, that Mr. Preston, the agent of General Legitime, was sounded by Mr. Blaine upon the subject of the Mole Saint-Nicolas.

Whether rightly or wrongly, it was affirmed that General Légitime, in order to secure the favor of France, had offered to Count de Sesmaisons, the French Minister at Port-au-Prince, to cede the Mole Saint-Nicolas to the French Republic. We do not desire to enter here into the discussion of that affair since M. de Sesmaisons was publicly disavowed by his government and recalled.

But certain it is that Mr. Blaine, seeing the Haytian Republic divided into two factions; knowing, on the one hand, that the North, or partisans of Hyppolite, could not be treated with upon the question of the Mole, after what Mr. Auguste, the special envoy of General Hyppolite and the revolutionists of the North, had said and written three months previous to Mr. Bayard: "*WE, to whom the Mole Saint-Nicolas belongs, could not either PROMISE it or SELL IT,*" and knowing, on the other hand, that the combinations of General Legitime and M. de Sesmaisons had miscarried, certain it is, we repeat, that while outwardly affecting to maintain equal balance between the two Haytian parties, Mr. Blaine held a certain number of interviews with the

agent of General Légitime during the month of March, April and May, 1889; that, after these interviews, a project of treaty was elaborated; that, in the negotiations which took place upon this subject, the question of the Mole Saint-Nicolas was, if not completely settled, at least taken up and frequently discussed; that, an understanding having apparently been reached between Mr. Blaine and Mr. Preston, the agent of General Legitime, Mr. Preston, who had been momentarily in the shade, saw fit to mark his re-entrance into the good graces of the Federal Government by giving a banquet to his colleagues of the diplomatic corps and to the Secretary of State, having at his side Miss Blaine, whom he overwhelmed with courtesies and attentions; that at this time Mr. Preston telegraphed and wrote to General Légitime the tidings of what he regarded as a brilliant triumph for his cause; that Mr. Preston obtained from Mr. Blaine the accrediting of an official representative of the United States Government to that of General Légitime; that this minister was to be Mr. Douglass, who was to depart without delay for Port-au-Prince, with the mission of recognizing General Légitime and of endeavoring to make General Hyppolite listen to reason; and that, finally, all these fine projects collapsed like a house of cards in consequence of the unexpected victories of Hyppolite's troops over those of Légitime, so that when Mr. Douglass arrived at Port-au-Prince he was surprised to find General Hyppolite, to whom he was to administer a remonstrance, installed in the national executive palace, while General Légitime, to whom he had been accredited, had taken his departure for the friendly shores of France, so hospitable to Hayti's political refugees.

Such was the manner of the introduction of the Mole Saint-Nicolas affair into Mr. Blaine's Americo-Haytian policy, and such the manner in which the Government

at Washington came to assure the triumph of Hyppolite over Légitime.

So much has been said, indeed, about the efficacious intervention of the United States in favor of Hyppolite, that we may be permitted to return yet again to this point, and by way of parenthesis, recite briefly the facts which brought about the flight of Légitime and the triumph of Hyppolite.

After having decreed, as related above, the blockade of the Northern ports, General Légitime had directed against the North two armies, commanded by the generals Anselme Prophète, Minister of War, and O. Piquant, Minister of the Interior. For several months following, glowing reports of the alleged successes of these armies were published in the bi-weekly *Moniteur* of Port-au-Prince, such as the capture of the Grande-Saline of Mirebalais, of Saint-Michel, etc., reports which could deceive only foreigners. In fact, those who were acquainted with the country knew that not even the town of St. Marc, distant only two days' march from Port-au-Prince, had been disturbed; that the blockade was a farce; that the bombardment of the towns of the so-called "insurgents" had not been followed up by debarkation; and that an advance of the Southern troops upon the northeastern frontier signified absolutely nothing from a military point of view.

Again, the capital fact which ought to have made the result of the war easy to foresee from the first, was that the men of the North went into the field themselves for a cause which was to them national and sacred, to avenge the murder of General Thélémaque, and their own honor so cruelly outraged on the night of September 28th; while the Southerners, without any such

cohesion, merely championed the cause of one man. This was why, despite the periodical dispatches from Port-au-Prince, which naturally were all bulletins of victory, the situation soon became untenable for *Légitime*.

At the very moment when, on the faith of the *Moniteur* of Port-au-Prince, which announced the annihilation of the Northern army as near at hand, Mr. Blaine at Washington pursued a policy of diplomatic flirtation with Mr. Preston, agent of General *Légitime*, at this precise moment the Northern generals Jean Jumeau and Alexis Nord energetically assumed the offensive, routed the Southern General Anselme Prophète from the position he had chosen at Trou, and finally, after having cut off his communications with his colleague Piquant, who was operating in the Northwest, brought back the demoralized troops of these two generals of *Légitime* prisoners to Port-au-Prince. So the soldiers of Hyppolite returned triumphant at the end of May, 1889, to the Haytian capital, whence they had fled as fugitives the day after the murder of their chief Thélémaque.

Let us now return to the Mole.

Mr. Blaine, disconcerted by the success of Hyppolite and his legal election to the Presidency of the Republic of Hayti—which election took place a few weeks later—was careful during the earlier days of General Hyppolite's administration not to revive the question of the Mole Saint-Nicolas. Now, would it not be supposed that if in reality there had ever been—we will not say a signed covenant between the government of General Hyppolite and that of the United States, but even some serious overtures in regard to this affair, some written or verbal promise—would it not be supposed that precisely this time, just after the victory of Hyppolite, would be the

most propitious moment for the Cabinet at Washington to demand, to promptly exact, the fulfillment of the promise made? Are we to believe that so shrewd a statesman as Mr. Blaine would have neglected such an occasion for the realization of a project so long cherished if he had been in possession of any pretext whatever that might have authorized him to claim the Mole Saint-Nicolas? There is not a person in the United States having any acquaintance with the habits of thought and the political methods of the present Secretary of State, to whom his passive silence at such a moment is not equivalent to a formal avowal or the most convincing proof that there has never been, either directly or indirectly, the slightest agreement or the shadow of a promise on the part of General Hyppolite in regard to the Mole Saint-Nicolas.

Mr. Blaine, then, keeps his own counsel; cordial relations ensue between Hayti and the United States; Frederick Douglass is welcomed with every demonstration of cordial sympathy; his reception, according to the correspondence published in an American paper, is the most splendid and enthusiastic ever tendered to a diplomat in Hayti. And this no less on account of his belonging to the colored race, than because he represents the great American republicanism.

All seems to be turning out for the best. But Mr. Blaine, whose hopes have vanished with the fall of Légitime and the departure of Mr. Preston, agent of the former chief of the Southern faction, does not lose sight of the matter of the Mole.

There was question, just at that time, of a very important concession to be accorded by the Government of Hayti to the firm of Clyde & Co., of New York, in relation to a weekly line of steamers to be established between Hayti and New York. The Clyde house had rendered valuable services to the Northern party during the struggle against Légitime, and nothing which they

might ask was likely to be refused. It was settled, therefore, that they should have the monopoly of a weekly line between Hayti and New York, with the privilege of establishing a corresponding steam service between the various ports of Hayti and the main line to New York; and that it should receive, moreover, from the Haytian treasury, an annual subsidy of thirty or forty thousand dollars during a period of five years.

In the meantime it was learned that the Clyde house had entered into relations with the State Department at Washington; and some time afterward the Haytians were not a little surprised to receive a new scheme of concession, in which, besides the advantages previously stipulated, it was specified that they should accord to the Clyde house the right of having coaling stations, notably one at the Mole Saint-Nicolas. On this head, it was furthermore provided that the cession of the bay of the Mole Saint-Nicolas should be accorded for a long lease of ninety-nine years, under the express condition that no war-vessel should be permitted to enter there, *with the exception of American ships.*

It was not difficult, in view of such a form of contract, to divine the portent of the scheme. Mr. Blaine, who is a wily diplomat, had evidently hoped that, thanks to the friendly relations existing between the Hyppolite government and the Clyde house, thanks to the remembrance of the services rendered by the latter to the Northern army, he might be able to recommence in the Antilles the tortuous policy he had pursued in 1881, apropos of a certain affair in Peruvian guano, during the short period of his passing in the State Department before the death of President Garfield.

Unfortunately for Mr. Blaine, it was readily surmised in the counsels of President Hypolite that if Messrs. Clyde and Co. had all at once awakened to the picturesque, and above all to the strategic value of the Mole

Saint Nicolas, this sudden appreciation was undoubtedly due to suggestions emanating from the State Department, which must have offered to take the Mole and bay as sub-lessees. Naturally, this new scheme of concession failed to receive the legislative sanction; and Mr. Blaine, who had perhaps hoped to spirit away the cession of the Mole in the same manner that he had juggled with Peruvian guano, had his trouble for his pains and his outlay of variegated maritime policy.

It had become evident at Washington that the Hypolite government would never consent to alienate, under any pretext whatever, nor under any possible guise, the minutest part of Haytian territory.

Still, Mr. Blaine, mortified at the outcome of the Clyde concession business, dissimulated his chagrin. Abandoning sinuous, underhand ways, and proceeding upon the idea that his road to power must be not only by a policy of vast unrealized projects and unprofitable international discussions, but above all by a showing of substantial results, he determined to attack the head and front of the question, and to make an official demand upon the Government of Hayti for the Mole Saint-Nicolas, with the purpose of establishing there a coaling station for the vessels of the United States navy. Presumably he did not deceive himself as to the probable outcome of such a measure; still, it might be possible that Hayti would permit herself to be intimidated, and at all hazards, the demand might be risked. He risked it.

It is well enough understood what is meant by the euphemism, *ground for a coaling station*. Not, we may be sure, to have purely and simply a coal dock, which in time of war might perchance prove as serviceable to the enemy as to the owners, but a regular *bona fide* naval station, where, under cover of guns, the ships might come, not merely for provisioning, but also for all necessary repairs, and in case of need to seek refuge from the

pursuit of a foe. This means an arsenal, with all its dependencies, batteries, a permanent garrison, etc. Such is, indeed, the definition which, on the 18th of June last, the New York *Tribune*, Mr. Blaine's chosen organ, gave to the term "coaling depot."

Now, when such a station is demanded of a small country, a choice between two things is left: either it must accord the privilege demanded to one sole power, thus virtually placing the small country under the protectorate of that power, or else it must accord it to all those whose interest it may be to have naval stations in those parts—in which case the small country no longer owns itself, it becomes the international public place of the great colonial and military powers, it has no longer any proper existence.

The disguised protectorate of Hayti—that is what, under the mask of a "coaling station," was in reality asked of General Hyppolite's government.

It was in the course of the year 1890 that the Hon. Mr. Douglass, United States Minister to Hayti, asked on the part of his Government for the Mole Saint-Nicolas, for the purpose of installing a "coaling station" there.

A succession of interviews followed; and the State Department at Washington, growing impatient at seeing that nothing definite came of them, decided to send Admiral Gherardi, commander of the West Indian squadron, to take part in the negotiations relative to the cession of the Mole.

From the first days of February, 1891, the American fleet of the Antilles, comprising the flagships *Philadelphia*, the *Petrel*, the *Kearsage*, and the *Enterprise*, assembled in the bay of Port-au-Prince. Such a naval demonstration greatly surprised the population of the city, and the excitement became intense throughout

Hayti when it was learned that Admiral Gherardi had been appointed as special commissioner of the United States to conduct the negotiations tending towards the acquisition by the latter country of the Mole Saint-Nicolas. It looked to the Haytian public as though this imposing display of naval force had no other object than to exercise a moral pressure upon the members of the Government, while at the same time intimidating the population.

After the preliminary exchange of letters, to which we shall revert further on, it was agreed that the negotiations should be resumed upon Admiral Gherardi's communicating to the Government of Hayti: 1st, the details or conditions of the tenancy desired by the United States; 2d, the copy of the full powers conferred upon Admiral Gherardi by the Government at Washington.

These powers were not transmitted to Port-au-Prince until the 18th of April. By that time there were two American squadrons in the bay of the Haytian capital. Four days later, the negotiations relative to the cession of the Mole Saint-Nicolas to the United States were definitively broken off. The grand naval demonstration gotten up by Messrs. Blaine and Tracy had failed to produce the desired effect.

§ 4.—THE HAYTIAN GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL.

It has been claimed, and is still claimed, that throughout this affair General Hyppolite's government has given proof of *bad faith* and *ingratitude*: enough has been said here already, we trust, to clear it of this double reproach. It has been further accused, in its refusal, of *insolence* and *ill-will*.

The refusal of the cession of the Mole Saint-Nicolas demonstrates on the part of the Haytian Government,

neither “insolence” to the Government of the United States nor “ill-will” towards the American people.

Far from that, whoever will review attentively and impartially the conduct of the Haytian Government, cannot fail to recognize that if it did not cut short the affair at the outset, it was on account of the great deference felt towards the Government and people of the United States, whose good will the present executive ruler of Hayti has ever, in a patriotic spirit, been desirous of assuring to this country.

The setback of the Clyde concession sufficiently indicated the principle which rendered it impossible that anything should come of an official proposition relative to the cession of the Mole. Such official proposition being made notwithstanding, through the medium of Mr. Douglass, United States Minister to Hayti, the Hyppolite Government did not deem it proper at once and imperatively to renounce the consideration of this question. On the contrary, numerous interviews were held, in the course of which the proposed arrangement was carefully examined, while at the same time the representative of the great American republic was made to understand the impossibility of Hayti's ceding or letting out the Mole Saint-Nicolas under conditions calculated to place the Haytian Government under the latent protectorate of the United States.

It was in consequence of the delays necessitated by the examination of this affair that Mr. Blaine found the time opportune to change his tactics, and to send Rear-Admiral Gherardi to Port-au-Prince with all the naval pomp and circumstance at the command of a maritime power.

Let us recall here the principle laid down in the beginning, viz., that in this question of the Mole Saint-Nicolas there are opposed to one another two sovereign nations, very unequal in importance, it is true, but

mutually independent, and one of which is in possession of an object that the other wishes to acquire.

Now, in what fashion does the nation which has to ask, the United States, set to work to obtain from the little Republic of Hayti the coveted object—the Mole Saint-Nicolas? After long consultation between the Hyppolite Government and Mr. Douglass, Rear-Admiral Gherardi presents himself in his turn with his flagship *Philadelphia*, flanked by the most formidable vessels of the American navy, including the *Kearsage* and the *Enterprise*. Will it be asserted that this demonstration was made simply with the idea of imparting greater solemnity to the official demand of the American Government, and that Mr. Blaine, in going to such an excess of politeness, was actuated by the motives of the young suitor who presents himself in full dress to ask from punctilious parents the hand of his fiancée? Why, then, for nearly a year previous, had this mission been left altogether in charge of Mr. Douglass? No! in proceeding thus, Mr. Blaine was little concerned about questions of form and politeness. He acted in this affair in the same manner as certain colonial powers of Europe when they wish, in remote countries, to impress primitive people, and impose upon them a protectorate which they could very well do without.

Is documentary evidence required? Let us take the trouble to read the first letter written by Admiral Gherardi to the Haytian Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the very beginning, we find this astonishing passage, which is perhaps unprecedented in the history of diplomatic demands, addressed by one government to another:

“SIR,—I have been appointed by the President of the United States as special commissioner to the Government of Hayti to negotiate for the lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, with a view to establishing there a coaling station and dock for the use of the ships of the United States Navy. *It is the desire and object of the President of the United States to acquire such a station in the Antilles. The special*

advantages united in the Mole Saint-Nicolas indicate incontestably that it is the manifest destiny of that port to become a naval depot for the use of the war vessels of the United States."

And further on :

"The acceptance of this demand would result in making of the United States a powerful friend and ally, upon whose aid and good offices Hayti might always rely."

Was ever demand more haughty and imperious? Could promise of protectorate be more plainly characterized? One would fancy one's self back in the days when the Prussian monarch wanted the Sans-Souci mill. "We must have your mill. What do you want for it?"

If it be the *manifest destiny* of the Mole Saint-Nicolas to become a naval station for the convenience of United States war vessels, there is an excellent subject for dissertation at the service of the Annapolis naval cadets, a fine theme to put in Latin verse. Meanwhile, the Republic of Hayti being in possession thinks that the manifest destiny of the Mole Saint-Nicolas is to remain Haytian property—a Haytian port and a Haytian fortress.

Is this, then, an impertinent assumption on her part? To well understand the intrinsic value of this property of the Republic of Hayti, let us hear what a United States Minister to that country had to say some few years since in his report to the Department of State on the subject of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, considered as a strategic point and natural fortification :

"It is so out of the way of the ordinary works of nature that words cannot do it justice....."

"The mole proper is more than three miles long, is almost of uniform height, and at a distance looks like some vast Roman wall. It is mainly composed of limestone. Before you get to it, as you enter from the west, Cape Saint-Nicolas on your right, is the first object that commands your attention. It is magnificently bold and volcanic looking, and clouds always hide the summit, so that you cannot well judge of its height. The harbor may be said to begin where the mole and the cape are at opposite points. The outer harbor is

almost too deep for anchorage in some places, but protected enough from storms for that purpose, and would hold all the fleets in the world. It is as healthy a place as Newport. The inner harbor is so remote from the end of the mole that it is perfectly landlocked by it. Aside from this, the mainland which forms this little pocket, projects far into the water, leaving a deep and narrow channel, but wide enough for the passage of vessels. After you get in you can hardly persuade yourself that you are not in a little country lake surrounded by bold shores. Ships can anchor everywhere in this basin according to their size. The outer harbor itself, with a battery on the end of the mole and batteries on the terraces of the cape, would be perfectly unassailable; besides, no ship could anchor outside the mole or outside the isthmus, for the purpose of landing troops as it is a wild coast and the waters are without soundings. Aside from all this, both the mole and the isthmus are unsurmountable, the mole being about eighty feet high, and the other on the ocean side from forty to fifty feet high. The back country a few miles from the village is said to be exceedingly fertile and the whole neighborhood salubrious."

So, it is this masterpiece of natural fortifications, the principal strategic point of the Island of Hayti, that the American Government asks, in a fashion so imperious and unexampled, of the Haytian Government, in order that it may establish there a new Gibraltar of the Antilles, commanding the approach of the interoceanic canal. The people of Hayti desire to keep their Mole Saint-Nicolas. They know that this stronghold, once in the hands of an outside power, whether of the United States or of any other maritime nation, they would be no longer masters in their own home. Yet, to this letter written in so pompous a tone by Admiral Gherardi, what is the reply of M. Firmin, the Haytian Minister of Foreign Affairs? Let us see for ourselves of what insolence he has been guilty. After acknowledging the receipt of the Admiral's letter, and summarizing the basis of the demand, he adds this singular so-called impertinence:

.... "I HAVE HASTENED TO SUBMIT YOUR LETTER to the Council of Secretaries of State, presided over by his Excellency the President of Hayti. After hearing the

reading of it, the Council of Secretaries of State (without having decided either favorably or unfavorably upon your demand) HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT I ASK, WITH ALL COURTESY, AND SUBJECT TO DUE DELIBERATION, THAT YOU WILL HAVE THE EXTREME KINDNESS TO COMMUNICATE TO THEM :

“ 1st, the details or conditions of the desired lease :

“ 2nd, a copy of the full powers conferred upon you by his Excellency the President of the United States, and of which the original shall be presented at the time of the signing (if such signing take place) of the terms of the lease which constitutes the subject of your demand.* ”

What could be more correct, more in accordance with diplomatic usage, than this reply ? and what willful blindness, what aberration of mind, must have been required to find in these lines the slightest trace of insolence or ill-will towards the American Government and the people of the United States ?

But, the reader may say, it is not in this first letter of M. Firmin's, but in his final response to Admiral Gherardi that the reprehensible attitude is taken which has brought down upon the Haytians the maledictions of the American newspapers.

Very well ! let us continue our documentary examination. Admiral Gherardi asked of the Government at Washington his full powers, which did not arrive at Port-au-Prince until the 18th of April, and were not communicated to the Haytian Government until the 21st of April, 1891. It was at this date that the American plenipotentiaries made known to M. Firmin the details and conditions of the proposed letting of the Mole Saint-Nicolas to the United States. Here, then, is an opportunity to ascertain exactly what Mr. Blaine wants—to find, indeed, the key to his policy in the Antilles.

* See complete text of letter in Appended Papers and Justificative Documents.

Thus, it is stipulated in these conditions that the leasing of the Mole to the United States *necessarily implies the non-leasing of any other coaling station to any other nation on the globe.* The passage relative to this exclusion is formulated as follows, in the instructions remitted to Messrs. Douglass and Gherardi by the Government at Washington:

“For the purpose of *preserving and strengthening the relations (between the two countries)* the President *desires* that so long as the United States may be the holder of the Mole Saint-Nicolas—in case it is leased—the *Haytian Government shall not lease any harbor or other portion of its territory, nor otherwise dispose of it, nor grant any special privilege or right of usage to any other power, state or government.*”

It is in terms analogous to these, *mutatis mutandis*, that the European colonial powers impose their protectorate upon the half-civilized races of Asia and Africa. Notably in recent times, it is in terms almost identical with these that France has established her protectorate over Tunis and Annam.

In the present instance, there is no further ambiguity; and Mr. Blaine, whose hand is easily to be recognized in the editing of these *instructions*, no longer even tries to conceal his play. What is asked of the Republic of Hayti is, that she abdicate her independence; that she place herself unreservedly under the exclusive protectorate of the United States; that she become, in short, a maritime province of Uncle Sam, with the commandant of the Mole Saint-Nicolas as proconsul.

The Government of Hayti, despite the presence of the two American fleets in the bay of Port-au-Prince, could not see its way to signing the proposed covenant, which would have meant nothing less than the emasculation of the little Black Republic of the Antilles, and its conversion into a veritable eunuch government in the service of the United States.

◆

But observe, notwithstanding the irreproachable form, the dignity and firmness in language of M. Firmin's response. After faithfully summarizing the divers phases of the negotiations relative to the cession of the Mole, he continues :

“The President of Hayti and my colleagues, assembled in Council of State, have ordered that I answer you as follows :

“After having carefully considered the conditions under which the United States Government desires to obtain the lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas for the purpose of establishing there a naval station, there might perhaps be no objection to the offer did not your instructions contain this clause :

“For the purpose of preserving and strengthening the relations (*between the two countries*), the President desires that, so long as the United States may be the holder of the Mole Saint-Nicolas—in case it is leased—the *Haytian Government shall not lease any harbor or other portion of its territory, nor otherwise dispose of it, nor grant any special privilege, or right of usage to any other power, state or government.*”

“The acceptance of your demand with such a clause would be in the eyes of the Government of Hayti an outrage to the national sovereignty of the Republic and *a flagrant violation of the first article of our constitution ; for, in renouncing the right to dispose of its territory, it would be tacitly consenting to its alienation. The Government finds itself bound by our internal public law, which it cannot violate, without rendering null and void all agreements made under such conditions.*”

Such is the impossibility resulting from the very Constitution of Hayti. Then follows the reason of policy arising from the conditions under which the demand was made :

“The arrival in this port of two American squadrons, comprising the most formidable war vessels of the

United States Navy, has created a most unfortunate impression throughout the entire country, which is alarmed and agitated thereat. Supposing even that the national constitution offered no obstacle to the compliance with the demand presented by your excellencies in the name of the President of the United States, the Haytian Government could scarcely, under the present circumstances, enter into negotiations for the leasing of the Mole Saint-Nicolas without appearing to yield to foreign pressure, and so compromising, *ipso facto*, our existence as an independent people.”

And he concludes with an earnest appeal to the justice and the good sense of the United States: “Profoundly confiding in your fairness and your sentiment of equity, I venture to hope that your excellencies will fully comprehend that the refusal to grant the United States the lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas is not, on the part of the Haytian Government, an act of defiance or of ill-will. *It is in consequence of a double prohibition, before which must bend even our active sympathy with and our sincere attachment to the most glorious, the most generous republic of the new world, and perhaps of the entire modern world.*

To this explanation, so loyal, so firm, so worthy to command the respect of any impartial witness to the situation, the plenipotentiaries respond with almost a menace:

We regret that the Government of Hayti finds itself under the necessity of refusing the friendly request of the President; the more so, as we have reason to fear that this refusal may not be received by the Government of the United States as testifying to the amicable sentiments which should exist between the two republics and govern their relations.

The story of the Sans-Souci mill over again; “We must have your mill, good people—or else, look out for yourselves!” In the presence of this “Great I Am” of American despotism, the Government of Hayti did like

the Miller of the historic mill: "Must I speak clearly?" "Yes." "Then, I keep it. That is all I have to say."

Justified as was the refusal of Hayti, it caused deep resentment at Washington and a great outcry in the press. Surprise and resentment were followed by recriminations, abuse, insults and threats. Need they be repeated here? We will not assume so painful a task. Let us rather leave to forgetfulness so much of calumny and falsehood, so little creditable to the honor of its writers, and which constitute a gratuitous outrage against the loyalty, the justice, the good sense of the American people. This democratic government of the United States is a government of public opinion; so we have wished to bring before this tribunal the very documents in the case, feeling assured that after having taken cognizance of them it will decide that there has not been, on General Hyppolite's part or on that of the Government of Hayti, throughout this entire history of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, either bad faith, or ingratitude, or insolence, or ill-will.

Let us now leave this affair aside, and inquire what should be, according to our view, the real policy of the United States towards the Republic of Hayti.

PART II.

OF HAYTI'S RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER POWERS, AND PARTICULARLY WITH THE UNITED STATES.

§ 1.—RETROSPECTIVE GLANCE AT THE HISTORY OF THE HAYTIAN REPUBLIC.

If the United States, in sending six of its largest warships to bear upon Port-au-Prince with a view to obtaining possession of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, indulge in a naval demonstration not only futile for its maritime commercial policy in the Antilles, but disgraceful to its dignity and the good name of its spirit of justice in international relations, we are compelled to add that the attitude of a great part of the American press since the repulse of the Blaine-Gherardi policy, has been as unjust towards the Haytian people and as odious and at times as outrageous towards General Hyppolite and the acts of his government.

Yet these maledictions upon the "black republic;" this abuse and these libellous recriminations against the present head of the Haytian Government, these calumnies incessantly repeated and spread to the four corners of the United States—all these might be passed by were it not that malicious correspondents and interested agencies promptly telegraph to Europe the false conclusions, the lying statements, the inexact and contradictory accounts from certain American journals, giving all these details as a truthful presentation, seeking to discredit in the sight of the whole world the

political attitude of the President of Hayti and the morals of the Haytian people, and seeking by every means to bring the hatred or the contempt of the civilized world upon the little republic of the Antilles which only asks to live its proper existence, but which struggles vainly in the hold of certain foreign bankers and shopkeepers, *soi disant* philanthropists, whose sole aim is, by provoking troubles at Port-au-Prince and constantly slandering the Haytians, to fatten and enrich themselves at the expense of the pearl isle of the West Indies.

We cannot here recount anew the history of the Republic of Hayti, nor retrace the succession of strife and intrigues which during too long a period have held full career there, to the end of assuring the dominating influence of this or that European power. Suffice it to say, in any case, that during these latter years it has rested, as perhaps it rests yet to-day, solely with the American Government to acquire preponderant influence in Hayti, upon the condition that this influence be really healthy, honorable alike for both the countries.

But it must be added that the Republic of Hayti, one of the smallest of the world's nations, inhabited by men belonging to a race that is looked down upon and even detested by the great powers, has been ever obliged to observe the greatest tact towards these latter, to show their official representatives an amount of respect and consideration which could not in every instance be accompanied by *esteem*.

Everyone is aware of the shameful abuse of this particular situation by many of these men, who sought to enrich themselves by taking part in the various administrative or political jobberies which have cost so much bloodshed to the unhappy little republic.

Let us summarily recall a few facts.

The Haytians, becoming independent in 1804, remained twenty one years under the menace of an aggressive

return of their former mistress ; while the entire universe appeared to ignore their autonomous existence while awaiting the final word of France.

Their independence at last recognized by this power in 1825, they had to wait *over forty years* more before the United States would acknowledge their nationality and enter into diplomatic relations with them.

During these forty years, the coast was clear at Port-au-Prince for the operation of all the intrigues, plots and passions of the diplomatic representatives of France and England, while the American Union maintained in that country merely commercial agents, without authority or official character. During these forty years, we repeat, the struggle for *influence* went on between the French and English consuls, the United States counting for nothing.

The successive governments of Hayti thus became accustomed to leaning, now towards the one, now towards the other of the rival consuls, in order to circumvent their respective intrigues. And the unfortunate Haytians had to manage all the more cautiously with these personages, because the antipathy of which they, the Haytians, were everywhere the object left them no hope of inducing the European Governments to hear the truth in opposition to the too often mendacious reports of their agents.

It is to be noted, too, that the dealings with these agents were rendered still more trying by the fact that the diplomatic posts at Port-au-Prince, being without prestige and not well salaried, were little sought after by men of sterling merit—particularly in view of the island's bad reputation for climate.

So, when the United States finally recognized the sovereignty of the Haytian nation, and established a legation at Port-au-Prince, all intelligent and patriotic citizens of Hayti hailed the event with joy ; there was a grand fete at the capital, and the town was spontan-

eously illuminated the evening that the tidings came, in token of general rejoicing.

For the Haytians were aware of the existence of the Monroe Doctrine. They interpreted it in the sense of a tacit alliance of the American nations to check the pretensions of the former rulers against the independence of their colonies.

Again, the opening of the diplomatic relations of the United States with Hayti was in consequence of the recent abolition of slavery in North America. This grand act having been brought about only through a gigantic struggle, in which thousands of American citizens had laid down their lives for the liberty of the negroes, the blacks of Hayti, by a natural sentiment of race solidarity, felt as much gratitude as the emancipated Americans toward the men who had waged the war to maintain the Union and liberate the slaves.

Thus everything concurred to assure to American diplomacy a preponderant influence from its very outset in the capital of Hayti.

Besides, in the choice of its first representative at Port-au-Prince, the Hon. Mr. Peck, the Government at Washington was fortunate. The republican simplicity, the dignity of manners of the American minister won him from the first the confidence and esteem of all right thinking persons. Mr. Peck's untimely death left Haytian society in sincere mourning.

Let it be said at once that, since the death of its first minister to Hayti, the American Government had never found an agent worthy to replace that upright man until it had the happy thought of sending to Port-au-Prince the Hon. Frederick Douglass, the man in all the United States best qualified to command the esteem and sympathy of the Haytians, and notwithstanding whatever may have been said or published upon this subject, the man most capable of obtaining from these latter all that could be in honor demanded of them

compatibly with their dignity and their interests, in favor of the United States.

From the facts just recalled, the reader will comprehend that it had become apparent to Mr. Peck's colleagues that the United States legation would occupy the most important position in Hayti. They could not resign themselves to such a state of affairs without a struggle. At this epoch, Hayti was governed by President Geffrard, whose wife was the daughter of an Englishman; consequently, the British agent had found means to captivate the President, with all his family. He had the entrée of the executive palace, took part in the discussion of current affairs, offered advice, had his say upon all subjects and doubtless believed himself a factor of immense influence; while President Geffrard, on his part, made ample use of this good will to have his government represented outside under the most favorable aspect, and to counteract such interested reports as might be sent out against him by the other legations.

Even during the Secession war in the United States, President Geffrard had taken a dangerous course against Spain, with the object of compelling that power to quit the eastern part of the Isle of Hayti (San Domingo), of which it had been enabled to take possession through this same American civil war. The Haytian Government, unable or not daring to act openly against Spain, had entered into relations with the Dominican leaders, to whom it promised its aid in driving the foreigner from their country. A Haytian general, Valentini Alcantara, of Dominican origin, had passed the frontier with Haytian soldiers disguised as Dominican patriots, and rallied the Dominicans in the name of independence.

The Haytian Government continued its assistance to the Dominican patriots until the definit triumph of their cause, furnishing them with all possible means for sustaining the war—arms, munitions, provisions, and money.

This Haytian intervention could not long remain concealed from the Spaniards. The latter, on their part, sent Admiral Rubalcara with a fleet to demand from President Geffrard an explanation of his conduct. The Spanish admiral addressed an ultimatum to the Haytian Government, holding it responsible for the uprising of the east, and demanding in reparation the salute of the Spanish flag and a heavy indemnity in coin. Geffrard engaged the good offices of his friends of the diplomatic corps to obtain the only thing possible at the moment, viz., a reduction of the indemnity, and the return by the Spanish flagship of the Haytian salute, gun for gun.

The Haytians then saluted the Spanish flag and paid an indemnity to Rubalcara to save Port-au-Prince from bombardment. But they had obtained their end: the Dominicans were once more in possession of their independence.

So, from this early epoch, and before they had entered into regular diplomatic relations with the United States, the Haytians applied against the Spaniards and in favor of their compatriots of San Domingo, the Monroe Doctrine.

The foregoing sufficiently indicates, we think, that despite the foreign intrigues of which Port-au-Prince was the arena, the republic of Hayti conserved none the less, for herself and for her Dominican congener, that cult of liberty and independence which during nearly a century past has cost her so many sacrifices and so much bloodshed, now for conquest, now for the preservation of her autonomy and her existence as a sovereign and democratic republic.

Under this same Geffrard administration, some other facts transpired which are worthy of the particular attention of the American public.

Geffrard, as everyone knows, was the head of the revolution which overthrew the empire of Soulouque

and re-established the republic in Hayti. His compatriots, at the beginning, believed in the sincerity of his republicanism. Young and intelligent men, of whom the imperial régime had enlisted scarcely any, rallied from all parts of the new republic, to the enthusiastic support of the public liberties which had just been reconquered. Newspapers sprung up, conducted with not less ability than republican ardor. The elections of 1862 sent to the Chamber of Representatives a whole galaxy of young orators, men of education and eloquence, enthusiastic republicans; the representatives of the two towns of Jacmel in the West and Cape Hayti in the North particularly distinguishing themselves amongst this talented group. Those from the Cape soon became the head and centre of the entire deputation from the North. The deputations from all the communes of Jacmel, being equally homogeneous, formed themselves into a decisive majority, upon which the government found itself obliged to count. General Geffrard, who had gotten himself elected on the strength of his republican principles, did not, it now appeared, carry these so far as to be willing to submit to the will of the majority of the people's representatives. He decided upon the dissolution of the Chamber. This was the first time that the Executive had ever taken such a measure in Hayti. Still, the President was exercising a right then constitutional, and no voice was raised against it. It is even permissible to believe that had President Geffrard acted loyally to the end, in this matter, he might have consolidated for long years to come the existing régime. But events demonstrated that he had dissolved the Chamber, not as a means of appealing to the country for a new and sincere election, but simply to secure for himself, at any cost, an assembly that should be docile, servile. While the citizens everywhere, and notably in the North, prepared to re-elect the same deputies, the Government audaciously put the national forces in

movement, so that all the polling-places were surrounded by soldiers who gave access only to the partisans of the President.

The result of this liberticidal campaign in Hayti was, what it would have been in any other civilized country—revolt. It broke out at Cape Hayti, through the ardent speech of M. Delorme, the popular tribune whose re-election the Government had arbitrarily interdicted. Salnave was the military chief of this insurrection. The Government re-awakened, on this occasion; the old-time local rivalries which had been the cause of civil warfare between the North and the West—first between Toussaint Louverture and Rigaud, then between Christophe and Pétion.

By this procedure, President Geffrard contrived to array all the military forces, all the national guards, all men qualified to bear arms, in the West and the South, against the district of the Cape. This town defended the cause of liberty, and, let it be frankly said, the cause of civilization.

The representatives of France and England, notwithstanding, openly took part against her. The United States remained neutral. The revolutionists of the Cape opposed to the Governmental forces of Geffrard an invincible resistance, making of Salnave, their chief, a legendary hero, whom the enthusiasm of the Haytian youth was destined soon to carry into power.

Two young officers, whose names it is proper to recall here, notably covered themselves with glory in this struggle of 1865: Seïde Thélémaque, who defended at Saint-Michel the approach to the Cape by the plain of Limonade; and Florville Hyppolite, who, at Bel-Air, repulsed almost daily, during six long months, the continual assaults of the Governmental forces, hurled against him from the intrenched camp of the Haut-du-Cap.

The town was not only besieged by land, but thor-

oughly blockaded by sea. It was in danger of being constrained, sooner or later, to capitulate through famine. Some means of escape from this situation had to be found, and promptly.

At this crisis was achieved one of those exploits of war which suffice to glorify a cause, be it even an unjust one, and to immortalize the men who accomplish them, as well as their country and their race.

A negro of Cape Hayti, Captaine Alonce, commander of a coasting schooner, the *Elisa*, concealed in the hold of his little boat a small detachment of resolute men, and ran out in front of the *Voldroque*, a screw steamer fitted out for war by the Geffrard government, and which was cruising off the Cape. Alonce allowed himself to be overtaken by the war-vessel, and then, watching a favorable moment, threw out a rope which entangled itself in the screw of the *Voldroque* and stopped her. Attaching grappling-irons, he sprang aboard the the steamer, followed by his men. Dumfounded at this unheard-of audacity, the crew of the *Voldroque* were unable to make any defence, and the *Elisa* returned in triumph to the Cape with her prize, which became the nucleus of a navy for the revolutionists.

Ere long the *Voldroque*, refitted for combat, set out from the Cape, manned by Alonce and his intrepid crew, after new laurels. A Government transport-steamer hove in sight. The *Voldroque* hastened to overhaul her. An English man-of-war, the *Bull-dog*, chanced at the time to be coming out from the port of Cagnette, where her commander had been in conference with President Geffrard, and proceeded to the rescue of the transport. This latter thereupon put herself under the protection of the British flag, and the commander of the *Bull-dog* gave Alonce to understand that he would open fire upon the *Voldroque* if she captured the transport. The *Voldroque* returned to the Cape for instructions relative to this act of hostility on the part of the

Englishman. The latter followed, and came into the port at the same time. There, without warning, under pretext of a controversy upon that eternal question of the *right of sanctuary of consulates*, the source of so many ills for defenceless nations, he opened fire upon the place. An American man-of-war lay there at anchor. Her commander, indignant, could do nothing against this cruel abuse of superior force. Though fretting under the restraint, his instructions were simply to protect his own countrymen, whom nobody was menacing, and who all sympathized with the defenders of the valliant little town which they inhabited. The *Voldroque*, on her part, did not hesitate an instant to attack the *Bull-dog*: but she was soon demolished by the heavy guns of the English ship, and went down gloriously, with her colors flying. The American sailors promptly lowered their boats, saved as many as they could of the brave Haytians, and welcomed them on board their vessel.

From that time—October, 1865—dates a particular sympathy between the inhabitants of Cape Hayti and all the liberal citizens of the North and the Americans. The manifestation of this sympathy is evident in all the succeeding occurrences upon the unhappy soil of Hayti.

The *Bull-dog's* fate was no better than that of the *Voldroque*. Considering herself in the presence of adversaries whom she could afford to despise, this ship drew up within gunshot of the shore. Salnave came in person to encounter her with all the forces he could spare from the defence of the city ramparts. A terrific fire was rained upon the decks and rigging of the English vessel. Her position becoming decidedly uncomfortable, the *Bull-dog* began manœuvring to get further away from the shore, when she ran upon a shoal, from which she could not pull off without assistance. Her commander, whose opinion of the prowess of "those

miserable Haytian niggers” had by this time undergone modification, saw the imminent danger of his vessel being boarded and seized by a swarm of the “woolly-heads.” He therefore blew her up, and took refuge with his crew in the camp of his ally, President Geffrard.

A little later, the English minister at Port-au-Prince, Sir Spencer St. John, after a visit to Cagnette, departed to Jamaica, and came back with two large English frigates, the *Galatea* and the *Lily*, which entered the port of Cape Hayti, took up a position out of the reach of harm from that city destitute of artillery worthy of the name, and, without explanation, without ultimatum, without any warning whatever, opened fire upon the fortifications and demolished them one by one.

From the *Galatea*, the English diplomat watched at a distance the retreat of the revolutionnists, and signalled their movements to President Geffrard, whose troops marched in, with their guns on their arms, to take possession of the points successively abandoned. This act of trahison on the part of the Government was destined to bring about, sixteen months later, the fall of President Geffrard. English cannon had been employed to destroy liberty and humiliate the cause of civilization in the “Black Republic.”

One of Geffrard’s foremost generals found occasion to characterize this action of his chief by a sarcasm as withering as it was fine. General Pétion Faubert had been wounded and had gone to Port-au-Prince for care. Returning to the army the day after this pitiful *conquest* of the cape by Geffrard, “General,” said the President to him, “you have only arrived for the dessert.” “I am glad of it, Mr. President,” retorted Faubert; “for I don’t like English cooking.”

On the side of the defeated, a young man, indignant and despairing over what he considered a national shame, and not caring to survive it, sought death in the fray. After the English shot had levelled the last

stones of the fort he commanded, after the last of his soldiers had been killed at his side, alone he charged a cannon and fired once more upon the enemies of his country. He was picked up beside his gun; his shoulder shattered by a biscaien ball. This young man, the commandant of the Bel-Air Fort, was Florville Hyppolite, to-day President of Hayti—the same man who, because of his long standing friendship for the United States, has been looked upon by short-sighted diplomats as a politician without moral sense, devoid of patriotism and capable of compromising the honor or the independence of his country.

But let us return to the special subject in hand; that is to say, the hostile attitude of the American press towards Hayti, an attitude which appears to us absolutely unjustifiable, and at every point contrary to the policy which, according to our view, the United States should adopt towards the little Republic of the Antilles.

§ 2.—AN IMPARTIAL ACCOUNT OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE 28th OF MAY LAST.—THE ATTACKS OF THE AMERICAN PRESS.—THE POLICY OF HYPOLITE'S GOVERNMENT.

Following the excitement created in Hayti by the incident of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, everybody knew at Port-au-Prince that efforts were making to take advantage of the situation to foment new troubles in the Haytian Republic. After a first attempted conspiracy against General Hyppolite, accompanied by threats and the commencement of a conflagration, the government laid hands upon the principal disturbers and decreed a state of siege in the city of Port-au-Prince. Determined to show patience and moderation in his dealings with the affair, President Hyppolite contented himself with

locking the conspirators in prison, and no execution was ordered by the commissions of inquiry. At all times in his public audiences on Sundays, the President had not hesitated to declare that his consciousness of the responsibilities of the existing situation would compel an exemplary severity on his part in case of actual troubles.

Despite the tolerant though firm attitude of General Hyppolite, the conspirators seemed to be only awaiting a favorable opportunity to release the prisoners, surprise the President, and finally to provoke a revolution which could only have the most disastrous results for the capital and the entire Republic.

It was the Thursday of May 28, the day of the Fête-Dieu, which is celebrated throughout Hayti with military and religious pomp, that the ringleaders of the plot chose for putting their design into execution.

About nine o'clock in the morning, while President Hyppolite, with the authorities and the troops, were attending the ceremonies at the cathedral, bands of armed men led by a "General," Sully-Guerrier, in connivance with others, ostensibly peaceable, made a descent upon the gate of the prison, killing some of the soldiers of the guard and setting at liberty all the prisoners without distinction. These latter, joining the ranks of the rebels, proceeded to attack the arsenal and the national palace, no doubt counting upon the cooperation of other adherents, with the atrocious project of assassinating the chief Executive of the State and his principal collaborators and giving up the city to an orgie of fire and blood.

At the sound of the first shots, the military authorities, surprised but not disconcerted, exerted themselves to put down the insurrection. All the armed force was directed against the points which had been attacked. In a short time, after a lively fusillade, the rebels, pursued through the streets in all directions by a destruc-

tive fire, took flight and disappeared, some in the consulates or in the houses of foreign residents, others in the woods—not without leaving behind a number of killed.

President Hyppolite, quitting the cathedral, hastened to mount his horse and gallop here, there, everywhere about the scenes of the disturbance, giving orders himself in the midst of the showers of bullets. The repression was as energetic as the aggression had been audacious and criminal. The struggle, happily, was not of long duration, but the consequences were grave.

It was now—and we have the fact from an eye-witness—that one of the leaders of the conspiracy, General X——, who had prudently remained at home to await the issue of the three projected assaults—the first upon the prison, the other two upon the arsenal and the national palace—perceiving that matters were turning out badly for his accomplices, hastened to General Hyppolite, excused his tardiness on the plea of having been obliged to make a long detour to evade the mob who were searching for him, and, finally, in the fear of being denounced and compromised, turned State's evidence and gave the names of a number of Haytians whom he designated as the originators of the plot to assassinate the President and the principal members of his government.

In the necessary ardor of the repressive measures adopted, and following this denunciation, some fifty persons were either killed or executed. *

* Among these latter was M. Ernest Rigaud, who, already under the suspicion of the government, had been arrested by the soldiers at his door for utterances more or less parliamentary directed against President Hyppolite as he passed by. This affair has had so much notoriety in France that it scarcely requires further discussion here. In any case, the matter has been settled; the French and Haytian Governments having come to a satisfactory understanding based upon an indemnity accorded by the latter to the family of Rigaud. (See official record of the session of the French Chamber of July 4, 1891, and M. Jules Auguste's pamphlet, "Some Facts as to Recent Occurences in Hayti.")

As to General Sully-Guerrier and his lieutenant, who had at first, on the 28th of May, succeeded in getting away, they were caught two days later, and shot. Other citizens, better known, such as the brothers Cauvin, whose participation in such disorders was sincerely regretted, were also arrested, but afterwards pardoned.

Such is the impartial story of the occurrences which preceded, accompanied and followed the outbreak of May 28.

Now, in consequence of the exaggerated and deliberately mendacious reports sent from Port-au-Prince by correspondents and agents interested in misleading American public opinion, the press of New York and other principal cities of the United States has begun a regular warfare against the Haytian Government and the "Black Republic."

Epithets of the most odious, the most outrageous, have been fastened upon the name of President Hyppolite. Nero, Caligula, Tiberius, were saints, or rather, a petty and well-disposed kind of tyrants, compared to him. As for the Haytian population, all the "tawny monsters of central Africa," all the "voracious and unclean beasts" of the whole creation, are but as bleating lambs beside that tribe of "savage cannibals" and "bloodthirsty slaughterers" who disgrace humanity and blacken the Pearl of the Antilles.

Taking into consideration the history of the kingdoms, empires and republics of the Caucasian race, for several thousand years past, this reproach seems certainly a little out of place.

Useless to insist upon the massacres and abominations which authentic annals lay to the account of the Asiatic monarchies, the Greek, Latin and Carthaginian republics before the Christian era; useless to recall the horrors and infamies which marked the decadence of the empires of Greece and Rome—the feudalism of the Middle Ages—the incessant revolutions, sometimes even

“semi-annual,” out of which blossomed the minor Italian republics, and others, for centuries—the wars of religion, of politics, of mere mercenary greed, which have ensanguined and still menace all Europe, Asia and America, now nearly two thousand years since the light of Christ came into the world—why cite all these? Is it amongst the peoples of the black race that such things are taking place, have taken place, and will perhaps take place again in the future?

To those who upbraid the latest new-comers into civilization with being as yet somewhat unfamiliar with the methods of modern politics, the reply would be but too easy.

At the very moment when, in the United States, President Hyppolite was being denounced as a “sanguinary despot,” a death-deserving fiend, and the Haytian people covered with vile abuse and ridicule, what was the actual condition of things in Hayti, in that republic of “savages and cutthroats,” only three or four days after the outbreak of May 28? We may find out by reading this decree, published the 2nd of June last, in the *Moniteur Officiel* of Port-au-Prince :

Department of State and the Interior.

PROCLAMATION.

“Whereas, order has been restored in the capital, and the Government, relying upon the loyalty of the army and the co-operation of the majority of the citizens, is master of the situation; and,

“Whereas, it is desirable that the summary executions, authorized by the legitimate defence at the moment of peril, be discontinued;

“The Secretary of State, of the Interior and of the Public Police, with THE APPROVAL OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF HAYTI, decrees as follows:

“ARTICLE I.—It is strictly prohibited to all public authorities and all functionaries to order or to perform

any execution of culprits of the attempt of May 28 last who may be arrested.


“ARTICLE II.—Any functionary or authority infringing upon this order WILL BE DEALT WITH BY LEGAL JUSTICE.

“Given at the Department of State, of the Interior, and of the Public Police, this 2nd day of June, 1891, in the year 88 of the Independence.

“NEMOURS, PIERRE LOUIS, aîné.”

This is how, in the “Black Republic,” the governors of the so-called *inferior* race conduct themselves, a few years subsequent to the massacres of December, 1851, of May, 1871, and numerous other fratricidal *incidents* committed by the governments and the peoples of the race called *superior*.

Let us leave all these reproaches of cruelty, of madness, and of infamy, prompted by passion or interest on the one hand, by ignorance or overweening presumption on the other; let us acknowledge that the President of Hayti, in acting as he did on the 28th of May last, took the part of a chief of State, adopting unhesitatingly the measures demanded by the public security and the superior right of governmental police; let us no longer insist that the black race, after less than a single century of emancipation is inferior to the white race which has been in power so many cycles; and let us try to arrive at a sensible solution of the vexed “Haytian question.”



CONCLUSION.

§ 1.—THE JUST POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS HAYTI.

Commercial relations, it is scarcely necessary to say, afford in the modern law of nations the best barometer, the truest indication, of the relations of policy which should subsist between two countries.

Let us see what are the commercial relations between the United States and Hayti.

According to the *official statement of the condition of the Republic of Hayti, in the year 1891*, just published by the Haytian Government, the amount of Hayti's importations is made up as follows :

From the United States...gourdes*	6,454,600.91
“ France.....	917,994.23
“ Germany.....	1,930,713.40
“ England.....	662,190.53
“ others countries.....	95,580.20

Amongst the importations from the United States figures the sum of 852,177.97 gourdes in American gold.

Her exportations are divided as follows :

For the United States....gourdes	2,289,292.15
“ France.....	“ 8,437,500.00
“ Germany.....	} ...gourdes 3,518,986.91
“ Belgium.....	
“ England.....	
“ other countries.]	

After this statement, the report adds :

“ A notable fact is the growing importance of the commerce between Hayti and the United States. This

* The value of the gourde is \$1.

explains the numerous complaints made by the New York newspapers against the measures in force in Hayti with regard to the sailing vessels which transport the greater part of the provisions brought from the United States.

“The American legation has made friendly overtures to the State Secretary of Foreign Relations to inquire if the government could not ameliorate the position of these sailing vessels by placing them under something like the same regime as the steamers. The principal cause of the complaints uttered is, according to the Hon. Mr. Douglass, the refusal to dispatch any sailing vessel the whole of whose importation duties are not yet paid in accordance with the definitive memoranda, while steamers are in no wise retarded by the non-payment of the duties upon their cargoes.

“From an investigation instituted in the offices of the Ministry of Commerce, it does not appear that any existing law imposes obligation to delay sailing vessels until their importation duties shall have been acquitted.

“This measure has perhaps no other foundation than a decree of April 30, 1869, which decree appeared neither in the *Moniteur Officiel* nor the *Bulletin des Lois* of the Republic, so that the authority from which it emanates is unknown. In any case, the date of April 30, 1869, belongs to a troublous period of the Republic, during which it was impossible to promulgate a decree in constitutional form; hence this decree is purely an act of circumstance.

“In the opinion of the Government, the obligation imposed upon traders to pay their importation duties, whether in definite entirety or upon approximate memoranda, is amply sufficient to protect the fiscal interests. If the National Assembly offers no objection, the Ministry of Finances and of Commerce will henceforth apply simply the law of December 10, 1861, which only requires for the expedition of sailing

vessels the payment of tonnage, and such others duties as affect the body and frame of vessels.” *

The importance of the commercial relations between the United States and Hayti, and the friendly disposition evinced by the Haytian Government towards importation traffic by sailing-vessels, indicate sufficiently, and better than all possible arguments, what ought to be the policy of the United States towards the diminutive Republic of the Antilles. It ought to be, not a policy of provocation nor of menace, but a policy of cordial understanding and mutual good terms. We believe that American public opinion, better informed as to the true situation and the real intentions of Hayti, would be quite of this same mind.

When it is added, furthermore, that the three departments of Hayti which sustained the cause of Hyppolite against Légitime are precisely those in which American influence, in consequence of the events already recalled here, has been preponderant ever since the United States entered upon diplomatic relations with Hayti, it will readily appear how far astray the American press has gone in instituting against President Hyppolite and the Haytian people this campaign of insult and provocation, of abuse and menace, which for more than three months past has wounded and disheartened so many patriotic citizens of Hayti.

Not only the well-known spirit of justice and loyalty of the American people, but also the immediate interests of so many commercial houses of the United States demand an attitude quite different from that latterly adopted towards the Black Republic.

§ 2.—SOLUTION OF THE HAYTIAN QUESTION.—INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALITY OF HAYTI AND THE REPUBLIC OF SAN DOMINGO.

In the session of the French Chamber of Deputies, at the time of the interpellation upon Haytian affairs, the

* General Statement of the Condition of Hayti (year 1851), pp. 25, 26.

4th of July last, M. Ribot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed himself as follows upon the naval demonstration of the United States relative to the cession of the Mole Saint-Nicolas :

“..... It was said at the time that the French Government had designs upon Hayti, that it had been intermeddling in the internal government of that country. It was furthermore said that Admiral de Cuverville had used violent language against the Haytians. All this was nothing but pretext and falsehood. We have never had any such intentions; we have always respected the independence of that little people, and we can only wish that all nations might show the same respect.” (*Cries of “ Very good ! Very good ! ”*)

In these words of the French minister is to be found, as we think, the germ of the solution of the Haytian question.

Too long have the capitals of Hayti and San Domingo harbored the intrigues of the representatives of certain foreign powers ; too long have the bays of Saint-Nicolas and Samana, commanding to the west and to the east of Hayti, the two main passages of the highway of the Antilles, been the object of envy on the part of the world's great maritime and commercial nations ; too long, finally, has the development of the two small sister Republics been retarded and comprised by the intestine revolutions and disturbances ceaselessly stirred up by foreign merchants or by bankers eager to gorge themselves with Haytian gold, and to fish profitably in troubled waters.


The approaching achievement of an inter-oceanic canal through Central America redoubles the activity of these machinations within and round about the Isle of Hayti. It is time to put a stop to an equivocal and uncertain condition of things which disquiets all good citizens of Hayti and San Domingo.

The two little sister republics are feeble, but they are proud of their independence, and desire to preserve it.

Let the two great Republics of Europe and America, let France and the United States comprehend that the time has come to do for Hayti and San Domingo what Europe did long ago for Belgium, Switzerland and Luxembourg. LET THEM TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN THE MOVEMENT WHICH SHALL END IN THE OFFICIAL AND DEFINITIVE CONSECRATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE ABSOLUTE AND ENTIRE NEUTRALITY OF THE ISLAND OF HAYTI.

There is the solution.

Then, freed from all the intrigues which have cost her the better part of her riches and her blood, assured henceforth of the future, Hayti will indeed see the era of revolutions close. Her children, enabled to devote themselves in security to the development of her agriculture, her industries and her commerce, and finding new careers open before them, will renounce the political practices which too often have turned brothers into enemies; and, marching proud, free and independent in the path of progress, Hayti will become morally what already she is physically—the Jewel of Nature, the “Pearl of the Antilles.”



APPENDED PIECES

AND

JUSTIFICATIVE DOCUMENTS.



APPENDED PIECES

AND

JUSTIFICATIVE DOCUMENTS.

PART I.

EVENTS IN HAYTI AT THE FALL OF SALOMON.—THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN LEGITIME AND HYPPOLITE.—REASONS WHY THE NORTH (OR PARTISANS OF HYPPOLITE) SHOULD BE TREATED AS BELLIGERANTS.—THE INTERVIEW BETWEEN MR. BAYARD AND MR. AUGUSTE.—AMERICAN INTERVENTION DEMANDED BY MR. THOMPSON, UNITED STATES MINISTER AT PORT-AU-PRINCE.

These Documents are Extracts from the Blue Book, entitled "Recent Occurrences in Hayti," published by the United States Government, and communicated to the Houses of Congress in 1889.

APPENDED PIECES AND JUSTIFICATIVE DOCUMENTS.

No. 149.

Mr. Haustedt to Mr. Bayard.

(Received December 3, 1888.)

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—In remitting to your excellency the *mémoire* addressed to the United States Government by the Comité Révolutionnaire Central du Nord d'Haïti, I beg to add by the present a brief statement of the actual political position of that country and of the facts as set forth in the said *mémoire*, with the object of obtaining thereby a prompt and clear understanding by you of the facts and consideration of the request presented.

It is a matter of history that President Salomon, after having governed the Republic of Hayti for several years, commenced to abuse his power and to subdue any free election or opinion to his own personal will by force and suppression. An opposition to this resulted in the open revolution at Miragoane in 1883, which, after six months' fierce and brave resistance, was subdued by the overpowering forces of President Salomon.

He, after the revolution being thus ended, caused himself to be re-elected President for a second term of seven years, and continued more than ever his oppressive personal government, disregarding the rights and freedom allowed to the people according to the constitution.

The general feeling of suppression over the whole Republic resulted in the uprising of the Northern departments under the leadership of General Thélémaque on the 5th of August last, with the agreement and help of Port-au-Prince, and the Southern departments conducted by General and ex-President Boisrond-Canal.

President Salomon decided to submit to the claims of the people and retired, leaving the country. Thereupon a provisional government was formed, including as members Generals Canal, Thélémaque and Légitime, and some others, with the object of ordering and conducting general elections throughout the country for choosing the necessary number of electors or constituents, whose duty it should be to elect the President of the Republic and revise the constitution.

The lawful number of electors is eighty-four. While these elections were held in due and peaceful order, General Thélémaque resided in Port-au-Prince in a house not far from the palace. A few of his

follower or troops from the North were stationed near by, but most at a far distance, or outside the town. When it became known that a large majority of electors chosen favored General Thélémaque for the presidency, an attack was made on his house by the troops of General Légitime, aided by the guns of the fort and a Haytian man-of-war in the harbor. This was done without the slightest pretext or warning, and so sudden and surprising was it that General Thélémaque had no time to organise for defense, but was killed in the commencement of the attack by shot of several mitrailleuses, which poured a rain of bullets into his house.

When quiet was restored in Port-au-Prince, General Légitime ordered the twenty-seven or about thirty constituents present at Port-au-Prince, and disposed in his favor, to proclaim themselves the government, and to grant him the executive power. This was without even the color of authority or right.

The Northern and Northwestern departments, as well as Jacmel, at once protested against this usurpation of power, and declared the killing of General Thélémaque as a premeditated murder; also declaring themselves ready to use their utmost force in order to provide for a lawful election of a President, and to resist the usurped rule of General Légitime.

This uprising and protest were of the whole people of the departments, not a faction, and meeting in convention, the electors, who composed the majority of those chosen at Cape Haytien, created a provisional governmental committee, who have named General Florvil Hyppolite their President.

The authority of the provisional government so formed is undisputed and indisputable in the three departments, the North, the Northwest and the Artibonite. Its army is regularly enrolled and officered, and even now marching on Légitime at Port-au-Prince. It governs by far the larger and more populous portion of the Republic, and governs it constitutionally, while the rule of Légitime in the South is only upheld by the bayonets of his mercenaries.

By the accident of their being in the harbor of Port-au-Prince, Légitime was able to secure control of the gunboats, which are all that there is of the Haytian navy, and with these he has assumed to proclaim a pretended blockade against the Northern ports, which is of no force, and would be farcical were it not for the occasional interruption of commerce. The two gunboats sail backward and forward from Port-au-Prince, and when at time they meet a trading vessel they seize it and take it to Port-au-Prince. There is no blockade in the true sense of the word, and your Excellency's Government is doubtless in possession of the facts concerning this and the detriment caused to American commerce by the sporadic seizures which have taken place.

The state of affairs existing in Port-au-Prince alone demonstrates the facts that the provincial committee of the North is the only stable government in the Republic, and that government asks that the United States observe a neutral attitude at this juncture, and permit the exportation from their ports of arms and ammunition, as such is permitted to any other lawful authority.

General Légitime meanwhile uses his power in Port-au-Prince and the Haytian men-of-war, which, being in the harbor, had readily fallen into his hands, in declaring a blockade on all towns or ports hostile to him, thus damaging regular commerce, extensive American interests, and navigation.

Believe me, Mr. Secretary, your most humble servant,

T. HAUSTEDT.

T. F. BAYARD,
Secretary of States.

Memorial addressed to the governments of foreign powers on the state of the Republic of Hayti and of the forces, both moral and material, of which the contesting parties dispose, to serve to establish the rights of the departments of the North, the Northwest, and of the Artibonite, with the arrondissement of Jacmel (forming more than three-fifths of the Republic actually at war with the usurping government of Port au Prince) to the neutrality of foreign powers.

The Republic of Hayti, all of whose misfortunes arise from the internal struggles to which its citizens so often give themselves up, pushed by ambition, or roused to action by tyranny, injustice, or indignation, is on the point of being plunged into one of the most disastrous of civil wars. The patriots are alarmed. Wise men curse the blindness into which certain men of Port-au-Prince have fallen, who forgetting all civic spirit, despising all rules and rights and all the political proprieties, have not shrunk before the responsibility of putting the country to fire and bloodshed to appease their thirst for domination and the material gains which they hope to obtain from an illegal power.

This conduct of the usurpers of Port-au-Prince, which shames the nation, and which would attract the disdain of foreign powers, if the civilized world had not the teachings of history to enlighten its judgments, has created in the whole country a situation so perilous as to require all the energy, the wisdom, and the foresight of all the Haytian people to avert grievous consequences. These people, without scruple, being able to profit by their position in the capital to present themselves before foreign powers as possessors of a power legally established, it becomes the duty of the three departments of the North, the Northwest, and Artibonite, united with the arrondissement of Jacmel in the province of the West, to enlighten foreign governments upon the true state of things, to the end that they shall not be misled.

HISTORICAL.

Before raising the questions of international public rights which are of nature to justify the action of the three departments and of the arrondissement of Jaemel to the governments of foreign States, it is proper to make a rapid sketch of the events which have brought about the actual state of affairs in the Republic of Hayti.

The country groaned for nine years beneath the most odious, debasing tyranny. General Salomon having seized the power in a moment when discord, party strife had turned the heads of even the wisest, had established a despotic government of which civilized people cannot form an idea. There was no guarantee for individual liberty. The press was silenced. The inviolability of deputies and senators was a vain word. The law disappeared before the will of a tyrant all the more capricious and versatile, in that he applied literally all there is most horrible in the maxims of Machiavelli. An unprecedented spy system was practiced in the whole Republic with abominable cynicism. No one could express the most innocent criticism upon the administration of the political aspect of the Government without being exposed to annoying scrutiny, while the public revenues, squandered with unheard-of prodigality, left the treasury at the mercy of the poorly-paid functionaries. It was desolation and ruin. The chambers, composed in the greater part of the creatures of the tyrant, accepted all, agreed to all, instead of calling the ministers to account. The legislators lavished on them an eternal incense of praise, after having decorated General Salomon with the title of "Father of the Country." An insurrection, which cost as much gold as blood to the country, was conquered in 1883. Tired of struggle and of deception, the people submitted and a new septenary was accorded to the despot in 1886. However, General Salomon hardly entered on his new Presidential term, when the whole country recommenced that moral opposition which does not betray its presence by material sign, but can be scented by despots in the very air.

The city of Port-au-Prince, where the chief of the State resides, was, rightly or wrongly, considered the centre of this hidden conspiracy. To punish this the hired assassins of Salomon, outside constituted authority, imagined nothing better than to fire the most populous quarters of the capital. The situation was mournfully sinister. The Government threatened with terrible punishments the incendiaries who should be caught in the act, but did nothing to carry out their threats. The tradesmen and citizens of Port au Prince were in despair.

At this time, one of the best known citizens of this city (Cape Haytien), General Boisrond Canal, ex-President of the Republic, sounded the disposition of General Seïde Thélémaque, imploring the aid of the Department of the North to deliver the country from the yoke of Salomon. Brave and chivalrous General Seïde Thélémaque, then governor of the city of the Cape, did not hesitate between military discipline and his duty as a citizen. On the 5th of August last, the flag of the revolution was raised in Cape Haytien, and five days after, General Boisrond Canal, keeping the promise he had made to General Seïde Thélémaque, made a movement

which obliged General Salomon, in the absence of his minister of war, who had marched against the North with his whole military force, to quit the national palace, to abandon a power which he had too long abused.

The government of General Salomon fallen, the population of Port-au-Prince, in a spirit of regrettable egotism and exclusion, pretended to owe nothing to the revolution of the 5th of August. General Légitime, who, obeying in a servile manner the despotic will of the ex-President, had accepted unqualified ostracism, was recalled from Kingston.

Up to this time nothing positively reprehensible had occurred, for Port-au-Prince had surely the right to present and to support a candidate for Presidency. However, the rest of the country does not think that the opinion of the capital should make the law, and the candidacy of General Seïde Thélémaque was popularly supported by the larger part of the Republic, in acknowledgment of the services which he had rendered to the country in overthrowing the yoke of tyranny.

A constituent assembly, composed of eighty-four members, was then elected, according to the decree of August 25, 1888, with power to frame a new constitution, and to name a President of the Republic. At the end of the elections, it was clear that General Seïde Thélémaque would be chosen President, because the majority of the constituent assembly was in his favor. This result enraged the partisans of General Légitime, but how could they rid themselves of him?

During the night of the 28th or 29th of last September, General Seïde Thélémaque, who was unsuspectingly returning from a journey to his house guarded by a few regiments of the volunteers of Cape Haytien, was suddenly assaulted by a storm of projectiles sent from the national palace, from the national fort, and from the Haytian war vessels anchored in the bay of Port-au-Prince. Surprised by this sudden attack, he had hardly time to visit a guard placed near his house, and in striving to animate the spirit of his frightened soldiers, he was struck by the bullets which poured from three mitrailleuses scarce a hundred yards from him in the national palace, and died four hours later in horrible agonies.

All had been arranged so that the divisions of Artibonite and the North, which were stationed in the capital waiting the orders of General Thélémaque, could not come to his aid, the chiefs having been bought over by the usurper of Port-au-Prince.

It is thus that one of the most dreadful political murders ever mentioned in history was committed upon the honorable and deeply regretted General Seïde Thélémaque, who, brave among the bravest, has fallen a victim to his confidence in General Légitime and his followers. It were well to throw a veil over the horrors of such an act, but human conscience and justice protest against silence, demanding universal execration against the criminals who, in this nineteenth century, have planned and executed such a deed.

When this terrible news had reached all the different parts of the Republic, a feeling of rage and indignation took possession of all ranks, and ran like wild-fire through the masses. It was not only effervescent passion but a sense of justice outraged by the most shameful deed. It was in-

jured moral justice with redressed itself with the severity of revenged power. Protestations were made on all sides. The three Departments of the North, the Northwest, and Artibonite would not recognize as an authority a Government which had accepted the assassination of one of its members as an accomplished fact, while sheltering the authors and accomplices with an amnesty both hateful and immoral. The Government, injured by the withdrawal of many of its members, feeling the false position in which it was placed by the simultaneous and united uprising of three departments out of five which compose the Republic, was forced to withdraw and lay aside its power.

This withdrawal had replaced the different parts of the Haytian territory in a state of revolution and anarchy. A new government could only be formed by universal adhesion of the citizens, or by a majority; it was especially the business of the constitutional assembly. But instead of waiting for the majority, which hesitated to assemble in Port-au-Prince after the odious act of September 28, thirty-three constituents in the capital, instead of the eighty-four elected, usurped the title of constituent assembly, claiming the right to give the executive power to General *Légitime*, without even troubling themselves as to the nature or limits of this power. Such a delegation of power is wholly without constitutional authority. The minority of the constituents present in Port-au-Prince had no right to act in the name of the Republic in the absence of the majority, whose right they have so audaciously ignored. The act which the thirty-three constituents have drawn up on the 16th instant, under the name of decree, can be considered only as usurpation of constitutional power. Thus the three Departments of the North, Northwest, and Artibonite, jointly with the *arrondissement* of *Jacmel*, in the province of the West, protest, swearing to defend, even by arms, their rights so unjustly trampled under foot by the usurpers of Port au Prince.

I.—*The right of resistance to usurpation.*

A constituted nation is the reunion of all citizens with the tacit engagement to live together, to defend themselves, and to share the same destiny while maintaining the existence of the country at any cost or sacrifice. Outside of the historic right which accords to a dynasty the exclusive privilege of governing the nation, the chief of the State must be, above all, elected by the people whose will is legally expressed by the vote of the majority. The principle of his power arises from the confidence of his co-citizens, who make of him the first among his equals, elevating him to a dignity all the more eminent since he represents the country before foreign states.

“All government,” says *Laboulaye*, “is only a political establishment, a tacit contract among people who are equal, an establishment made to bring happiness to the community and not for the benefit of a single man or a few privileged ones.” These are truths whose moral strength is considerable; any departure therefrom would overthrow eternal justice and social equality which form the fundamental basis of all government. So that any citizen or any minority who should, through open force or by stratagem, take possession of the supreme power without the consent,

legally expressed, of the majority, commits usurpation. The state of oppression, which succeeds to the brutal act of usurpation, is necessarily precarious, for violence or bad faith can establish nothing respectable.

The usurper, while violating the right of the nation whose sovereignty he confiscates, places himself voluntarily and manifestly in a state of war with all the citizens whose assistance has not been given to facilitate his criminal enterprise. The aggressive comes from him, and the people who resist usurpation does nothing else than place itself in a state of legitimate defense. This resistance is all the more authorized that the usurper by the inherent vice of his power is compelled to employ force that he may be obeyed and must necessarily place in peril the liberty, honor and the life of all those who have not accepted his pretensions.

In vain were it to seek pretext to justify the deed of usurpation. Cruel as are the difficulties of the situation, it is not permitted to a minority of the people to arrogate to themselves the right to override the majority of the nation under the pretext that the public safety and the national defense demand such action, as was said by the minority in giving the executive power to General Légitime.

“Without doubt,” says Benjamin Constant, “there are, for political societies, times of danger which human prudence can hardly foresee. But it is not by violence, by suppressing justice, that these dangers are avoided. It is, on the contrary, by adhering more scrupulously than ever to established laws, to tutelary forms and protective guarantees.”

It is thus without any excuse that General Légitime and his accomplices have overridden the rights of their most respectable co-citizens. But far from retracing their steps before the protestations of the three departments, they threaten them and treat them as rebels. “The natural,” says Puffendorf, “orders, without contradiction, that the aggressor should offer satisfaction to the offended person, who, on his part, is forced to accord to the aggressor the pardon which he asks, and to smother all resentment against him when he shows a true repentance of his fault. If then the aggressor, after having refused just satisfaction which has been asked, defends himself against the injured party who attacks him, he heaps offense upon offense.”

It may be that in resisting the usurpation the three departments of Artibonite, Northwest, and North, as well as the important district of Jacmel, see themselves at the same time forced to maintain a civil war with all the horrors which it entails; but between a peace at once disgraceful and destructive of all liberty and public order and a legitimate war, they cannot hesitate.

“*Miseram pacem vel bello bene mutari,*” says Tacitus, and all the writers on the rights of the people, from Vattel to Calvo, have recognized the necessity in which a people at times will find themselves of undertaking civil war in order to avoid evils which an usurping tyranny menaces.

II.—*Of the equality of rights between the protestors of the three departments and the usurpers of Port-au-Prince.*

With a daring which would be simply ridiculous if it were not of a nature to drag such calamities into the heart of the Haytian country, the usurpers

of Port-au-Prince, profiting by their position in the capital, which is the centre of all the public service and the residence of the diplomatic corps, affect to treat as rebels the protesting departments and the arrondissement of Jacmel. To hear them would lead one to believe that the supreme authority belonged to them, while those who protest are in a state of rebellion.

But the slightest knowledge of the rights of the people will suffice to distinguish the case of rebellion from the actual position of the three departments of the North, Northwest, and Artibonite.

“Those are called rebels,” says Vattel, “who take arms unjustly against the leader of the society, either on the pretense of stripping him of supreme authority or because they propose to resist his orders in some particular affair or to impose conditions upon him. But when a party is formed in the state which will no more obey the sovereign, and finds itself sufficiently strong to oppose him, or in a Republic, when a nation divides itself into two opposing factions and both come to arms [such is our case], this is a civil war.”

There is to-day a civil war in Hayti, but there is no distinctive quality between the contesting parties which can make one to be considered as enjoying legal and superior prerogatives over the other.

As has been shown at length in the historical part of this memorial the Government of General Salomon has been overthrown. The provisional government, which is, by its nature represented only a transitory order of things, retired before the manifestation of the national will. The power delegated to General Légitime, having no constitutional basis, is a precarious and illegal power, which has no superior authority to the revolutionary powers.

There is no reason why more attention should be paid to the pretended Government of Port-au-Prince than to its adversaries. But, then, how is it possible to tell the respective force of the contesting parties and the apparent right which each could have to represent the national will?

In a territorial point of view no effort is needed to demonstrate that the force is on the side of the three departments of the North, since the possessions of the usurpers of Port-au-Prince do not extend further than the departments of the South and West, out of which must be taken the important district of Jacmel.

No reliable census having been taken in the country, the number of the population cannot be definitely ascertained, so that no exact count can be made of the number of voices which are supposed to have consented to the usurpation of General Légitime in opposition to the protesting departments; nevertheless a statistical representation fully as important can show to the foreign Governments the incontestable superiority of the protesting party. It is that of commerce, importation, and exportation, which denotes not only the relative importance of the contesting party in an economical point of view, but also their productive activity and the commercial and international relations, which are its necessary consequences.

Let us take at haphazard a synoptical table of imports and exports by the Republic of Hayti during the second quarter of the budget 1886-'87, which is inserted in the *Moniteur* (official journal) of the 19th of November, 1887.

On the sum total of 1,464,515.26 francs, representing the value of imported

goods, the commercial cities of the protesting counties figure for 684,116.47 francs. To judge of the importance of the last figure it must be known that the capital imports alone for the value of 539,640 francs; all the rest of the parts subjected at this moment to the authority of General Légitime is represented only by 320,760 francs—that is to say, for less than half of the imported merchandise of the protesting party.

This large figure for Port-au-Prince explains itself, inasmuch as a large quantity of the merchandise imported into Port-au-Prince is destined to be shipped from thence to the cities of Gonaïves, St. Marc, and Port-de-Paix, via cabotage.

This assertion can be verified by examining the figures.

On the sum total of 3,374,514.55 francs, representing the value of the exported products, the commercial cities which are found in the three protesting departments and the district of Jacmel, that is to say, Cape Haytien, Jacmel, Gonaïves, St. Marc and Port-de-Paix figure for 2,089,990.32 francs, nearly two-thirds of the exportation of all the Republic.

It must be remarked that these exported products are in true proportion to the territorial extent occupied by the protestators. The exports are of distinctive character to express the laborious and productive activity, the true economical force, of the cities and countries from which come the products; besides which, the fact that Port-au-Prince figures for such a large importation, with an exportation relatively small, has a great significance. It is that the capital, all things being equal, consumes more than it produces.

This indication is perhaps the explanation of the real state of the country, where provinces are seen to resist against the spirit of centralization which dominates in such a high degree amongst the agitators of Port-au-Prince.

The Government of foreign powers, represented by learned men of an experience and an impartiality which is equal to the eminent positions which they occupy, will not hesitate to admit that the true superiority as well as the majority belongs to the protesting party. This fact, which is incontestable in a material point of view, since it is abundantly established by the extent of the territory and the commercial importance of the three departments, is also legally and politically proved by the majority of the elected constituents, which are on the side of the protestators, leaving the usurpers of Port-au-Prince with a minority whose audacity will never give them right.

At all events, if the foreign Governments, acting with a well-understood and proper reserve, cannot decide the question of superiority of facts or rights between the usurpers of Port-au-Prince and the protestators of the three departments, they will keep a perfect equality between the contesting parties, neither of which should be considered as more authorized to represent the country in the eyes of foreigners than the other.

III. *On the blockade pretended to be established by the usurpers of Port-au-Prince before the different ports or territories occupied by the protestators of the three departments.*

It is true that, in international law, an acting government has the right to establish a blockade as a coercive measure against its adversaries. While

abstaining from recognizing the usurpers of Port-au-Prince who are led by General Légitime as depositaries of the lawful authority of the Republic of Hayti, the Governments of foreign powers could not prevent them from establishing a blockade if they possessed the material means.

The protestators do not dispute this point, but it is on their side generally admitted that when a marine blockade exists, and in order to have it respected by neutral powers, it must fulfill certain conditions, outside of which it loses its obligatory character.

The first of these conditions is the notification of the blockade to the authority against whom the blockade is made and to neutral Governments whose subjects must not be surprised by the exercise of a constraint especially harmful to their greatest interests.

The usurpers of Port-au-Prince, profiting by the possession of two Haytian war vessels which were in the bay of the capital and which remain in their possession, have simply sent these two cruisers, one time before Gonaïves, another before St. Marc or Cape Haytien, the Mole St.-Nicholas, or Port de Paix. These vessels cruise at a large distance from the coast, turn away all merchant vessels which make sail toward one of these ports, and constrain them to pass elsewhere.

This special notification, which is not made according to the rules, since no official notice was given in advance, cannot be sufficient. This kind of blockade, without diplomatic notification, is termed by publicists and English statesmen, a "blockade of fact," but it is admitted only in cases where it is established "by the commanders of vessels before places so far away from their country that it would be impossible to give a diplomatic notification." (P. Fauchille, in the *Marine Blockade*.) However, the commanders of the Haytian cruisers are not only in close proximity to Port-au-Prince, but communicate daily with that city, which is the seat of the pretended government of the usurpers. Is not such a fact, contrary to all the rules of the rights of the people, of a nature to cause the remonstrances of a foreign Government, whose duty it is to maintain the liberty of the seas?

But this is not all: Another indispensable condition to give to a blockade an obligatory character toward the neutral powers is effective force. This point of international right has been definitively decided by the Congress of Paris in its celebrated declaration of April 16, 1856.

Without entering into the controversies raised by many publicists and statesmen in regard to the fourth paragraph of this declaration, it is indisputably properly interpreted in this sense, that "a legitimate blockade," as Mr. Mason, of the United States, says, "demands the actual presence of a sufficient force at the entrance of the port, and stationed sufficiently near to prevent all communication." (*Diplomatic Archs*, 1861, pp. 410, 441.)

The blockade by cruisers such as the two Haytian war vessels, coming before the different ports of the protesting cities without formal notice seek to establish, cannot, then, be considered an effective blockade. "In fact," says P. Fauchille, "to be effective, access to the enemy who holds the shore should be really interdicted; should be rendered impossible by the blockading forces or by a cruising blockade. Blockading the coast is not forbidden, but the stopping of vessels at long distances from the blockaded port by cruisers."

Is not the existence of such a blockade of a nature to bring more harm to the interests of the neutral powers than to those of the protestators? Even if the right of war admits that a blockade should be established without stopping to consider the harm which is done to a third party, must the liberty of commerce, on which depends the development and the prosperity of nations, suffer such an attack because of this illegal blockade, which can neither weaken the resistance of protestators nor their organized forces? This is absolutely contrary to the principles of the rights of the people.

It is for the foreign governments whose civilizing mission it is to impose everywhere respect for justice, to concur in putting an end to these proceedings, the continuance of which will prove the ruin of the commerce of Hayti. It is the duty of the protestators to struggle to obtain redress.

IV.—*The protestators should be admitted as belligerents in their relations with foreign governments.*

From all that has been said it is easily understood that since the despotic government of General Salomon has been overthrown by the revolution, and the provisionary government has retired; each large territorial and administrative division of the Republic of Hayti has resumed its independent existence, awaiting the time when the constituents which represent actually all the different factions of the Republic, should come together legally, that is to say, with the majority constitutionally necessary to frame a constitution and name the chief of State. This is a result compelled by the events which, having destroyed all rights heretofore created by the common will of the nation, leaves each part of the country to its natural right. The discords which exist between the protestators of the three districts united with the Province of Jacmel and the usurpers of Port-au-Prince, show then a clearly defined political situation. It is a civil war where each party has equally just claim to the rights of belligerents.

“Civil wars, properly so called,” writes Calvo, “give to each party engaged the character and rights of belligerents, not only as regards their enemy, but also as regards a third country which desires to remain neutral.”

“The idea of belligerence,” says Bluntschli, “and as a natural consequence the application of the law of nations as opposed to penal law, can be extended to an integral part of a state actually organized as a military force, which observes the laws of war in conducting hostilities, and in good faith strives to defend the welfare of the State.”

The opinion of these two authors, whose authority is so great, is shared by the most eminent publicists. The principles which they proclaim have been recognized and applied by the principal powers of the civilized world, among other instances, during the war of Sunderbund, in Switzerland, in 1849, and during the civil war of the United States of America, 1861-1865.

The protestants of the three departments of the North are, then, authorized by all the usages of international law to claim from the governments of foreign countries recognition as belligerents, with the privilege of enjoying all the benefits which a perfect neutrality will afford. In making this claim the protestants expect, above all, from the impartiality of foreign governments that they accord no assistance nor advantage to the usurpers

of Port-au-Prince which may be refused to themselves for any reason. The duties of neutrality would be violated if the usurpers of Port-au-Prince could freely furnish themselves with arms, munitions of war, and war vessels, which could only be obtained in foreign ports, while the same privilege should be interdicted to the protestants of the three departments; but nothing authorizes the supposition that foreign governments will incline to protect usurpers of the capital to the prejudice of their adversaries.

“Neutrals,” says Bluntschli, “may show sympathies for one of the belligerents. Neutrality is not synonymous with indifference.”

There is an indisputable law, whose origin is in the moral nature of mankind, which forbids him to be indifferent between right and wrong.

In all armed strife there always exists between the belligerents one party whose cause is more just than that of the other, and neutral parties should naturally sympathize with the cause whose justice they recognize. In this point of view the protestants do not doubt that the opinion of foreign governments will be in their favor.

The cause which they uphold is that of political morality, atrociously violated by the assassination of General Seïde Thélémaque; that of constitutional right, boldly disregarded by a minority of constituents arrogating to themselves the right to assign the executive power to a citizen whose candidature is rejected by the majority of the members who rightfully form the constituent assembly. It is, in fact, the cause of the liberty of the people, whereof the usurpation of the 16th of October last is an insolent denial.

All leads to the hope that foreign governments, far from favoring the usurpers of Port-au-Prince, will hold an even balance between the belligerents, if they do not feel the necessity—the moral stimulant—to make the right triumphant by aiding the cause—legal, just and holy—which is maintained as well with moderation as resolution by the protests of the three departments.

“Foreign nations which are bound by no treaty can, without doubt,” writes Wattel, “rest their judgment for their own conduct on the merits of the cause, and may assist the party who will appear to them to have right on its side, in case it implores or accepts their assistance. They may do this, I say, as it is free to them to espouse the quarrel of a nation at war against another, if they find it just.”

The protestants would be perfectly authorized to claim of foreign governments their intervention on behalf of eternal right and justice; but without precipitate recourse to this step, which might perhaps be criticised as anti-patriotic, they repose confidently in the wisdom and reason of these governments, that they may obtain a hearing of the just claims which are the subject of the present memorial.

CONCLUSION.

In summing up the facts contained in the historical statement and the discussion of the principles of international right which proceed from them, the three departments of the North, Northwest, and Artibonite, jointly with

the arrondissement of Jacmel, of the department of the west, believe to have demonstrated in a clear manner to any impartial body :

1. That the state in which the Republic of Hayti finds itself is the consequence of the usurpation of power by General Légitime, assisted by a minority of thirty-one constituents out of eighty-four elected.

2. That the right to resist this usurpation cannot be contested.

3. That in every point of view, territorial, economical, and political, they have a superior right to represent the national will, having the majority on their side.

4. That they must, in fact, be admitted as belligerents in their relations with neutral powers, who are called on to render towards them all the duties of an equal neutrality.

Done at Cape Haytien, October 20, 1888, in the eighty-fifth year of Independence.

HYPOLITE,

The President of the Committee

ST. M. DUPUY.

J. LE CORPS FILLE.

ANDERSON DUVIVIER.

F. GUILLEMATTE.

A. GRIMARD.

A. MENARD.

A. FIRMIN.

D. GENTIL.

STEWART.

M. C. DANIEL.

No. 189.

Memorandum of Conversation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1888.

Dr. Auguste Nemours called to see the Secretary of State this morning.

He said that he came as the representative of the party of the North of Hayti, now under the leadership of General Hyppolite. He narrated the course of events in Hayti since the revolutionary movements of last spring and summer, which culminated in the expulsion of President Salomon, and asserted that Hyppolite had larger following in the country than Légitime and justly represented the will of the Haytian people and the objects of the revolution which overthrew Salomon. He did not, however, ask for the recognition of Hyppolite as *de jure* president. His tenure did not profess to be more than provisional, awaiting a fair chance for the real wishes of the Haytian people to be made known by constitutional methods, which, under Légitime's arbitrary and usurpatory control was, he alleged, to be at present impossible. All that Hyppolite desired was impartial treatment.

The Secretary of State said in reply that the titular government of Hayti under President Salomon, having been overthrown by revolution and followed by a division of the revolutionists themselves into two hostile factions, each exercising local control in a part of the Haytian territory, the Government of the United States could not be called upon hastily to conclude or even to give an opinion as to the *de jure* character of the claim of either faction to represent the will of the people or the Government of Hayti. The state of things in Hayti, unfortunately, was not novel, and experience had shown that the only thing to do was to await the progress of events, and defer any formal recognition until it could be given to an established government, evidently representing the will of the Haytian people. That General Légitime had sent through Mr. Preston a letter to the President of the United States, wherein he announced his election as "chief of the executive power," but that this letter had not been laid before the President because it was deemed premature to do so.

The Secretary hoped this state of things would soon end and asked whether no attempt had been or could be made amicably to compose the strife.

Dr. Auguste said that Hyppolite's party had offered to abide by the result of a free election of electoral delegates (constituents), the delegates to meet in any city of Hayti except Port-au-Prince, and choose a President according to prescribed constitutional methods. General Légitime had refused this and precipitated the state of war now existing in Hayti.

The Secretary said :

Then your party really desires the free choice of a President by all the people, and not the triumph of Hyppolite as against Légitime, or of the North against the South.

Dr. Auguste said that they did.

In the course of the conversation, Dr. Auguste intimated that his party, if successful, could offer to negotiate special advantages for the commerce of the United States with Hayti. The Secretary said that was a question to await the event, and that, for his part, he believed that the people of Hayti, irrespective of party and any regular government representing the popular will, could not but be alive to the importance of fostering full and intimate commerce with the United States.

Dr. August then withdrew.

Mr. Auguste to Mr. Bayard.

NEW YORK, December 21, 1888.

I have the honor to give you in this letter the explanations you were pleased to ask of me this morning touching Haytian affairs.

Two parties are at this time confronting each other and in conflict. One, having at its head General Légitime, claims the supreme power, which it has seized, and alleges that a regular Government has been formed at Port-au-Prince, on the 16th of October, by several deputies, who have given to General Légitime the title of Chief of the Executive Power. The other, which I have the honor to represent alleges that this assemblage of a few deputies in the capital of the Republic does not constitute a sovereign national assembly; that a minority of twenty-seven or thirty-three deputies present when this decision was reached has neither the right nor the authority to act; that the proceeding is contrary to the spirit and the letter of the laws and the several constitutions of Hayti; that it constitutes an invasion of the fundamental principle of the national sovereignty; and we and the constituent delegates of the three departments of the North have protested against this usurpation of power and called upon the citizens of the other parts of the country to join us in restoring to the people their rights which are so audaciously violated.

We ourselves are not striving for power, but to pluck it from the hands of those who so unjustly hold possession of it; we are not striving, as General Légitime and his friends are, to impose a chief of the state upon the Republic of Hayti, but to permit the constituent delegates elected by the people to choose, without fear of being molested in the performance of their mission, the President whom it is their duty to elect.

We have accepted that the election be held in any city of the Republic of Hayti, provided it be not in the city of Port-au-Prince. We accept also that the city chosen be one of those submitted to the power of General Légitime. The party in power at Port-au-Prince refuses to accept these conditions, and prefers to plunge the country into a long and ruinous civil war. Upon General Légitime, therefore, rests the responsibility of present events, the blood which is shed, and all the evils which threaten us.

Thirty-nine delegates have met at Gonaïves, a city of the North, out of the eighty-one which had been elected to form the constituent assembly. Four of their colleagues were on their way to join them when they were seized on board of the American steamer *Haytian*

Republic. These four delegates would have given us a majority of seven votes, which would have annulled all the decisions reached by the pretended assembly of Port-au-Prince; it was necessary, therefore, to seize them, and this, Mr. Secretary of State, is the sole and true motive of capture of the *Haytian Republic* and the reason why men without authority and as devoid of right as of patriotism have not shrunk from bringing upon their country international complications of which no one can foresee the gravity.

General Légitime having caused himself to be named Chief of the Executive Power, we can not be called "revolutionists," so that we declare, in our soul and conscience, before God and men, that it is he who is in insurrection against the law and against the clearly expressed will of the people. We have, therefore, formed a provisional government, of which General Hyppolite is the President. What is it that makes a government and gives it the right to proclaim itself as such except the maintenance of order at the same time that the amplest guaranties are given to individual liberty? Your consuls have doubtless informed you, Mr. Secretary of State, upon this point, and told you that never, at any time, has better order prevailed in the Republic of Hayti, or more respect been professed for the liberty of every man.

The present political situation differs from all that have preceded it in that it is the whole people who protest the monstrous illegality committed at Port-au-Prince. It is not a faction or a party that is in revolt against another faction or another party—men of all conditions and all professions, and of every station, submit to the most onerous and painful sacrifices in order to prevent a faction which has fraudulently gained possession of power from reaping an inheritance which belongs not to them, and for the purpose of constraining every one to bow before the will of the people. We regret to state that General Légitime finds his staunchest supporter in the Count de Sesmaisons, the French minister.

The limits of discretion within which I must keep constrain me to believe that he has exceeded the instructions of his Government, for, in the course of an interpellation which took place yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies touching the affairs of Hayti, the minister of foreign affairs of France declared that he had not recognized the government of General Légitime, and that he proposed to observe a strict neutrality between the two parties to the contest, and show favor to neither of them.

You were pleased to make me a similar declaration after my interview with the honorable Assistant Secretary, and I must thank you for it as a proof of the equity wherewith you are resolved to regard our dissensions.

If General Légitime has asked of the Government of the United

States his recognition as chief of the executive power of the Republic of Hayti, which recognition your Department has refused to accord to him, I only come to ask of you, in the name of my Government, our recognition as belligerents; that is to say, that you do not treat General Légitime more favorably than you treat President Hyppolite—that you do not forbid the latter to do that which you permit the former to undertake—and that you do not authorize against us any measure that might become an advantage for our adversaries. You have had the goodness to answer me, with a benevolence to which you will permit me to render homage, that such is the decision which you have reached and which has received the sanction of his Excellency the President of the Republic, and that I could carry with me from Washington the assurance that the most absolute impartiality between the two parties will continue to be the rule of conduct of your Department.

These declarations, Mr. Secretary of State, are of a nature to satisfy my Government, which will be gratified to learn that you have not given the sanction of your recognition to the *coup d'Etat* of Port-au-Prince.

After having laid before you our political situation and defined the responsibility of the present crisis, permit me, Mr. Secretary of State, to dwell upon a point which I think worthy of your attention. I would speak of the commercial relations of Hayti with the United States.

It is said, and repeated with too much earnestness not to have in this regard some foundation of truth, that General Légitime has promised to the Count de Sesmaisons the Mole St. Nicholas, which has been so much coveted.

We, to whom the Mole St. Nicholas belongs, could not either promise it or sell it, but we can propose to a friendly Government stipulations of another character, which would give to it more decided advantages. A treaty of commerce and friendship already unites us to the American Republic. We would be happy to draw the ties closer and render more intimate the relations of the two countries. We buy from the United States a large number of manufactures for which the commerce of England is a formidable competitor. To secure to the American commerce the markets of Hayti and deprive the English of it a diminution of the customs duties upon these goods will suffice, and immediately the importation of American manufactured products will increase to considerable proportions.

My Government, in return for the advantages which would be given to it, would be prepared to treat with you on this basis. It is convinced that good will result therefrom for the two countries, and that the sympathy which the Government of the United States has ever shown towards us, and of which you have been pleased to give me

the assurance in the name of his Excellency, President Cleveland, can not but increase at the same time that the relations of every nature between the two countries are developed.

I have the honor to send you the letter of the provisional president of the Republic, accrediting me to you in the capacity of envoy extraordinary.

Being about to depart for Europe, and the interests at issue requiring the presence of a special agent to represent my Government, I have the honor to inform you that I have appointed as general agent of my Government Mr. Haustedt, to whom I have given powers to this effect.

Be pleased to accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurance of my profound respect.

Dr. NEMOURS AUGUSTE.

The SECRETARY OF STATE.

No. 69.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Bayard.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAYTI, October 29, 1888.

(Received Nov. 7.)

SIR,—Late Sunday afternoon, the 21st instant, I received a note from Mr. J. D. Metzger, agent of the Diamond Mail Line of steamers, informing me that the steamer *Haytian Republic* had been seized by the Haytian war vessel *Dessalines*, and brought into this harbor, and that my presence at the port office was absolutely necessary. I immediately went down to the city and observed at the port office a great quantity of men and considerable confusion. In the Office I found Mr. Smith, first officer of the *Haytian Republic*, whom they seemed to regard as a prisoner. After questioning him I thought it advisable to go on board, but was informed by the captain of the port that no one could visit the ship without a permit from the acting minister of foreign affairs. It was then growing dark; and noticing the excitement of the common people around there, I determined to call upon General Légitime and request him to allow the first officer to return on board as a measure for his personal safety. I found General Légitime with his counselors, made my request, which was granted, and then I refused to have anything whatever to say about the affair that evening. The next morning, Monday, I received a dispatch from Mr. Piquant, acting minister of foreign affairs, copy inclosed herein. In reply to such I sent the enclosed reply.

General Anselme Prophète, in charge of the portfolio of war and navy, called upon me the same morning and appeared to be anxious to arrange the matter; "any friendly arrangement," said he. I could give him no satisfaction, not yet having visited the ship. About noon went on board, examined the ship's papers, and the following is Captain Compton's narrative of the affair, as taken directly from his statement :

"Left Jacmel October 19 and arrived at St. Marc, on the 20th, at 5.30 p. m. ; when entering the harbor we sighted a steamer to the northwest, 7 miles distance, but were unable to make her out ; took pilot on board and came to anchor ; pilot informed us that the steamer outside was a Haytian gunboat trying to blockade the harbor.

"Saw the American consul, and he informed me that he had received letters from the American minister at Port-au-Prince, in which there was no mention of any blockade at St. Marc.

"Left St. Marc at daylight, October 21, with the American flag flying, and when out clear of the buoy we were stopped by the gunboat, and the commander ordered me on board. I refused to leave my ship and sent my first officer on board with my passenger list and declaration of the steamer's destination.

"The commander kept my first officer a prisoner on board and sent a boat-load of armed men to take charge. I let two men on board but refused to allow the others to board. The commander ordered me to proceed to Port-au-Prince, which we did under protest.

"We arrived at Port-au-Prince at 2.30 p. m. and came to anchor in the outer harbor ; at 6.30 the commander of the port sent a verbal message to us to take my ship to the inside harbor, which I refused to do, not having seen the American minister.

"The commander of the gunboat came on board and wished me to go on shore, but I refused to go, unless by force, until I had seen the American minister ; he then took my first officer on shore and returned at 9 p. m. with my first officer and a detachment of soldiers, who have taken charge of my ship.

"I now protest and deny the right of the Haytian gunboat to detain my ship from proceeding on her voyage, as I knew nothing of any blockade at Haytian ports, and I consider it an insult to the American flag, and will so represent it to the United States through the American minister."

The notification of the blockade was made the 16th instant, and from that time I had no means of communication with our agent in the North.

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There being ten passengers on board and four of them constituents going to join the others in the North, the authorities here wished to have them brought to the shore, but I protested against such action,

declaring that their persons were guaranteed by the flag covering the vessel, even more so as passengers, than the crew of such vessel. Had they been brought to shore at that time, undoubtedly their lives would have been forfeited.

General Prophète, returning in the afternoon, had an entirely different attitude than in the morning, and nothing could be done. The following day the three counsellors present at the capital called upon me with an idea of arranging the matter. I was conciliant and asked but three things.

1. That the passengers be permitted to continue their voyage to a port not under blockade.

2. That the United States flag receive a salute of twenty-one guns for the insults received.

3. That an indemnity, the amount to be settled between the authorities and myself, be granted the ship at a certain rate each day of detention.

The gentlemen appeared to have a certain belief in their culpability, and anxiety to avert any trouble between the United States and Hayti; but later they sent to me the chargé of finance and commerce, who wished to argue about the first and second stipulations made by me; wished the four constituents landed to remain under my protection, etc.; could not comprehend the insult to our flag; feared it would look like humiliating themselves to salute.

I made no argument with him, but remained firm in my convictions.

.....
To show exactly the situation of to-day it must be explained that Hayti is divided into five departments, the North, the Northwest, the Artibonite, the West, and the South. Now, the three first-named departments are entirely against Légitime, and demand that he retire as candidate and protest against his election as "Chef du Pouvoir Exécutif" by the minority of the constituents of the country. Of the West, Port-au-Prince appears to be Légitime's stronghold, yet they are at this moment conspiring against him, which is taking rapid progress; at Jacmel, also in the West, they have declared against him and have taken up arms to that effect, the two constituents of Jacmel, the one of Baint being on board of the *Haytian Republic*. In the South the principal city, Aux Cayes, is said to be simply waiting for the word. Hence it can be easily seen that almost the entire country is against Légitime, and even had he the departments of the West and South solid in his favor, the majority of the departments would be against him.

.....
This country is now in a state of anarchy. They had lately a defective provisional government, which was in charge of affairs when

the few constituents elected General L^égitime as “ Chef du Pouvoir Ex^écutf.” There were of the eighty-four constituents eighty-four elected to represent to all parts of Hayti, to form a new constitution and elect a President. Now, the North, Northwest, and Artibonite alone have forty-three constituents, and by the blank votes cast, it appears now that there were but twenty-seven of the thirty-three present that voted for L^égitime. Hence a small minority is attempting to represent the whole people.

Since the seizure of the steamer *Haytian Republic*, in a printed sheet published by a unknown committee it has greatly commented upon us Americans and tried to show us up in a very bad light. Hence our citizens have become alarmed, and owing to the condition of affairs, are anxious to see at least one of our war vessels. I am afraid for the lives of those Haytians under our protection in the steamer, to say nothing of our own lives; and, as above remarked, the desperate position in which those in this city are placed is such that any extravagance, if they find themselves cornered, may be feared.

I send to-day, by way of Kingston, Jamaica, the following cablegram in care of the United States consul, advising him to send such dispatch in cipher, if possible :

STATE DEPARTMENT,
Washington D. C. :

American steamer and schooner seized by Haytian war vessels; flag insulted; life and property in danger. War vessel necessary immediately.

THOMPSON.

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I received word from Captain Compton on the 25th instant that he was ordered to bring his ship, which was in the outer harbor, into the inner harbor within an hour, or the authorities themselves would bring her in. On account of the outer harbor being the more healthy place, I addressed a note to the charg^é of foreign affairs (inclosure 3), but not even has its reception been acknowledged, and the same evening they sent aboard and took out certain portions of the ship's machinery, which is deposited at the port office. Saturday the ship was hauled into the inner harbor.

The blockade established is not effective. Consequently in law it is null, because there were three cities blockaded—Cap Haytien, Gonaïves and St. Marc and but two vessels to make such blockade, and I take into consideration that on the 19th instant I received a dispatch from the charg^é of foreign affairs stating that, notwithstanding the notification of the blockade given the foreign representatives at this city on the 16th instant, on the 17th instant the steamer

Haytian Republic made a voyage from Gonaïves to St. Marc. In my reply I said succinctly that certainly I could not enter into the question of the blockade being efficient, since he said in his dispatch that the steamer *Haytian Republic* continued her regular trips from Gonaïves to St. Marc.

On Monday, the 22d instant, both of the Haytian war vessels were in this harbor. What vessels, then, were making the blockade? Saturday, the 27th instant, the German steamer, direct from Cape Haytien, arrived at Port-au-Prince. No vessel stopped her on her way. Hence there is no serious blockade.

Sunday, the 28th instant, the Mole St. Nicholas, Port de Paix, and Jacmel, by a decree, were put under blockade.

• • • • •
We have in the harbor the French war vessel *Bisson*.

The Haytian war vessel *Toussaint L'Ouverture* brought in here Sunday evening, the 21st instant, the American schooner *William Jones*. The *William Jones* was bound for Gonaïves, having left Boston October 3. When off Gonaïves she was spoken by the Haytian war vessel *Toussaint L'Ouverture* and told to proceed to Port-au-Prince, as Gonaïves was under blockade. The Captain immediately shaped his course for this port, but later the vessel was taken in tow, soldiers put on board while at sea, and at this writing are in charge of the vessel, which has a perishable cargo.

In the name of all our citizens, I pray you to insist upon the Secretary of the Navy sending us a vessel of war.

I have, etc.,

JOHN E. W. THOMPSON.

Mr. Piquant to Mr. Thompson.

[Translation.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, SECTION NO. —
PORT-AU-PRINCE, October 22, 1888.

MR. MINISTER,—I have the honor to inform you that the steamer *Haytian Republic*, having been captured for having forced the blockade before St. Marc, a tribunal has been formed so that the affair be submitted to its appreciation.

I hasten to give you notice in the meantime that it be permitted me to submit to you the verdict of that tribunal in the circumstance.

Please accept, etc.

The counselor of the interior, charged per interim with the department of state of foreign relation,

O. PIQUANT.

M. Thompson to Mr. Piquant.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES.

PORT-AU-PRINCE (HAYTI), October 22, 1888.

SIR,—I am in receipt of your dispatch of this date informing me that the steamer *Haytian Republic* “having been captured for having forced the blockade before Saint-Marc, a tribunal has been formed so that the affair be submitted to its appreciation.” The object of such an act and the validity thereof I ignore completely, reserving all rights in the premises to the protection of such vessel and all on board.

Saluting you, etc.,

JOHN E. W. THOMPSON.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Piquant.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAYTI, October 25, 1888.

SIR,—I have just received notice from Captain Compton, of the steamer *Haytian Republic*, that he is ordered to bring his ship into the inner harbor. I pray you, sir, to have that order remanded until I can have the honor of waiting upon you, which I will do at any hour you name. In the meantime I am willing to give my parole that such ship will not attempt to leave this harbor until the authorities of Port-au-Prince consent that she shall leave.

Accept, etc.,

JOHN E. W. THOMPSON.



APPENDED PIECES

AND

JUSTIFICATIVE DOCUMENTS.

AFFAIR OF THE MOLE ST.-NICOLAS.

PART II.

CORRESPONDENCE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE AMERICAN COMMISSIONERS AND M. FIRMIN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF HAYTI.

These Documents are translated (with the exception of the pretended copy of the pretended powers of Mr. Elie, taken from American newspapers) from the French as they appeared in the Haytian *Moniteur*, of May 6, 1891, and in *L'Ordre*, of Port-au-Prince, of May 30, 1891.

APPENDED PIECES AND JUSTIFICATIVE DOCUMENTS.

THE SO-CALLED INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO MR. ELIE.

[Copy.]

LIBERTY. EQUALITY. FRATERNITY.

REPUBLIC OF HAYTI. }
Cap Haytien, Dec. 28, 1888. }

In the 85th year of Independence.

Hyppolite, Provisional President of the Republic, to all present and to come, greeting :

Animated by the desire of preserving the bonds of friendship that exist between the people of the Departments of the North, of the Artibonite, and of the Northwest in the Republic of Hayti, and the great people of the United States of America and of obtaining the active protection of the Government of Washington for the three Departments above named in return for the economic, commercial, and maritime advantages that we expect to grant it, we have, after having consulted with our ministers and councillors, resolved to send a special representative at once to the White House for the purpose of there making propositions in which shall be stipulated such measures as may be necessary for the accomplishment of our wishes.

For this purpose we have selected, appointed, and authorized our distinguished and loyal fellow-citizen, Charles Frederick Elie (merchant), as our representative, chosen, appointed, and authorized by these presents to enter into negotiations with such person, or persons, as may be authorized by the United States, to conclude and to sign with him the proposed treaty, promising on the honor of our Republic to ratify and faithfully execute all which shall be signed by our plenipotentiary and to give it our presidential sanction in the terms in which the promises shall be made by him. In proof of which we have signed this full power in all loyalty and free will.

HYPPOLITE.

By the Provisional President,

The Councillor charged with the Department of Foreign Affairs,

A. FIRMIN.

RESUME.

On the one part, propose to the Government to give us its active protection :

1. By stationing in our ports one or more vessels of war so as to hinder a foreign power from disregarding our right by favoring the usurpers in Port-au-Prince and also to prevent any violation of international law to our detriment.

2. By permitting us to buy in the United States such vessels, arms, ammunitions of war as we may need for our defence.

3. By giving instructions to the commanders of the war vessels to declare, should the necessity arise, their intention not to permit the rights of nations to be disregarded to our disfavor.

On the other part :

1. Freedom of shipping from tonnage dues.

2. A deduction of 20 per cent. from the import duties on textile fabrics.

3. The right of a naval station to be granted to the Navy with freedom of entry and exit, the privilege of establishing coaling stations and depots without any expense or formality, conforming, however, to the local police laws.

In the course of the negotiations should the American Government demand any privileges or advantages not mentioned in the present instructions but which you might regard as acceptable, you can consent to them subject to the subsequent ratification of the Provisional Government.

[The above is the apocryphal copy of the powers of Mr. Elie, published in several American newspapers.]

PORT-AU-PRINCE (HAYTI), February 2, 1891.

To the Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Port-au-Prince (Hayti).

SIR,—I have been appointed by the President of the United States as special commissioner to the Government of Hayti to negotiate for the lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, with a view to establishing there a coaling station and dock for the use of the ships of the United States Navy.

It is the desire and object of the President of the United States to acquire such a station in the Antilles.

The special advantages united in the Mole Saint-Nicolas indicate incontestably that it is the manifest destiny of that port to become a naval depot for the use of the war vessels of the United States.

The cordial relations existing between the two countries, the close and ever-strengthening ties of commerce, and similarity of the insti-

tutions and interests of the two republics, would seem to render such a demand as reasonable as natural.

The acceptance of this demand would result in making of the United States a powerful friend and ally, upon whose aid and good offices Hayti might always rely.

The past history and the well-known policy of the United States are sufficient guarantees that there is no design on the part of that nation to endanger the autonomy or the sovereign rights of the Republic of Hayti. This is clearly demonstrated in the instructions which I have received from the President, which declare that: "Aware of the provisions of the Haytian Constitution which interdict the alienation of the least portion of the territory or of the effects of this Republic, and respecting the full right of this people to maintain these provisions, the President desires only to secure a lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, the effects of which lease will be of great advantage to the security and prosperity of the Haytian Republic, while at the same time affording to the United States all the accommodation sought by its navy in this part of the Antilles."

The privilege here asked has been long since accorded by the Government of the Sandwich Islands, without loss of prestige, and to the great advantage of the people of those islands. It was, in fact, accorded to the United States by the Government of Hayti during our late civil war, when a land coaling-station was established and maintained at Cape Hayti. For some years past, the Dominican Republic has evinced a disposition to concede to the United States a land coaling-depot within the limits of its territory.

I have the honor to ask that the Haytian Government express its willingness to concede such a station, the details of the lease to be settled between the special commissioner of the United States on the one part, and some dignitary of State appointed by his Excellency the President of Hayti on the other part.

Very respectfully,

BANCROFT GHERARDI,

Special Commissioner of the United States to Hayti.

STATE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
PORT-AU-PRINCE, February 10, 1891.

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your important letter of the 2nd inst., announcing that you have been appointed by the President of the United States as special commissioner to the Government of Hayti, to enter into negotiations for the lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, with the object of establishing there a land

coaling-station or depot for the use of the vessels of the United States navy.

After having the kindness to set forth the reasons militating in favor of the demand which His Excellency the President of the United States has charged you to present to the Government of Hayti, you conclude with the request that the latter Government express its willingness to accord the station desired, the details of the lease to be settled between the special commissioner of the United States on the one part, and commissioners appointed by His Excellency the President of Hayti on the other part.

I have hastened to submit your letter to the Council of Secretaries of State, presided over by his Excellency the President of Hayti. After hearing the reading of it the Council of Secretaries of State (without having decided either favorably or unfavorably upon your demand) have recommended that I ask, with all courtesy, and subject to due deliberation, that you will have the extreme kindness to communicate to them :

1st. The details or conditions of the desired lease ;

2nd. A copy of the full powers conferred upon you by his Excellency the President of the United States, and of which the original shall be presented at the time of the signing (if such signing take place) of the terms of the lease which constitutes the subject of your demand.

I had foreseen the first of these recommendations, and had the honor to ask of you, in our interview of Monday, February 2, certain explanations which I felt called upon to lay before the Council of Secretaries of State, without being quite sure of their exactitude. His Excellency the President of Hayti and my colleagues, in council assembled, judiciously reminded me that, since it is a question of the Government of Hayti expressing its willingness to accord the above-mentioned station, it is important to know first the conditions to be stipulated, in order that decision may be rendered according to these conditions officially proposed.

As regard the second recommendation, it is an essential formality ; for the Government of Hayti being asked to bind itself by the expression of its will directly transmitted, it is indispensable that the special Commissioner of the United States communicate his full powers, which are of a nature equally binding upon the American Government.

In thus deferring to the wish of the Council of Secretaries of State, I venture to hope that you will recognize its justice ; and I seize the occasion to renew, sir, the assurances of my very high consideration.

A. FIRMIN,

State Secretary of Foreign Relations.

Rear-Admiral GHERARDI,

Special Commissioner of the United States to Hayti,
Port-au-Prince.

U. S. Flagship *Philadelphia*.

PORT-AU-PRINCE, Hayti, February 12, 1891.

To the Hon. State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Port-au-Prince, Hayti.

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, in which you ask me :

1. To furnish to his Excellency the President of Hayti and his Council the details and conditions of the desired lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas.

2. To procure for the Council a copy of my credentials, the originals to be presented at the moment of obtaining the desired lease.

Conformably to your second request, I have the honor of inclosing to you herewith a copy of my credentials, and of making known my readiness to present the original instrument before receiving the desired lease.

These articles clearly show that in this matter it does not enter into the views of the United States to obtain anything whatsoever that cannot be accorded consistently with the Constitution and laws of Hayti. If any further assurances are necessary, they can be explicitly set down in the terms of the lease.

A tract of ground sufficient for the establishment of a land coaling-depot can be comprised within one square mile, as indicated upon the subjoined map. Now, as this square mile includes the interior basin of the port of the Mole Saint-Nicolas, it is evident that the amount of land desired is of little importance.

It is well understood that, as in all previous contracts of this nature entered into between the United States and foreign powers, the local police laws are to remain in full force upon the leased territory.

There is nothing novel in the action of the United States in asking this lease, and it establishes no precedent. Provisioning stations have been accorded to the United States at various times, by France, Brazil, Spain, Peru, Mexico, Hawaii, Portugal, Italy, Japan, and other nations.

Nothing is asked of Hayti to-day which has not been already accorded by these powers. Nowhere were these privileges more freely granted than at Port-Mahon, where the Spanish Government consented to extraordinary concessions. Certainly there is no government more jealous of its prerogatives than the Spanish Government ; yet no misunderstanding has ensued between the two nations.

In no case have these stations been a source of inconvenience or trouble to the nation granting the lease.

Where they have been abandoned, it has been because the United States Government wished to change their situation or to discontinue them.

These facts are undoubtedly known to the President and to his Council; but I have cited them in order to explain what the United States desires in the present instance.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,

BANCROFT GHERARDI,
Rear Admiral U. S. Navy,
Special Commissioner of the United States
to Hayti.

PORT-AU-PRINCE, April 21, 1891.

SIR,—Referring to our interview with you this morning, in the course of which we had occasion to notify you of a document signed by the President of the United States, investing us with plenary powers to confer with all persons invested with similar authority by Hayti, in order to establish a convention between the two Governments, we have the honor to enclose an official copy of the said document.

Accept, Sir, etc., etc.

[Signed] FRED. DOUGLASS.
BANCROFT GHERARDI.

HON. A. FIRMIN, *Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

ENCLOSURE.

To all those whom these presents may come, greeting.

I invest by these presents Frederick Douglass, Resident Minister and Consul-General of the United States of America in Hayti, and Bancroft Gherardi, Rear Admiral in the United States Navy, with full power to confer with such persons as may be authorized on the part of Hayti; and to conclude, subject to the opinion and sanction of the Senate of the United States, a convention to insure to the United States the use of the Mole St.-Nicolas as a naval station.

In verification of which I have ordered that the seal of the United States be hereunto affixed.

Given under our hand and seal, in the City of Washington, 9th

March, of the year 1891, and of the Independence of the United States, the one hundred and fifth.

[Signed] BENJAMIN HARRISON, President.
JAMES G. BLAINE, Secretary of State.

The above document is certified as a true copy of the original.

[Signed] FRED. DOUGLASS.
BANCROFT GHERARDI.

PORT-AU-PRINCE, April 22, 1891.

Messrs. Plenipotentiaris :

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 21st inst., in which you enclosed an official copy of a document signed by his Excellency the President of the United States, investing you with full powers to confer with such persons as may be invested with the same powers by the Government of Hayti for the purpose of negotiating a convention between the two Governments. Upon examining the document and referring to the interview which I had the honor to hold with you the same day that I received the dispatch, I infer that the full power has reference to the request made on February 7 last by Admiral Gherardi, as Special Commissioner of the United States, that the Government of Hayti should signify its willingness to lease the Mole St.-Nicolas to the United States for use as a coaling station by vessels of the United States.

In fact, this Department, by its letter of February 10th last, stated to Admiral Gherardi that the Government of Hayti, preliminary to a final settlement, wished to have the conditions of the desired lease, and also a copy of the full power which had been issued by the President of the United States, the original of which should be at hand to be presented when the lease was consummated. In his letter of February 12 the Admiral furnished me with all the desired details by giving me a certified copy of his instructions from the State Department in Washington, and after an interview, it was settled that he should write to his Government for the full power. It is this document which you have received and sent, so that this Government is called upon to reply to you formally.

As I had the honor to inform you in our interview yesterday, as soon as I learned the arrival of another squadron of the American navy, and that full power had been given you, I sent a detailed dispatch to the President of Hayti, and the Council of the Secretaries

of State, then absent in the Department of the South. The President and my colleagues in Council have directed me to reply as follows :

“After having fully considered the conditions upon which the United States Government wishes to obtain the lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas for use as a coaling station there would appear to be no objection whatever to granting the concession were it not that your instructions contain the following clause: ‘For the purpose of preserving and strengthening the relations (between the two countries), the President desires that so long as the United States may be holder of the Mole Saint-Nicolas—in case it is leased—the Haytian Government shall not lease any harbor or other portion of its territory, nor otherwise dispose of it, nor grant any special privilege or right of usage to any other Power, State or Government.’

“The acceptance of such a clause would be, in the opinion of the Haytian Government, an outrage on the national sovereignty of the Republic and a violation of the first article of the Constitution; for the renunciation of the right of disposing of its territory would be tacitly consenting to its alienation.

“Admiral Ghefardi, in his letter of February 12, has mentioned France, Brazil, Spain, Peru, Mexico, Hawaii, Portugal, Italy, Japan, and other countries which have at one time or another granted coaling stations for the use of the United States Navy. The Haytian Government is no less well disposed than these various nations towards the American Union, but it finds itself restricted by its internal public law which cannot be violated without rendering void any contract made under like conditions. These considerations are so important that you will, no doubt, be the first to recognize the impossibility of the Haytian Government consenting to lease the Mole Saint-Nicolas to the United States on the terms desired by the latter. But, in addition to the constitutional difficulty, there must be taken into account political considerations of the highest importance to the Haytian Government.

“The arrival in this port of two American squadrons, composed of the most powerful vessels of the United States Navy, has made a most unfortunate impression on the whole country, which is disturbed and alarmed. Even supposing that the national Constitution offered no obstacle to the granting of the request presented by you in the name of the President of the United States, the Haytian Government could not under existing circumstances enter freely into negotiations for the leasing of the Mole Saint Nicolas without seeming to yield to foreign pressure and to compromise, *ipso facto*, its existence as an independent nation; and all the more so because several American newspapers, for some inexplicable reason, are carrying on an untruthful propaganda, endeavoring to cause it to be believed that engagements have been signed between the Presidents of Hayti and

the United States for the cession of this same harbor of the Mole Saint Nicolas, which his Excellency President Harrison wishes to have as a naval station for the use of the American Navy.

“Profoundly confiding in your sense of loyalty and justice, I venture to hope you will understand thoroughly that the refusal of a lease to the United States of the Mole Saint-Nicolas for a naval station is not an act of mistrust or ill-will on the part of the Government of Hayti. It is the result of a two-fold obstacle before which our lively sympathy for and our sincere attachment to the most glorious and most generous Republic of the New, and, perhaps, of the modern World, has been forced to yield.”

I beg that you will accept, etc.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
[Signed] A. FIRMIN.

HON. FREDERICK DOUGLASS,
United States Minister.

BANCROFT GHERARDI,
Rear-Admiral, United States Navy.

PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAYTI, April 24, 1891.

HON. A. FIRMIN, *State Secretary of Foreign Affairs.*

SIR,—We have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant, in reply to the application of the President of the United States presented by us to the Government of Hayti for the lease of the Mole Saint-Nicolas as a coaling-station for the use of the naval forces of the United States.

We regret that the Government of Hayti finds itself under the necessity of refusing the friendly request of the President; the more so, as we have reason to fear that this refusal may not be received by the Government of the United States as testifying to the amicable sentiments which should exist between the two republics and govern their relations.

While obliged to express our disappointment at the ground taken by the Government of Hayti, permit us to present to you, Monsieur le Ministre, the expression of our highest esteem and consideration.

[Signed] FREDERICK DOUGLASS.
BANCROFT GHERARDI.

WILL BE PUBLISHED SOON

(*IN FRENCH*)

LA QUESTION HAÏTIENNE

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